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SOME RECENT CHANGES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

By ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

SOVIET economic policy in the few years since Stalin's death has been characterized by flamboyance and ferment. In an attempt to free economic growth from the bottleneck of stagnation in agriculture, Khrushchev has sponsored some extravagant gambles in corn-growing and in expansion of the sown acreage. Policy toward the consumer has gone through two complete reversals: the regime at first experimented with offering the population an improvement in the standard of living, but is now once again asserting that abundance in the future requires austerity today. Perhaps the most startling innovation of all emerged in the past year when the regime began to develop a program of foreign economic assistance as a weapon in its economic competition with the capitalist part of the world. Because of their spectacular nature, these shifts of policy have attracted considerable attention in the West and have been commented on at length. Aware that the Soviet Union is expanding her economic power at a more rapid rate than are the capitalist countries, Western students of the Soviet economy have sought in these policy changes some clue as to whether its rate of growth is likely to decline or to be maintained in the future. The early indications of a rise in standards of living that would cause a reduced growth of heavy industry and so a decline in investment and in the rate of growth have now been dispelled. The inability of Soviet agriculture to provide an expanding food supply for a growing work force certainly appears to be a real threat to industrial growth, and with the failure of Khrushchev's gambles, this threat remains. Thus the evidence as to the over-all effect of these changes on the rate of expansion of the Soviet economy is still inconclusive.

Extremely significant reversals have been made in some other areas of Soviet economic policy, however, and these have been more or less neglected by Western commentators. In the long run, these other shifts may well have a more significant and lasting effect on Soviet economic power than the spectacular vagaries which have attracted so much attention up to now. Three important such changes involve some new thoughts concerning the proper degree of centralization of control in the operation of the economy, a new approach to the prob-

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lem of allocating capital resources effectively, and an increased determination to speed up technological progress in Soviet industry. In point of time, these new policies considerably antedate the Twentieth Party Congress, but they received emphatic endorsement in the speeches of the leaders at the Congress and appear to represent the long-run intentions of the present leadership. The purpose of the present article is to discuss these three changes.

I. Centralization of Control

Maintaining the proper balance between centralized direction and local independence in the management of the economy has always been a difficult problem for the Soviet planners. The Soviet planned economy requires a high degree of supervision and control for a number of reasons. In the first place, the economy is administered by bureaucrats who tend to have only a minor dedication to the objectives of the regime *per se*, and the regime secures their compliance and directs their energies into the desired channels only by strictly prescribing the desired forms of activity and then passing out rewards in accordance with their execution of that prescription. Secondly, because fulfillment of the objectives of the state has involved deprivation of the population, strong pressure is exerted on the managers by the latter to contravene the plans of the state. The goals for investment and military spending set by the regime have been so ambitious that the share of national income left over for consumption is greatly reduced, and there are great potential profits awaiting anyone who is in a position to divert resources away from the prescribed ends back toward the satisfaction of consumer wants. Consequently, Soviet industry has always been plagued with theft, pilferage, and diversion of resources through the black market. Because the temptations are so strong, a tight system of control over the activities of people in positions of responsibility is absolutely necessary. Finally, the managerial personnel at the lower levels, who deal with the workers on a face-to-face basis, and who are confronted with the problem of securing their active cooperation, are under great pressure to overpay the workers or to add to their incomes in other ways. So it is impossible for the state to give management at the lower levels very much freedom of action. Such independence would often be used for "anti-state" ends; hence local initiative must be curbed by an elaborate system of centralized direction and control.

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On the other hand, complete centralization of control is not feasible. The functioning of a complex modern economy involves a fantastic number of decisions, and coordination of all the separate decisions and actions is a task altogether too big for any central planning agency. Some room must be left for local initiative, and in fact many decisions are left to the discretion of people at the lower levels of the Soviet administrative hierarchy. Nevertheless, despite the impossibility of complete centralization, there still exists the real danger of too great a degree of centralization. The right answers to many questions can only be determined by someone on the spot, familiar with local conditions in a given enterprise, and if the central planners try to specify too minutely what actions the local manager should take, they make mistakes which he himself would have the sense to avoid. Furthermore, unforeseen contingencies arise, plans are contradictory or unrealistic, and the local people must be left some freedom to remedy these mistakes in planning.

Faced with this dilemma, the Russians have never been able to find a completely satisfactory answer to the problem of deciding where to give local initiative a wide field of action and where to restrain it by direction from above. In the past they have experimented with the problem, letting the line between central control and local initiative shift back and forth. When overcentralization has become too stultifying, they have tried looser control, but when this has led to localism and to violations of state aims, the degree of control from above has been increased. There is patently a great deal more centralization of control in the Soviet economy than in the capitalist economy, and yet there is probably also a great deal more initiative and independence at the lower levels than the usual American conception of Soviet planning admits. It is probably safe to say that, in the opinion of most Western observers of the Soviet economy, there has been too much centralization of control, even taking into account the overriding importance which the state attaches to its own objectives. In its preoccupation with fighting localist tendencies, the regime has gone so far in the direction of centralizing planning and control that it has lost more than it has gained. The resources saved from diversion to the satisfaction of consumer wants have been more than offset by those lost through mistakes in planning and lowered efficiency in production. When the local administrators get too bound up in red tape, they are unable to work effectively even to fulfill the objectives desired by the state. The natural tendency of bureaucratic administrative structures and the inordinate suspicion of the leaders have generated a bias toward over-

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centralization. Indeed, it has been suggested that the economy is able to function at all only because there has developed an elaborate system of informal techniques for evading centralized control.[1]

The new regime has displayed a strong inclination to reject the bias of its predecessors, and to approach the problem from a more rational point of view. It has encouraged officials at the lower levels to express their ideas on how they might be freed from excessive control from above, and has initiated a number of important changes, giving officials increased independence in carrying out their managerial functions.

Quite early, for instance, in dealing with the agricultural problem, Khrushchev accused the Gosplan of overcentralization in its planning of agriculture and introduced a number of measures for decentralization. Then, beginning in 1954, a number of economic enterprises were transferred from the jurisdiction of All-Union ministries to Union-Republic ministries, and Premier Bulganin has more recently asserted that further transfers should be made.[2] According to M. Saburov, chairman of the Gosplan, 11,000 industrial enterprises have already been so shifted.[3] The Union-Republic ministries involve more regional and less central planning, and so these shifts represent a transfer of authority downward in the administrative hierarchy. The degree of comprehensiveness in the national economic plan worked out by Gosplan has been greatly reduced. The plan no longer specifies so many detailed goals for the performance of the economy and leaves the determination of more of these details to the officials in the ministries involved. For instance, in the 1955 plan the number of commodities whose output and allocation were directly specified in the plan was reduced to one-third of the number which had been covered in the 1953 plan.[4] Correspondingly, the number of commodities which were directly allocated among users by physical controls at the center was sharply reduced.

Another important indication of the trend toward decentralization is the reduction which has been effected in the volume of reports which the lower units send in to their supervising organs. Centralized control can be effective only if accompanied by an elaborate system of re-

[1] For a description of some of these techniques, see Joseph S. Berliner, "The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXVI, No. 3 (August 1952), pp. 342-65.

[2] *Izvestiia*, February 11, 1955, and *Pravda*, July 18, 1955.

[3] *Pravda*, February 24, 1956.

[4] "O sisteme pokazatelei narodnokhoziaistvennogo plana" ("On the system of indices in the national economic plan"), *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (*Planned Economy*), No. 5 (1954), p. 60.

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porting. The work of the Soviet enterprise is prescribed beforehand in an extensive set of planned goals, which include in addition to such general indicators as the volume of output, the labor force, profits, and so on, a host of more detailed indicators, including cost calculations for each kind of output, inventory norms, and a budget specifying the disposition of funds. But this plan can be enforced only by requiring the enterprise to report on its fulfillment of each of these indicators. The flood of paperwork involved in this process is hard to imagine. There are thousands of computations to be made, hundreds of forms to be filled out and sent in every ten days, every month, every quarter, and at the end of each year. The multiplicity of these reports is a good indication of the extent to which the manager's hands are tied. Moreover, the accountants and managers have always complained that they spend so much time reporting that they have little left over in which to make any use of all this record-keeping themselves.[5]

In 1955, however, the government began a campaign to reduce the volume of these reports. Many of the indicators were omitted altogether, others were required at less frequent intervals, and the detail in all the reports was reduced. It was claimed that the amount of reporting would be cut in half in 1955,[6] and in his speech introducing the 1956 budget, Minister of Finance Zverev said that there is to be a further reduction in 1956.[7] This is an extremely instructive indication of the real extent to which control from above is being relinquished. Since the superior organs can enforce their directives to the lower echelons only by requiring detailed reporting, halving the volume of reporting means an important reduction in the ability to control from above. The number of aspects of his behavior for which the manager is held accountable is an important measure of the extent of his independence.

The willingness to free the local administrators from some of the shackles of control from above is also attested by the repeal of a 1941 law prohibiting managers from disposing of unwanted equipment and materials on their own initiative. The Soviet system for allocating materials and equipment has always been inefficient, resulting in the accumulation of unwanted stocks in some places and in failure to provide them in other places where they were desperately needed. So long as the managers could enter into some informal system of bartering their surpluses with one another, the mistakes made in the central plan

[5] For typical examples, see the report of the 1955 conference of bookkeepers in *Bukhgalterskii Uchet* (*Bookkeeping Account*), Nos. 7 and 8 (1955), and the speeches at the 1955 conference on industrial planning in *Pravda*, May 17-18, 1955.

[6] *Bukhgalterskii Uchet*, No. 10 (1954), p. 5.

[7] *Pravda*, December 22, 1955.

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could be corrected and waste avoided. But apparently this informal kind of exchange among plant managers got out of hand. It was used in many cases as a channel for black market activities for personal gain, and in 1941 the authorities responded by prohibiting such trading entirely, and by providing strict penalties for violation of the law. This action may well have been irrational from the point of view of economic efficiency. The leadership was so frightened by the black market activities that it followed a course which involved even greater losses in the form of inventory misallocation, encouragement of hoarding, and crises in supply. The present regime has recently repealed the 1941 law, and the managers are now being encouraged to dispose of unwanted stocks.[8] This action is an indication of the flexibility with which the leadership is now approaching the problems of industrial administration. Uncommitted to a mechanical defense of past decisions, they were able to take a fresh look at the law, to appreciate the arguments against it, and to discard it as an interference with economic efficiency.

Finally, the manager of an enterprise has been granted an increased degree of initiative in making certain kinds of capital investments. Under a law of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Party of August 24, 1954, the enterprise director is given the right to borrow from the Gosbank to finance any project for technological improvement in the plant with a pay-off period of one year or less (i.e., if the cost savings will recoup the investment within one year or less). There is no limit on the amount that can be borrowed under this procedure, and for amounts up to one million rubles the manager is not required to get the approval of the superior administrative organ. Likewise, with regard to the Gosbank, the decision whether or not to grant the loan is left to the discretion of the lower levels except in the case of very large loans.[9] This is an unprecedented action. The planning of capital investment has always been one of the most highly centralized aspects of the Soviet economy. Under such planning, Soviet industry was mechanized very unevenly. The central planners concentrated on the big investment projects and neglected a multitude of small-scale uses of capital within the enterprise which in the aggregate are as important to raising productivity as are the big projects. The managers, who were in a position to see the importance of small-scale uses of capital, were unable to finance them except by illegal diversion of funds from their planned uses. The new law should

[8] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VII, No. 20 (June 29, 1955), p. 22.
[9] *Den'gi i Kredit* (*Money and Credit*), No. 9 (1955), p. 5.

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greatly facilitate the allocation of capital to these small-scale but very productive uses.

The prospect is that even further changes will be made toward increasing the freedom of local managers to make their own decisions. Certainly the managers would like less interference from above, and the party leadership is apparently willing to experiment in that direction. Premier Bulganin told the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1955 that in elaborating further reforms in planning policy special attention should be given to the problem of "the rights of enterprise directors, or to put it more accurately, the lack of rights of directors."[10] This statement was greeted with shouts of "Correct!" from the audience. How far the regime will go in decentralizing authority is not yet clear, but the actions of the last year or two show indisputably that it is really serious in its declaration of intent to shift the center of gravity of economic decision-making further down in the administrative structure.

II. Capital Allocation

Another indication of the willingness of the regime to approach its problems from a fresh point of view is found in its attitude toward the problem of capital allocation. In the last few years before Stalin's death, rationality in economic planning was threatened by a dispute between the orthodox theoreticians and the practical planners concerning the proper approach to the allocation of capital among alternative investment projects.[11] This dispute seems now to have been settled in favor of practicality.

In conformity with the Marxist labor theory of value, Soviet economic theoreticians have always seen in the rate of interest only a form of exploitation, and do not admit that capital commands a price because of its scarcity. Because of their view that all value is created by labor, the productivity of capital is denied, and a charge for the use of capital is considered impermissible in the socialist economy. But this Marxist prejudice has caused the practical planners a great deal of trouble. Interest in the capitalist economy is not only a form of income, but also a price which measures the scarcity of capital and serves to allocate it to its most productive uses. A change in the economic organization of society cannot eliminate the scarcity of capital, and both

[10] *Pravda*, July 17, 1955.

[11] The best discussion of the issues in this debate is found in Gregory Grossman, "Scarce Capital and Soviet Doctrine," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXVII, No. 3 (August 1953), pp. 311-43.

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the scarcity and the productivity of capital have become perfectly evident to the men engaged in planning investment projects in the Soviet Union. In their work they came up against the fact that cost economies could be achieved in many cases by increasing the proportion of capital to other factors of production, but they realized that there was not enough capital available to permit them to use as much as they would like in every project. Clearly they had to find some rational way of determining how the available capital should be distributed to obtain the greatest over-all effect in the economy as a whole. To meet this problem, the practical planners developed a number of formulas which avoided the explicit use of the rate of interest, but which were really equivalent to an acceptance of the rate of interest in their implications. For a long time these practices attracted no particular attention, but after the war they were vigorously attacked by some theoreticians as a backhanded attempt to introduce the proscribed rate of interest. In the hot debate which followed, the conflict between the very real problem of the planners and the demands of purity in doctrine was made quite clear. The Soviet leaders faced an impasse; one of the central assumptions of Marxist economic theory had been proved wrong by their own experience, and they were faced with a painful choice between ideology and rational expediency. For a long time the issue went undecided. It had been referred to the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for an official resolution as early as 1949, but the economists of the Institute were unable to formulate any conclusion that would be compatible with orthodoxy and would also satisfy the practical needs of the planners. So long as Stalin was alive, no official line emerged to break the deadlock. About a year after his death, however, the Gordian knot was cut, and cut in such a way as to constitute a surrender of orthodoxy to reality. The journal of the Institute of Economics printed an article in 1954, summarizing the debate and purportedly settling the issue once and for all.[12] The article is a masterpiece of evasiveness, and in fact does not lay down any consistent position at all, but the Institute has now officially bowed out of the debate and has publicly rid itself of the dilemma. The article never admits the essential error of the orthodox position but in effect it constitutes a retreat from orthodoxy. Although the methods of the practical planners were earlier declared to be bourgeois deviations, it now tacitly permits their use, without giving them the explicit imprimatur of theo-

[12] "Itogi diskussii ob opredelenii ekonomicheskoi effektivnosti kapital'nykh vlozhenii v promyshlennosti SSSR" ("Summary of discussion on the determination of the economic effectivity of capital investments in Soviet Union industry"), *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (*Questions of Economics*), No. 3 (1954), pp. 99-113.

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retical correctness. In not specifically prohibiting them, it allows them a sort of *sub rosa* existence, and we can assume that they will continue to be used. Interestingly enough, the only clear and forceful statement in the whole article is a condemnation of some real but minor errors which it claims were sometimes made in figuring the productivity of capital, but which are peripheral to the central problem of the dispute.[13] It appears that the theoreticians understand economic issues well enough, and where considerations of doctrinal etiquette do not intrude, their defense of economic rationality is perfectly forthright.

In one sense, the final resolution of this debate may not greatly affect economic efficiency. The actual loss in the productivity of the economy associated with misallocation of capital may not be very large in quantitative terms. The importance of this decision lies rather in its indication of the way of thinking of the new leaders of the Soviet Union. It is hard to believe that the resolution of the matter was not the result of a high-level decision; such a crucial ideological issue could never have been settled without approval from the party leadership. Indeed, in their speeches at the Twentieth Party Congress, several of the leaders attempted to justify the allocation of capital to certain of the projects they were advocating in terms of the pay-off period approach which had earlier been condemned.[14] In settling on this particular horn of the dilemma, the new leaders have shown that they are able to free themselves from the shackles of ideology when its demands come into conflict with rationality.

III. Technological Progress

The eventual outcome of the productivity race between the Communist bloc and the capitalist world may depend less on the relative efficiency of the institutional structures evolved by each for utilizing its available resources than on the relative speed with which each improves its technological basis for transforming these resources into output. Up to the present the Soviet Union has reaped an important advantage in her drive to overtake the capitalist world from the very fact of starting late. In designing her industrial plant, she has been able to copy directly the modern technology of the advanced industrial nations of the West, by-passing the decades of experimentation in-

[13] The criticism concerned the formula for figuring the cost savings in projects producing joint products. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[14] See, for instance, the speech by Khrushchev in *Pravda*, February 15, 1956; the speech by Bulganin in *ibid.*, February 22, 1956; and the speech by Pervukhin in *ibid.*, February 23, 1956.

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volved in the perfecting of this technology. The possibility of borrowing technology in its perfected form has been one of the important factors in the extremely rapid rate of industrial growth which the Soviet Union has experienced since the inception of the Five-Year Plans.

However, the legacy of modern technology which the Soviet Union inherited when she began to industrialize is a wasting asset, an advantage which is liquidated in the very process of being exploited. Once the Soviet Union has brought her technology up to the level of that of the West, borrowing no longer provides her with a differential advantage in economic growth. She can continue to borrow any new technological improvements as they are made, but this kind of borrowing only enables her to keep up with the rate of growth of the West, not to exceed it. To keep gaining she must make independent advances of her own.

Moreover, there are some inherent features of the Soviet economy which make it difficult even to keep technology in the USSR advancing *pari passu* with that of the West. In the first place, a large amount of resources has now been invested in obsolescent techniques and equipment, and there is an understandable reluctance to suffer the apparent loss involved in scrapping the old assets and introducing more modern ones. This reluctance is concretely embodied in the official formula for deciding whether or not to scrap and replace equipment. The accepted procedure seems to be that no assets are to be scrapped and replaced by new ones unless the cost savings of the latter are great enough to cover the unamortized value of the old assets in addition to the opportunity cost of the capital investment. Both economic theory and the actual practice of progressive American businessmen indicate that the unamortized value of old assets is a consideration irrelevant to the question of whether or not to replace them. The Soviet approach will slow down the rate of introduction of technological improvements to less than the optimum rate.

In the second place, the regime has put so much stress on short-run production goals in elaborating its system of managerial incentives that officials at the lower levels are reluctant to experiment with new machinery or processes. The introduction of a technical innovation is almost certain to slow down production temporarily; the existing organization is disrupted, workers must be retrained, there may be mechanical deficiencies in the new machines, and so on. Since the manager's rewards depend in the first instance on his meeting the production goals for the current month, quarter, or year, he is little inclined to gamble on a disruption of production in the present for a

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possible output increase in the future. Likewise, those responsible for making the new machines required for technological advance in other factories are reluctant to abandon the production of models that have been "mastered" and to deal with the problems of getting new models into production. Finally, the inter-branch cooperation which is necessary for implementing new technical possibilities is poorly achieved in the Soviet economy. For instance, improvements in electric-generating equipment require the development of metals with special characteristics, but all too often the pressures on the administrators of the metallurgical industry are such as to encourage them to concentrate on maximizing their output of the traditional products, rather than on attempting to meet the special needs of the electric equipment industry. To judge from the discussions in the daily press and in the economic journals, these pressures offer strong resistance to progress in industrial technology.

Consequently, many students of the Soviet economy have suggested that sooner or later a reduction in the rate of Soviet technological advance will be an important factor in bringing the Soviet rate of industrial growth down closer to that of the capitalist countries. The developments of the last few years have tended to support this hypothesis. Technological progress is directly reflected in increases in the productivity of labor, and the achievements of the Fifth Five-Year Plan period in this respect must have been very discouraging to the Soviet leaders. It was originally planned that labor productivity would rise by 50 per cent between 1950 and 1955, but the actual increase was only a little over 40 per cent. Even worse, the annual percentage increase fell over the five-year period. Thus the 1955 output goals were achieved only by an increase in the industrial labor force, and the possibilities of further expansion of the number of industrial workers are now circumscribed by the urgent need for workers in agriculture. The crucial importance of technological progress is indicated in the Sixth Five-Year Plan recently announced. The output goals planned for 1960 are predicated on a planned 50 per cent increase in labor productivity, and failure to achieve the underlying technological advances would place these goals in jeopardy.[15]

Despite the real obstacles to further technological progress in the Soviet economy, however, there is some room for doubt that the problem of technological progress will seriously reduce the rate of growth of the economy. The frankness with which the Soviet press sometimes reveals failures and obstacles is usually as much an indication of the

[15] *Ibid.*, January 15, 1956.

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determination of the regime to overcome them as it is of their intractability. The Soviet leadership has always been well aware of the implications of technological progress for economic growth. The government spends tremendous amounts for scientific and applied research, and we have recently been made aware of their achievements in training scientific and engineering personnel.[16] Moreover, Bulganin, Khrushchev and Company seem to have gone a great deal further than their predecessors in their efforts to foster technological advance. They have made it a high-priority objective and have shown an unwonted determination to uncover the actual obstacles to technical progress and an unusual degree of flexibility in elaborating programs to overcome them. It was the desire to assist the introduction of innovations, for example, which prompted the increased independence in planning capital investment that has been granted to managers. The radical reorganization of the Gosplan aimed at this same objective, and the decision to repeal the 1941 law prohibiting disposition of materials and equipment was based partly on the realization that the difficulty in getting rid of obsolete equipment was a hindrance to the introduction of new. The new emphasis on improvements in technology has also been dramatized by the formation of a special Committee on New Technology by the Council of Ministers.[17] In characteristic fashion, all the resources of the Soviet propaganda machine have been mobilized to promote the new campaign.

The student of Soviet affairs has learned to be wary of reading too much into official campaigns and administrative rearrangements. When they leave basic difficulties untouched, they often come to naught in terms of results. But the realism and determination with which the leadership is approaching the present problem are amply verified by the repudiation of the former official doctrine that obsolescence does not occur in the Soviet economy. In the past, the problem of scrapping obsolete capital has not been a pressing one for the Soviet planners. The Soviet industrialization process took place in a rising flood of manpower, so that even when capital became obsolete there was no need to discard it. There was always manpower available to operate every scrap of capital, and so long as a machine could add anything to the total output, there was a net gain achieved by keeping it in operation. Despite the economic rationality of keeping obsolete capital in operation when manpower is abundant, however, the fact of obsolescence still exists and should be taken into consideration in accounting,

[16] Nicholas DeWitt, *Soviet Professional Manpower*, Washington, D.C., 1955.
[17] *Pravda*, May 20, 1955.

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price formation, and economic decision-making. During the early 1930's, this was widely recognized. Some Soviet accountants and engineers explained the issues, and advocated the inclusion of an allowance for obsolescence in determining the depreciation allowances. Nevertheless, it was officially decided not to make any allowance for obsolescence in accounting or in price formation. The propagandists then went on to assert that obsolescence did not even exist in the Soviet economy and claimed this as one of the advantages of the planned socialist economic system over the anarchy of capitalism. But now the situation has changed. The Russians are finding it possible to expand their capital stock more rapidly than they can expand the labor force, and so the question is posed of discarding some of the obsolete assets and concentrating the available labor on the newer, more efficient, items of capital. In the past, the ideologues could make a virtue of necessity and claim that the utilization of assets up to the point of their actual physical collapse was an indication of the superiority of the socialist economic system. Now that the contours of necessity are changing, however, they face the problem of redefining virtue. The old doctrine has provided a rationalization for those who are reluctant to innovate, and so the leaders are attempting to rid themselves of this particular doctrinal albatross.[18] Khrushchev told the 1955 conference on industrial planning that "we must not use a machine until it wears out and only then replace or modernize it,"[19] and an article in the authoritative journal of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences has asserted that the notion that obsolescence does not exist in the Soviet economy is a "profoundly mistaken point of view."[20] The change in line is also strikingly illustrated in the new Soviet encyclopedia. The second volume, which went to press in 1950, contains an article on amortization in which it is claimed that "in the conditions of the planned socialist economy, the progress of technology does not give rise to obsolescence," but an article specifically dealing with obsolescence in a later volume, which went to press in 1954, makes no such disclaimer, and clearly implies the existence of obsolescence even in the planned socialist economy.[21] Finally, the possibility of obsolescence was made an important theme in the economic discussions at the Twentieth Party Congress. In conformity with the new line, the eco-

[18] For a most outspoken example, see the editorial in *Kommunist*, No. 10 (1955), pp. 3-12. This editorial even suggests that the depreciation norms should be set high enough to include an allowance for obsolescence.

[19] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 6 (1955), pp. 12-13.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[21] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, 2nd ed., II, p. 291, and XXVIII, p. 277.

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nomic journals are taking up the question of how to determine the proper time to replace a machine.[22]

In this instance, the Russians are repudiating a fallacy of their own invention, rather than a Marxist prejudice. Marx's discussion of obsolescence makes it perfectly clear that it is a phenomenon arising from technological advances alone, and so can occur in any progressive economy. But even so, such a change in line is never undertaken lightly, and this ideological backtracking is a suggestive indication of the importance which the new leadership attaches to the problem of technological progress.

The present article does not pretend to complete coverage of the changes in Soviet economic policy in the last few years. An exhaustive treatment would also have to include some discussion of new policies in industrial location, the reorganization of the Gosplan, and the new attention being given to the problems of intra-plant planning. The three changes described, however, seem to be representative of the whole gamut of policy change in one important respect. They are all changes in the direction of rationality. The old policies that are being replaced have generally been recognized by outside observers as specific examples of inefficiency in the Soviet economy. One has the feeling that the changes represent the sort of reforms which a professional management consultant might well have recommended to the Soviet leaders. Their putative effect will be to increase the operating efficiency of the economy and, in the long run, the economic power of the Soviet regime. Moreover, the three changes which we have singled out for discussion here seem to be good test cases for revealing the manner in which the new group of leaders view their problems. Each of the changes strongly suggests a propensity to choose between alternatives on the basis of rational criteria. None of the changes could have been made without rejecting some traditional Soviet bias, and the ability of the new leadership to make the rejection indicates the importance of the "reality principle" as a determinant of its actions.

[22] A. Konson, "Nekotorye voprosy analiza ekonomicheskoi effektivnosti vnedreniia novoi tekhniki" ("Some questions on the analysis of the economic effectivity of introducing new technique"), *Vestnik Statistiki* (*Statistical Journal*), No. 5 (1955), pp. 3-11. See also *Pravda*, September 16, 1955.

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POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETIES*

By S. N. EISENSTADT

THE purpose of this article is to analyze in a preliminary way some of the basic sociological problems of bureaucratic political systems —legitimation, autonomy, and political struggle. For reasons which will be specified later—not least among them, reasons of space—we shall limit our discussion to pre-modern, historical societies, such as the ancient empires (especially the Egyptian), the Byzantine, Chinese, and Ottoman Empires, and some of the European countries in the age of absolutism. By way of introduction, we shall endeavor to discern some common characteristics in all these political systems, and the main differences among them; and then inquire into some of the sociological conditions that are related to both the common features and the chief differences.

The term "bureaucratic political system" was probably first used systematically by Mosca, who contrasted it with feudal systems.[1] A much fuller discussion of various characteristics of bureaucracy in general and, to a smaller extent, of bureaucratic polities in particular can of course be found in the works of Max Weber, from whom most of the modern sociological discussion of bureaucracies derives.[2] Weber also differentiated bureaucratic systems from feudal systems on the one hand, and from what he called "patrimonial systems" on the other, and he discussed in detail various borderline cases. It was also Weber who first fully elaborated the now famous "ideal type" of bureaucratic structure. Many, if not most, of the discussions of bureaucracy in modern sociological literature have dealt with deviations from this ideal type. In Weber's own work, as well as in that of some of the

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[1] G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, New York, 1939, pp. 70-103. See also F. M. Marx, "The Bureaucratic State," *Review of Politics*, 1 (October 1939), pp. 457-72.

[2] See M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, 1922, pp. 148-53, 650-78. For some of the discussions based on Weber's analysis, see the various papers in R. K. Merton, ed., *Reader in Bureaucracy*, Glencoe, Ill., 1952.

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more historically oriented sociologists and political scientists, it has been demonstrated that in many historical cases the so-called bureaucratic apparatus did not evince some of the most crucial characteristics of the ideal type of bureaucracy: for example, the total financial dependence of the officials on their salaries (rather than on remuneration by direct appropriation from their offices and from their clientele), universalistic criteria of recruitment and advancement in the bureaucratic hierarchy, etc. In recent times there has also been a very lively discussion of another aspect of bureaucracy—namely, the extent to which a bureaucracy is really politically and socially "neutral" and autonomous or, conversely, the extent to which it is but a spokesman for a definite social group or class.[3] While most of those who have dealt with this problem have been chiefly concerned with modern societies, and with the ethics and problems of the civil service within them, this discussion is of great importance for a general understanding of bureaucracy, inasmuch as some degree of autonomy and social distinctness has been postulated by most analysts of the subject.

It seems to me that an analysis of historical cases may be very helpful to an understanding of all these problems. In the societies under consideration, some of the distinct characteristics of bureaucratic polities, as distinguished from other types, may be more easily discerned. Moreover, an analysis of these societies may focus attention not only on the internal characteristics of different bureaucratic organizations and apparatus, but also on the broader characteristics of bureaucratic political systems and their relation to the internal characteristics. It is this type of analysis that has been relatively neglected, although the very use of the term "bureaucratic systems" poses the problem sharply.

Basic Characteristics of Bureaucratic Polities

We may begin our analysis by asking whether there exist any basic characteristics which delineate the "bureaucratic" polity as a special type of social and political system. There seem to be two main interdependent characteristics. First, in all bureaucratic societies there is a relative autonomy and a distinctiveness of the political sphere; the political sphere and its institutions are very strongly goal-oriented, with both goals and goal-orientations distinct from those of other institutions and subgroups of the society. The political goals and aims are not embedded in the structure and organization of other groups and insti-

[3] See R. Bendix, "Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power," in Merton, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 114; S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism*, Berkeley, Calif., 1950, pp. 255-77; H. Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, rev. ed., New York, 1949, esp. chs. 2ff.

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tutions and in *their* goals and values, as is the case in primitive, patrimonial, and most feudal societies. Historically, perhaps the most important point in the development of bureaucratic polities is the emergence of kings as autonomous, independent political actors unfettered by the goals of clans, lineages, or nobles. While this may be a long process of evolution, its distinct characteristics can generally be discerned.[4]

The second major characteristic of bureaucratic polities is the creation of special organizations for the mobilization of the major types of facilities which are needed for the maintenance and furtherance of the goals of the political sphere, and for the performance of basic social functions. This applies to various "material" facilities—especially the financial means for the support of administration, the conduct of wars and diplomacy—as well as to political support in terms of loyalty, policy commitments, etc. Thus the political rulers cannot rely on the facilities available to them through their own resources (for example, the king's domains), or through the unquestioning commitments of other groups, as is the case in less-developed political systems. Even when supports of this kind do exist—as they do in some marginal examples of semi-patrimonial empires—they are not sufficient for the realization of the main goals of the polity. The polity must create special administrative organizations which are able to mobilize these different types of support from different strata and groups in the population. It is within this broad context that the origin of relatively autonomous administrative organizations and officialdoms is understandable.

It may be noted here in passing that from these two major characteristics of bureaucratic polities another important characteristic is derived: within these systems there always exists a political or ruling class that is not entirely identical with any given, ascriptive, social group (nobility, lineage group, etc.). But we shall return to this in greater detail.

While these two characteristics—the distinctiveness of political goals in the society and the need for special organizations for the mobilization of different types of support—are closely connected, they are not identical and can vary independently within certain limits. For in-

[4] On primitive political systems, from this point of view, see M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, London, 1940, Introduction; M. Gluckman, *Rituals of Rebellion in South East Asia*, Manchester, Eng., 1954, *passim*. A very illuminating analysis of the struggles of medieval-feudal monarchy to free itself from feudal bonds and to establish its political autonomy can be found in E. A. Jolliffe, *Angevin Kingship*, London, 1955, *passim*. See also R. Fawtier, *Les Capétiens et la France*, Paris, 1942, esp. chs. 5, 10, and 11; and the general discussion of F. Kern, "Vom Herrenstaat zum Wohlfahrtstaat," *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, LII (1928), pp. 393-415.

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stance, in some of the ancient empires—e.g., in Egypt—the extent to which the political goals and orientations were articulated and distinct was much greater than the scope of the administrative activities, since the monarchy still had to rely extensively on its own resources.[5] It is important to keep this distinction in mind, as it can explain many differences in the structure of bureaucracies in various societies.

From these basic characteristics of the bureaucratic system, its distinctiveness from primitive or feudal systems can be derived. In general, the lines of distinction are as follows: (a) the extent to which the political hierarchy is distinct from the social and economic one; (b) the extent to which there exist specific administrative and political organizations that are not embedded in other specific groups (such as villages, manors, etc.); (c) the extent to which there exists a differentiation among political apparatus; (d) the extent to which the political apparatus are regulated, in terms of personnel, recruitment, and operation, by criteria of their own which differ from those of other groups or social strata; and (e) the extent to which remuneration for political office is based upon some sort of salary and not upon direct appropriation.

These characteristics can be found, in varying degree, in all the bureaucratic systems known to us. They can also account for some of the basic social conditions under which these systems appear to develop and exist. Most of these conditions have been analyzed by Max Weber and, following him, we may point out the more important ones: (a) Relative weakness of the ascriptive and particularistic criteria in the role allocation in the major institutional spheres and a growing development of some universalistic and achievement orientations. (b) Diminishing scope of the family and kinship units as well as of strictly hereditary status groups. (c) Growing specialization and differentiation of groups, sub-systems, and functional organizations. Of special importance in this context is the growth of a market economy, which enables the accumulation of means of payment. (d) Differentiation among main types of elites—political, cultural, professional, etc. (e) Growing differentiation in systems of communication, between central and local communicators, and between different types of communicators (formal and informal, official and unofficial); and development of special media of communication and of professional communicators. (f) Growing complexity of the various interlinking spheres

[5] See J. A. Wilson, *The Burden of Egypt*, Chicago, 1951, esp. chs. 3 and 4; W. F. Edgerton, "The Government and the Governed in the Egyptian Empire," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, VI (July 1947), pp. 152-60.

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and mechanisms of social control, diminishing scope of self-regulation of various groups and sub-systems of the social system, and growing differentiation between formalized and informal systems of control.[6]

Some Major Differences Among Bureaucratic Polities and Organizations

Beyond these general characteristics of bureaucratic political systems and beyond the common general conditions under which they seem to exist, there are many differences among bureaucratic polities both in respect to major structural characteristics and to the character of the administrative apparatus. The main differences can be summarized—at this point, very briefly—under the following headings: (a) The types of activities in which these apparatus are engaged. (b) The general scope of the activities of the bureaucratic apparatus in the society. (c) The extent of specialization in each of these types of activities. (d) The levels and degrees of centralization in policy-making and decision-making. (e) The relation between political heads (kings, etc.) and heads of bureaucratic apparatus in relation to policy-making and decisions. (f) The nature of the control, discipline, and supervision exercised by political authorities toward the bureaucratic apparatus, and the channels of such discipline. (g) The criteria of recruitment of personnel. (h) The social bases of recruitment to the bureaucracy. (i) The social status of the bureaucracy. (j) The financial bases of the bureaucracy—the extent to which the salaries are paid entirely out of the central treasury; or, conversely, the extent to which there is some direct appropriation, by the official, of benefits from his office.

These features relate to certain basic structural characteristics of a bureaucracy. They relate to its goals, its internal division of labor, and its principles of organization—particularly the extent to which it is organized by principles of universalism, specificity, and achievement orientation, like Weber's "ideal type." Some of them relate also to the basic question of the extent to which the bureaucracy is an autonomous social and political body.

It should be one of the main concerns of a comparative analysis to try to discover some of the factors that may be related to such differences. One such factor may, of course, be the extent to which the basic social conditions of bureaucratic structures, as enumerated earlier, really do exist. It may be stated that the extent to which these different conditions obtain is an important element in determining the extent

[6] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Communication Systems and Social Structure," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XIX (Summer 1955), pp. 153-67.

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of development of the specific characteristics of bureaucratic systems, and of the scope of political and administrative bureaucratic activity in a society. Thus it seems that what may be called the quantitative development of bureaucracy[7]—for example, the development of different administrative bureaus and of the scope of their activities—is greatly influenced by the existence of these factors.

No doubt there is some validity in such an approach. But it certainly cannot account for all the differences in which we are interested. In order to be able to account for some of the variations, and even for some aspects of the more purely "quantitative" development of bureaucratic organizations, certain more dynamic elements and characteristics of bureaucratic political systems should be taken into account. Among these, the most important seem to be the basic problems of legitimation and the nature of political struggle within such systems. These problems have been relatively neglected in the systematic analyses of bureaucratic systems. Most of the existing analyses have focused on the internal structure of organizations and have only touched on their wider context. It is my assumption, however, that the analysis of this context is of crucial importance for the understanding of the dynamics of bureaucracies. In the remaining pages, we shall concentrate on two basic aspects of this wider context—the nature of legitimation, and the nature of political struggle within such systems—and on the way they influence one important variable in bureaucratic structure: the degree of autonomy.

Problems of Legitimation in Bureaucratic Polities

The basic problem here is that there are two necessary levels of legitimation in bureaucratic systems, and two parallel sets of activities on behalf of their maintenance and propagation. These two levels reflect the existence within such systems of at least two major political elites or ruling groups—namely, the bureaucracy itself, and the "head of state" and the upper political group connected with him (whether a hereditary king, a dynasty, an oligarchic "collegiate" authority, or modern elected rulers). For obvious reasons, the ultimate headship of the bureaucratic state, as of any political system, cannot be selected in terms of bureaucratic criteria; it has to be chosen and maintained with more direct reference to the ultimate values of a society. This means that within such systems there have to exist at least two types of legitimation—the more legal-rational one of the bureaucracy, and the more

[7] See Weber, *op.cit.*, p. 658; C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Politics*, New York, 1937, pp. 20-41.

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symbolic and cohesive one (whether traditional or secular-social) of the headship of the polity.

Dual legitimation has some special consequences for the social and political orientations of a bureaucracy, as compared with those of a head of state. Because it is difficult to maintain the basic position of the bureaucracy, especially in more traditional societies, through legal-rational legitimation alone, the bureaucracy usually tends to "usurp" some of the ultimate legitimation of the king, or to propagate a similar one of its own. By way of example, the tendency of bureaucracies to establish many of their own titles as social titles or designations is clearly discernible in the Byzantine state, in many periods of Chinese history, and in the attempts toward self-legitimation of the *noblesse de robe* in France and other European countries.[8] In many cases, it may even claim for itself controlling power over the political heads, in the name of some of the basic values of the system. In China, where such self-legitimation was probably carried the furthest, this was done in the name of Confucian ethics and by claiming the "Mandate of Heaven."[9] In Byzantium, somewhat weaker claims were put forward by the legalists and by the church; in absolutist Western Europe, the legalistic claims were quite often very pronounced and effective.

All these tendencies posed difficult problems of control for the kings, who quite often tried in turn to assume all the effective decision-making powers within the framework of bureaucratic organizations. The constant quarrels between the "inner" and "outer" courts which we find in China, Byzantium, and the Ottoman Empire, and the parallel relations between, for instance, the Wardrobe and the Exchequer in medieval England, as well as the kingly attempts to manipulate titles, etc., are recurrent manifestations of this problem.[10]

But the outcome of these struggles cannot be understood merely in

[8] See C. Diehl, "The Government and Administration of the Byzantine Empire," *Cambridge Medieval History*, IV, Cambridge, Eng., 1923, pp. 726-44; L. Bréhier, *Les institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, Paris, 1949, esp. ch. 1; E. A. Kracke, *Civil Service in Early Sung China*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, chs. 3 and 4; F. L. Ford, *Robe and Sword*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, esp. p. ii and ch. 5; M. Beloff, *The Age of Absolutism*, London, 1954, ch. 1.

[9] Kracke, *op.cit.*, chs. 1 and 2; E. Balázs, "Les aspects significatifs de la société chinoise," *Asiatische Studien*, VI (1952), esp. pp. 80ff.; W. Eberhard, *A History of China*, Berkeley, Calif., 1950, esp. chs. 6, 7, and 9.

[10] E. G. Pulleyblank, *The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-Shan*, London, 1955, pp. 40-61; Wang Yü-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XII (June 1949), pp. 134-87; W. L. Wright, ed. and trans., *Ottoman Statecraft*, Princeton, N.J., 1935, esp. pp. 21-60; Bréhier, *op.cit.*, ch. 2; W. C. Richardson, *Tudor Chamber Administration*, Baton Rouge, La., 1952, *passim*; A. Steele, "The Place of the King's Household in English Constitutional History, to 1272," *History*, XV (January 1931), pp. 289-95.

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terms of attempts at legitimation by the different groups. These very attempts have important repercussions on the whole structure of political struggle within bureaucratic societies, and it is only within this larger framework that these particular conflicts as well as certain additional structural characteristics and differences among the bureaucracies can be fully understood.

General Characteristics of Political Struggle in Bureaucratic Polities

What, then, are the basic characteristics of political struggle within these societies? In general, it can be said that political struggle here is much more diversified than in primitive, nomadic, or feudal political systems. In every bureaucratic polity there are many more elements participating in the struggle, and many more issues involved, than in any of the less-developed political systems. The general framework of this struggle is determined by the basic characteristics of the bureaucratic system itself—that is, by the distinctiveness of political goals and by the necessity for the political elite to mobilize and organize the main types of facilities and support. This means that the political elite (in most of the cases under discussion here, the kings, the emperors, and the bureaucracy) is not entirely identified with any hereditary-ascriptive group or with any other center of power. It therefore strives to control some of the main centers of power in the society, and to minimize the possibility that any of these centers or groups will be able to monopolize influence and power within the society and determine the goals of the polity. The instruments of control that interest the political elite are financial, material, and political. In the field of finance and manpower, and in the area of loyalties and political support, the elite is interested in the continued existence of some "free-floating" resources which are not entirely committed to certain fixed groups, as they are in primitive, feudal, and patrimonial societies.

The most important illustration of this tendency is the various efforts of kings to restrict the power of the aristocracy—especially the landed aristocracy—and, to a smaller degree, to control merchants and other urban economic interests. Other examples are found in the efforts of the Byzantine emperors of the seventh to the tenth century to establish a free peasantry at the expense of large landowners,[11] the struggle of

[11] G. Ostrogorsky, "Die ländliche Steuergemeinde des byzantinischen Reiches im X. Jahrhundert," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XX (1927), pp. 1-108; E. Bach, "Les lois agraires byzantines du X^e siècle," *Classica et Mediaevalia*, V (1942), pp. 70-91.

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many of the Chinese emperors to support the literati and gentry as against the hereditary aristocracy,[12] and the Ottoman experiment in establishing a ruling institution based on slavery.[13]

The kings also tend to use bureaucratic administration and policies in order to "level out" some of the centers of power, and to organize them within the framework of bureaucratic policies. Of great importance from this point of view are the taxation policies undertaken by kings through their administrative organs, and the parallel attempts to limit the legal autonomy of tax-gathering units or groups.[14] We can find in these societies many other efforts by the kings and the bureaucracy to regulate different aspects of the economic, social, and cultural life of the society. These attempts usually had the objectives of regulating the various centers of potential power in the society in such a way as to hinder any of them from attaining full monopoly of power and influence, and of assuring the continuous flow of the various "free" resources to the polity.

This tendency, inherent in the structure of a bureaucratic polity, determines one of the basic elements of political struggle within it: the contest between the king and the bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the landed aristocracy as well as the merchants and cultural and religious groups, on the other, concerning the scope of bureaucratic activity in the society and the relative immunity of various groups to such activity. The main objective of the aristocracy is to influence in a negative way the general goals of the bureaucracy: to limit its autonomy and distinctiveness and the resources available to it.

Struggles Within the Bureaucracy

This type of struggle, however, is but one aspect of the political process. Side by side with the struggle over the general scope of bureaucratic and central political activity, there occurs a struggle over the relative influence of different groups on the king and on the bureaucratic administrative organs—on their chief policies, on the principles

[12] Eberhard, *op.cit.*, ch. 6; Pulleyblank, *op.cit.*, pp. 24-40; Balázs, *op.cit.*, pp. 80ff.; S. Balázs, "Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des T'ang Zeit," *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen*, XXXIV (1931), esp. pp. 82ff.

[13] A. H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge, Mass., 1913, pp. 48-61; Wright, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 21-28.

[14] Ostrogorsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 1-108, and "Das Steuersystem in byzantinischen Altertum und Mittelalter," *Byzantion*, VI (1931), pp. 223-40; M. Gale, *Discourses on Salt and Iron*, II, *Sinica Leideniensa*, Leiden, 1931, Introduction; S. Balázs, *op.cit.*, pp. 82ff.; R. C. Blue, "The Argumentation of the Shih-huo Chih," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XI (June 1948), esp. pp. 30ff. For the later periods in particular, see E. Balázs, *Le traité économique du "Souei-Chou,"* Leiden, 1953, pp. 123ff., 151ff.

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of allocation of facilities, rewards, influence, and the like. This conflict is carried on *within* the framework of the administrative and central political organs, to determine who will monopolize the major bureaucratic positions and formulate major policies in the fields of taxation, foreign relations, etc. In some countries, the centers of this struggle are the king's immediate entourage, his "inner court" or harem, cliques of eunuchs and the holders of the highest administrative positions.[15] In many European countries the various representative bodies and councils, and in Byzantium the Senate and sometimes the popular circus-parties, have also been important participants in this struggle.[16]

Significantly, in most of these cases there is a basic acceptance of the bureaucratic framework; instead of limiting it, the major objectives are to utilize and exploit it. Only in relatively exceptional cases, usually in periods of total disorganization of the bureaucratic polity, is there a complete identity between some of the general anti-bureaucratic tendencies in the first type of struggle and the various conflicts within the bureaucratic framework. Close relations, however, may often be found among the different groups engaged in these struggles. In Byzantium, for instance, there may have existed a close relationship, but not a complete identity, between the great landowners and the civil bureaucratic aristocracy (*Beamtenadel* in Ostrogorsky's nomenclature).[17] Usually, in an internal struggle within the framework of the central political administration, many more social groups, such as merchants, military groups, and church elements, would participate—groups which were identified in one way or another with the basic premises of a centralized and bureaucratic polity, and whose main concern was not to limit its general effectiveness but to influence and utilize it. The constitutional struggles in various absolutist countries in Europe, and especially in England, are perhaps the best illustration of this tendency. It is obvious that these struggles took place not merely between the king and different groups within the society, but also among these different groups and strata, over their relative position and influence vis-à-vis the king and the bureaucracy. In most cases, the basic problem was the relative distribution of riches and privileges within the framework of the goals of the polity and its basic

[15] For good illustrations of such struggles, see Pulleyblank, *op.cit.*, esp. ch. 4; J. K. Rideout, "The Rise of the Eunuchs During the T'ang Dynasty," *Asia Major*, N.S., I (1949), pp. 53-72, and III (1953), pp. 42-58; Wright, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 28-33.

[16] See C. Diehl, "Le Sénat et le peuple byzantin aux VII^e^ et VIII^e^ siècles," *Byzantion*, I (1924), pp. 201-13.

[17] G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des Byzantinischen Staates*, Munich, 1950, ch. 5; E. Stein, "Introduction à l'histoire et aux institutions byzantines," *Traditio*, VII (1949-51), esp. pp. 138ff., 143ff.

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administrative institutions. In these societies we do not find many attempts by these groups to usurp the executive power of the king and the bureaucracy. Attempts to substitute the political control of the general polity for that of the king are found only in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and constitute an entirely new type of political struggle, involving new principles of selection of the political elite and determination of political goals. Within most of the historical societies studied, the main struggle centers on the question of influence on the king.

Of special interest and importance within this context are the relations between the central political elite and bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the major religious and cultural elites and institutions, on the other. It is significant that in most of these societies these latter elites are also highly organized, very often on a bureaucratic pattern. The Byzantine Church, the "Muslim Institution" of the Ottoman Empire, the whole body of literati (holders of examination degrees) in China, and the church and the parliaments in France and Western Europe are all outstanding examples. One way or another, these groups are always drawn into the political struggle, for two main reasons. First, they are very important in the legitimation of the political system, and are prone to seek various restrictions of and control over the exercise of executive power. Second, they usually constitute important centers of power, in terms both of property and of potential political influence; consequently, they invite the intervention of the king and of the central administration. The exact relations between the latter and these religious and cultural elites—as well as other socially and politically active groups—differ greatly from one society to another. This relationship, as we shall see in detail later on, constitutes one of the important influences on the structure of bureaucracy.

The Bureaucracy in Relation to the Central Political Authority

In addition to these types of political struggle, there are others in which the bureaucracy, or at least some of its main constituent groups, is more directly involved. The first of these is closely related to the problem of legitimation analyzed above. In these societies there is a continuous contest between the king and the non-bureaucratic groups around him (such as the royal family, his personal advisors, sometimes various groups of nobles) on the one side, and the bureaucracy on the other, regarding their relative power over each other and over

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policy and decision-making. Such a struggle may become especially acute when the king is wholly corrupt and capricious, interested only in his private pleasures, and bent on utilizing the state machinery for his own non-political ends and for the benefit of members of his immediate entourage. Good examples of this can be found in various periods in China,[18] in the later stages of the Ottoman Empire and, to a smaller degree, in Byzantium.[19] An important aspect of these struggles is the king's attempt to "pack" the bureaucracy with his own protégés without regard to their qualifications or to the usual procedure of appointment, and to dismiss any displeasing officials arbitrarily—even if, or especially if, they are honest and scrupulous.

However, this kind of struggle occurs not only in extreme situations but also in normal and relatively stable times. The bureaucracy tends very often to emphasize its own basic political philosophy and experience as against those of the emperor or king, and tries to limit his innovations. The struggle between the legalists and the Confucianists at the beginning of the Han Dynasty is a very good example,[20] as are the relations between the *noblesse de robe* and the parliaments in France, and the whole complex of relations between the sultan and the vizir, and the Ruling Institution, in the Ottoman Empire.

In most of these countries, the bureaucracy develops a "professional morale" and ideology that emphasize its own autonomy and direct ethical (and sometimes even legal) responsibility, as contrasted with the caprice of policy and the vicissitudes of politics. It is only in some of the relatively "underdeveloped" countries, in borderline cases of semi-feudal, semi-patrimonial societies—for example, Ancient Egypt—that such an ideology seems to be lacking. Its clearest exposition can be found in China, where the bureaucracy fostered many aspects of the Confucian code, emphasizing its own responsibility and ethical functions. Similar tendencies, couched to a greater degree in legal terms, can be found in Byzantium and in European countries.

While the concrete points of difference may vary from one society to another, in general it seems that the bureaucracy manifests more

[18] Pulleyblank, *op.cit.*, pp. 42ff.; H. H. Dubs, ed. and trans., *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, Baltimore, Md., 1938, esp. pp. 171ff., 216ff.; Rideout, *op.cit.*, III, pp. 42-58; W. Bingham, *The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty*, Baltimore, Md., 1941, esp. chs. 6 and 11; G. Haloun, "The Liang-Chou Rebellion, 184-221 A.D.," *Asia Major*, N.S., I (1949), pp. 119-39.

[19] See Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte*, *op.cit.*, pp. 118ff., 319ff.

[20] Gale, *op.cit.*, *passim*; E. Haenisch, *Chinas Weg vom Lehnsreich zum Einheitsstaat*, Sitzungsberichte der Bayer. Akad. der Wiss., Phil.-hist. Kl., No. 3, Munich, 1947.

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traditional and legalistic attitudes than the emperor, is much more bent on the maintenance of any given status quo (subject to limitations to be discussed later), and is much less prone to take the initiative in the executive field, although from time to time it may produce great reformers and innovators. But it is not easy to discern continuous patterns of difference in principle as between bureaucratic and executive powers. Elements of personal competition, of general attempts to maintain influence, and different basic orientations always have some place in these controversies between the more "political" and the more "legal-rational." The more "conservative" and "legal-rational" attitude of the bureaucracy can be clearly seen in its relationship to legal problems and reforms. The bureaucracy usually seems to have a greater respect for legal tradition than do the kings, as well as a greater propensity for systematization and codification and a lesser predisposition to employ *ad hoc* measures. It may be closely related to the legal profession, and even try to incorporate parts of it.

The arena in which this struggle is waged encompasses the various administrative organs and mechanisms that are designed to maintain the king's control over the bureaucracy and to carry out the major policy decisions. Some of the sources of conflict have been mentioned earlier in the discussion of legitimacy, but we shall deal with them somewhat more systematically now. First is the constant effort of the kings to maintain a body of personal officials and advisors who are independent of the bureaucratic machinery and cliques, in the face of the equally constant effort of the bureaucracy to penetrate these circles and to influence them. The wide use made of eunuchs in many of these monarchies, and the ambivalent position of these eunuchs in the political struggle, are one feature of this kind of conflict.[21] Another is the attempt of the kings to develop a core of officials of the "inner court," directly under the throne's control. The fact that many of these officials tended, in time, to achieve relative independence and to lose touch with the king explains the very frequent changes of the officials' positions and the continuous creation of new positions and titles.

A second source of conflict is created when a chief official and a general council are at the head of the bureaucracy, acting as the king's major policy- and decision-making body. In many cases, the king tried to dispense with such a corporate body, or to play it off against

[21] Rideout, *op.cit.*, III, pp. 42ff.; R. Guilland, "Les Eunuques dans l'Empire byzantin," *Etudes byzantines*, I (1943), pp. 197-238, and "Fonctions et dignités des Eunuques," *ibid.*, II (1944), pp. 185-225; Wright, ed., *op.cit.*

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the bureaucracy. It is significant that the greater extent of what may be called "conciliar" centralization is found in Byzantium in the periods of the relative predominance of the aristocracy,[22] and that during them the Senate had a relatively greater importance. In China, on the other hand, a council and particularly a prime minister were usually most influential during the periods of the predominance of the bureaucracy.[23]

Closely connected with this is the problem of the maintenance of discipline in the bureaucracy. Here we find a tendency on the part of the king either to concentrate most of these matters in his own hands or, alternatively, to delegate them to as many heads of department as possible, in contrast to the tendency of the bureaucracy to establish its own regulations and organs, through which it might be able to influence the king's policy and attitude. Of special interest from this point of view are the "controlling officers" established from time to time by the kings and sent out to supervise the local officials. The most noteworthy examples are the Chinese inspectors, the French intendants, and the Spanish "visitors." Most of these officers stood outside the administrative hierarchy; quite often the first appointments were special confidants of the kings. But with their passing, and with the gradual institutionalization of the offices, many efforts were made by the bureaucracy to assimilate them. There was generally a struggle of some sort over who was to control these controlling officers.

The Chinese censorate is perhaps the most important illustration of the tendency of bureaucracies to maintain their own regulations and supervisory systems.[24] Others are found in the dealings of French parliaments with the regulation of the sale of offices and other disciplinary matters, and in some of the activities of the Byzantine legalists. Certain special posts within the bureaucracy have also been utilized to control the executive and ensure its compliance. The astronomer in China provides the best example, perhaps, but many others could be offered.[25] In the European countries we find many attempts by the

[22] See Bréhier, *op.cit.*, chs. 2 and 3.

[23] See Wang, *op.cit.*, pp. 161ff.; Kracke, *op.cit.*, pp. 28-54. See also H. Miyakawa, "An Outline of the Naitō Hypothesis," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XIV (August 1955), esp. pp. 538ff.

[24] C. O. Hucker, "The Traditional Chinese Censorate and the New Peking Regime," *American Political Science Review*, XLV (December 1951), pp. 1041-53.

[25] W. Eberhard, "The Astronomers in China," paper delivered at the 2nd Conference on Chinese Thought, 1955 (mimeographed). On the role of oracles in Egypt, see Edgerton, *op.cit.*, pp. 159-60. See also the papers of Wilson, Speiser, and Bodde in "Authority and Law in the Ancient Orient," supplement of *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1954).

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bureaucracy to gain control of some of the main representative institutions, especially the parliaments—attempts which were sometimes very successful at the height of absolutism, and which tended to influence the composition of the kings' councils.[26]

The policy area dealing with titles is one of the most interesting fields in which this struggle occurred, especially in Byzantium, China and, to a lesser extent, in the Ottoman Empire. In most of these cases, a distinction was made between the official designation of a function and an honorific title which denoted the general status of the official in the hierarchy. While there was some correspondence between the two, they were never identical; and the distinction was often used by kings to control the bureaucracy and to hinder it from monopolizing both status positions and administrative positions. Sometimes the honorific titles were used to compensate for loss of power, or as a means to create new "nobles" more directly dependent on the king.[27] On the bureaucratic side, there was a continuous effort to make the titles more or less hereditary and to develop a strong sense of group cohesion among the title-holders. Some of the developments in Europe in the age of absolutism are parallel to this. The most important among these is the creation of the *noblesse de robe* by the king as a counterweight to the *noblesse d'épee*, and the strong efforts of the former to become an autonomous and self-perpetuating status group, mainly through the development of various devices for the sale of offices.

Another interesting field in which this aspect of political struggle has been waged is the whole system of sales of offices, which was prevalent in most of the countries in question.[28] This system was usually inaugurated by the kings in order to solve their financial problems and to let new, non-aristocratic elements into their service, thus diminishing their dependence on the aristocracy. But in time, in most of the societies, the bureaucracy came to look upon its offices as units of property, and to transmit them within families or sell them in the market. Thus, despite their own efforts, the kings tended to lose control over these offices.

[26] Ford, *op.cit.*, pp. 222ff.; Beloff, *op.cit.*, ch. 1.

[27] C. Diehl, R. Guilland, *et al., L'Europe orientale de 1081 à 1453*, Paris, 1945, esp. pp. 129ff.; Diehl, in *Cambridge Medieval History*, *op.cit.*; Bréhier, *op.cit.*; R. des Rotours, *Le traité des examens*, Paris, 1932, esp. Introduction, and *Traité des fonctionnaires et traité de l'armée*, Leiden, 1947.

[28] For a general survey of this problem, see K. W. Swart, *Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century*, The Hague, 1949, *passim*.

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The Bureaucracy and Major Political and Social Groups

This brings us to the last and perhaps most important aspect of political struggle in bureaucratic polities: the relationship between the bureaucracy and other social strata, especially those which are politically active and from which many of the upper bureaucracy are recruited. Does the bureaucracy tend to have a policy or orientation of its own, or does it only represent the interests of the major social strata? Are the different policies of a bureaucracy a reflection of the different social groups and cliques who vie with one another within its framework, or can more autonomous tendencies be discerned? Is the bureaucracy only a representative of the gentry and the literati in China, of the different landed and urban groups in Byzantium, of the rising bourgeoisie in Western Europe? In other words, does the bureaucracy constitute an autonomous force in the political struggle vis-à-vis other groups in the society?

In some extreme cases, the answer is clearly yes. These are mostly instances in which the bureaucracy is very closely identified with the king or central political authorities against all other groups in the society. The best examples are the Ottoman Empire in its first flourishing stages, some of the periods in the development of Muscovite bureaucracy between the reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine II, Prussia in the eighteenth century and, in modern times, some of the bureaucracies of the Balkan countries in the period between the two world wars. In all of these cases, the major social strata were politically and economically weak, while there was a very strong "punishment orientation"[29] and alienation on the part of the bureaucracy and, usually in cooperation with the king, a very strong legalistic and "leveling" policy. In all of them we also find that the bureaucracy—at least in its upper echelons—tended to become a very cohesive status group, arrogating to itself many of the basic positions of prestige and power. But, to repeat, these are extreme cases, arising from rather specific conditions.

These tendencies in the bureaucracy usually accompanied its strong subjugation to the king and, even in these cases, the bureaucracy was rent by internal struggles. It can perhaps be postulated that at certain stages in its development, a bureaucracy is almost completely identified

[29] This term is used by A. Gouldner (*Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, Glencoe, Ill., 1954) in relation to industrial bureaucracy, but it has a much wider and more general application. By "punishment orientation" is meant that the norms of the bureaucracy are *imposed* on the population and not fully accepted by it as contributing to its welfare.

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with the upper political elite. In the early development of a body of officials by a king who may still be fettered by patrimonial or feudal restraints, such "private" officials (as distinct from the more honorific aristocratic officials) usually tend to identify themselves totally with the king.[30]

It can be claimed, of course, that these tendencies are inherent in any bureaucracy, even if they cannot be fully worked out in all circumstances. But can any of these tendencies actually be discerned in other, more stable, bureaucratic polities?

It is difficult to argue that at any given time the whole bureaucracy of a country has a unified and homogeneous policy and orientation, entirely distinct from those of different groups or classes. Writing of China's experience, Wang Yü-ch'üan has put this in a rather extreme way: "In spite of the basic interests of its members, the bureaucracy did not constitute a homogeneous body. It was made up of a number of factions, all struggling for supremacy, which were formed on the basis of personal ambition for power and position or on the basis of the interests of the social group which a particular faction represented. The bureaucracy was maintained by the equilibrium of the forces between the various factions or by the domination of one of them."[31] For example, in different stages of Chinese history the administration was more or less dominated, in terms of policy, by certain upper gentry and even merchant groups, the Byzantine administration by certain landowning or military interests, and the French by certain groups of the rising upper bourgeoisie.

These groups did not have absolute control over personnel or decision-making; rather, they had to deal with other groups and cliques contending for power. Most of these struggles were carried on within the basic framework, rules, and orientations of the bureaucracy. These groups may have quarreled over details of taxation or economic policy, but they tacitly recognized the necessity for some kind of policy, or the need to uphold certain basic legal frameworks that would not admit all the privileges demanded by certain groups, some of which would deny the legal rights of lower strata of the population. Thus a degree of universalism in orientations and regulations was upheld by most of the bureaucracy, even if it ran against the interests of the social strata closest to them. The bureaucracy tended to maintain these basic orientations to, and identifications with, legal and universalistic principles because its own position was largely dependent on its doing so,

[30] I am indebted to Professor W. Eberhard for this suggestion.
[31] Wang, *op.cit.*, p. 181.

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and because some of its basic duties, such as maintenance of peace, minimal provision of food, and river administration, could be discharged only within such a framework.

Sometimes there exists a tendency on the part of the bureaucracy to organize itself into a status group differing even from those strata with which it is most closely related or identified. Thus in France many of the *noblesse de robe* gradually dissociated themselves from the bourgeois families from which they originated.[32] In Byzantium, as has been mentioned earlier, even in the period of decline from the eleventh century onward, there was not a complete identity between the urban civil nobility and the great landholders and military magnates. In Russia and Prussia, the emperors succeeded in disciplining the nobility into a bureaucracy which was more an instrument of the emperor's will than a reflection of the nobility's own interests. Even in China, where the relation between the gentry and the bureaucracy was the closest, complete identity did not exist. The bureaucracy tended to differentiate itself from both the gentry and the literati,[33] and to maintain a framework and policy of its own. This is perhaps most evident at the first stages of the establishment of the examination system, but it persisted thereafter.[34]

Moreover, in many of these bureaucratic systems, reformers arise from within the bureaucracy; this happens particularly where the system is dominated and, from the point of view of its own premises, corrupted by the monopoly of one group. The most interesting and best known examples of such reformers are Wang An-shih in Sung China,[35]

[32] See Ford, *op.cit.*, pp. 105ff. See also the discussion of G. Pagès, "La vénalité des offices dans l'ancienne France," *Revue historique*, CLXIX (May-June 1932), pp. 476-95; Pagès tends to see in this an important precondition of the French Revolution.

[33] The controversy between the Wittfogel school and other Sinologists, especially Eberhard, as to whether the literati constituted a group distinct from the landed gentry does not greatly affect our argument. Even Wang admits that there was a marked difference between the literati, who did not hold positions, and the gentry. Eberhard himself would probably agree that while the bureaucracy was close to the gentry, it sometimes tended to maintain distinct policies. See E. Balázs, "Les aspects significatifs," *op. cit.*, pp. 80ff. In general, however, Eberhard's insistence on the continuity of gentry families seems well founded. See the balanced summary by D. Bodde, "Feudalism in China," in R. Coulborn, ed., *Feudalism in History*, Princeton, N.J., 1956, pp. 49-92.

[34] E. Balázs, "La crise sociale et la philosophie politique à la fin des Han," *T'oung Pao*, N.S., XXXIX (1950), pp. 83-131, and "Les aspects significatifs," *op.cit.*, pp. 80ff.

[35] See H. R. Williamson, *Wang An Shih: A Chinese Statesman and Educationalist of the Sung Dynasty*, London, 1937, *passim*; F. H. Michael, "From the Fall of T'ang to the Fall of Ch'ing," in H. F. MacNair, ed., *China*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946, pp. 89-111. See also O. Franke, *Der Bericht Wang An Shih's vom 1058 uber Reform des Beamtentums*, Sitzungsberichte der Pr. Akad. der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1931-33, pp. 264-312.

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Sari Mehmed Pasha in the Ottoman Empire,[36] and the great European ministers in the age of absolutism. True, they do not always succeed in their efforts at reform, and the bureaucratic apparatus may continue to be corrupted. This can easily bring about the end of the system—whether the dynastic changes in China, the gradual shrinking and disintegration of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, or the political revolutions in Europe. It is significant from the point of view of our analysis that many of these downfalls are related to the abandonment of a unified and equitable policy of taxation, which is the basic financial and political mainstay of a bureaucratic polity.[37]

It is also important to note that in the periods following these disorganizations, one of the first steps is the reinstallation of a relatively autonomous bureaucratic organization and policy. This is especially well known and well documented for China,[38] and it seems to be true also for several periods of Byzantine history.[39]

A close analysis of various attempts at bureaucratic reform and of patterns of change in bureaucracies reveals another very important aspect of the relationship between bureaucracies and other social groups. The main functions of a bureaucracy in these societies seem to include mediation between the major political and economic interests and groups, and the maintenance of some of the rules of the game in political struggle. The fact that the political institutions in these societies have their own goal orientations, and that they must consolidate support from various groups and strata in the population, necessarily means that in turn they have to provide these groups with various facilities and rewards, such as prestige, influence, or power. The bureaucracies usually administer the technical aspects of these facilities, and in addition they allocate rewards according to certain general rules and expectations. The concrete details of such rules differ greatly from one

[36] See Wright's discussion in *Ottoman Statecraft, op.cit.*, esp. pp. 43ff.

[37] Ostrogorsky, "Das Steuersystem," *op.cit.*, pp. 223-40, and "The Peasant's Pre-emption Right," *Journal of Roman Studies*, XXXVII (1947), pp. 117-26; Wang Yü-ch'üan, "The Rise of Land Tax and the Fall of Dynasties in Chinese History," *Pacific Affairs*, IX (June 1936), pp. 201-20. It may be, however, that an explanation of these changes in terms of problems of taxation alone is oversimplified. This has been suggested to me by Professor Eberhard. Problems of taxation did constitute a significant element, however. The importance of the financial problem in France on the eve of the Revolution is well known, as is that of the problem of control over taxation in English constitutional history.

[38] E. Balázs, "Les aspects significatifs," *op.cit.*, pp. 80ff.; W. Eberhard, "The Formation of a New Dynasty: A Sociological Study," in *Thurnwald Festschrift*, Berlin, 1950, pp. 54-67.

[39] Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte, op.cit.*, chs. 3-6.

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society to another, and may be biased in favor of certain social groups, but maintenance of such rules is necessary to the maintenance of the bureaucratic polity. It is this fact that gives the bureaucracy its main power in relation to the king, who may not be as sensitive to the various problems of balancing out different interests; this is more likely to be the case in countries that are without any type of representative institution.

This need to maintain a set of rules, however, sets limits to the degree to which a given bureaucracy can be dominated by any one group without causing the whole system to disintegrate. This, of course, is closely connected with the whole range of problems of the legitimation of the polity in general and of the bureaucracy in particular. It also explains an important and nearly universal feature of bureaucratic systems: their development of relatively systematized and unified legal codes, and their strong tendency to uphold these codes and to inculcate the basic norms and orientations inherent in them. The codes and their norms may often be enforced against the special privileges and interests of various social groups, a process that involves a strong element of mediation.

The performance of mediating functions by the bureaucracy and its at least partial autonomy do not mean, of course, that it acts outside the basic framework of a given society or that it performs really important and integrative functions for it. Nor do they mean that in these societies the principles of polity and organization are not biased in favor of one or more groups. First of all, it is quite obvious that the interests of politically and socially passive groups, especially the peasantry, were minimally represented in most of the bureaucracies—Byzantium being the exception. Secondly, the bureaucracy itself, and the kings who directed it, did not usually stray very far beyond the basic principles of stratification that existed within a given society; they tried to adjust their policies to these principles, to modify the principles to some extent, or even to isolate some of their more difficult aspects, but they did not seek to abolish them entirely.

But all this does not negate the basic fact that the bureaucracy, sometimes with the king and sometimes in opposition to him, tries to maintain some basic mediating functions that are not entirely identical with the interests of any single group or stratum. Even in its relations with the lower groups and strata, the bureaucracy tends to maintain a measure of continuity; and, unless it is totally corrupted or punishment-oriented, it generally entertains a minimal defense of the interests of these strata.

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Conditions Influencing Degrees of Autonomy

In conclusion, we can illustrate briefly the possibilities of a comparative approach to the differences among bureaucratic societies by analyzing, in a preliminary way, some of the conditions that influence the degree of autonomy of bureaucracy. At the risk of some repetition, by "autonomy" is meant (a) the organization of the bureaucracy according to its own criteria rather than those of any other social group, and (b) the conduct of an independent role in the political struggle and in the general status-hierarchy of the society.

Among the many conditions which may influence the degree of autonomy as here defined, we shall concentrate on two that are most closely related to the earlier analysis. These are the scope of political struggle within the society, and the relations between the main goals of the polity and those of its most active social and political groups. With respect to the first of these conditions, the hypothesis is presented that, other conditions being equal, the larger the scope of political struggle within a bureaucratic society, the smaller is the extent to which the bureaucracy can be an autonomous force in that struggle. In societies like Ancient Egypt and China, where relatively few elements participate actively in the political struggle, the bureaucracy may have a semi-monopoly on most political and administrative activities and thus a singular place in the power and prestige structure of the society. The bureaucracy becomes a relatively autonomous group, constituting a stratum in its own right, with symbols of status and very high prestige. The monopolistic strength of the bureaucracy in such situations is derived also from the circumstance that, because there exist but few "private" economic groups which can be taxed profitably, it has to develop its own productive and marketing enterprises.[40] In such cases, the strength of the bureaucracy can be limited—usually in a small way—only by religious centers of power.[41]

Insofar as other groups tend to participate more actively in political life, the monopoly of power and prestige breaks down, and the bureaucracy may thus become only one among a number of status groups, deriving many of its symbols from other groups and strata in the society. As the pressure from these groups becomes stronger, the bureaucracy tends to lose some of its autonomy. It can retain its distinctness from other groups mainly by becoming increasingly neutral in the political

[40] W. F. Edgerton, "The Question of Feudal Institutions in Ancient Egypt," in Coulborn, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 120-32, and "The Government and the Governed," *op.cit.*, pp. 152-60.

[41] Edgerton, "The Government and the Governed," *op.cit.*

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sphere—by upholding some of the most general rules and orientations of the society, as well as its legal-rational legitimacy, without at the same time participating actively in the political struggle. This phase can be found in its fullest expression only in modern societies, with the development of constitutional government. In most of the societies that have been discussed in this article, this development did not take place, and in addition to its administrative tasks, the bureaucracy tended to perform many executive and party-political functions.

The second aspect of this problem concerns the extent of compatibility between the goals of the polity and those of other social groups. In general, it can be hypothesized that the greater the incompatibility between these goals (as in situations of conquest, rapid modernization, and acute political strife), the greater will be the tendencies of the bureaucracy toward monopolization of power and status. In such cases, the bureaucracy will tend to become an independent force in the political struggle, and will attempt not only to regulate other centers of power and to mediate between them, but also to level them out to the greatest possible extent.

In this article we have attempted to analyze some of the basic social and political characteristics of bureaucratic polities. We have tried to show that in order to understand the structure and complexities of various bureaucratic polities, as well as the major differences among them, it is necessary to consider not only the formal aspects of bureaucratic organizations, but also, and perhaps mainly, the basic sociological characteristics of bureaucratic polities. It is these characteristics that provide the social and political framework within which various bureaucratic organizations develop. In this article several aspects of this wider framework—especially the main elements of political struggle within bureaucratic polities—have been singled out for discussion. We have tried to show the basic political and social issues that exist in such polities, and the relation of the major political elements—the king, the aristocracy, and other social groups and strata—as well as of the bureaucracy itself to such issues. We have also demonstrated how some characteristics of the bureaucracy—chiefly the extent of its autonomy—are related to these aspects of the political struggle. The analysis presented here has necessarily been preliminary; its main purpose has been to clear the way, as it were, for more systematic comparative analyses of bureaucratic polities and structures.

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JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST

The Contrast With China

By WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD

JAPAN'S response to the intrusion of the West, by contrast with the response of China and other Asian nations, has long intrigued statesmen and scholars. Generalizations about Asia, its cultural traditions, its policies, its economic development, are especially difficult to fit to the Japanese. "Japan is of course *sui generis*," says O. H. K. Spate, the British geographer, and few will disagree.

In particular, it was the Japanese who met the challenge of Western imperialism after 1850 with vigorous steps to assure their survival as an independent nation. More than any other Asian people, it was they who acted decisively, in the words of Lin Tse-hsü, to "drive away the crocodile and to get rid of the whales." The condition of such survival in the nineteenth century can be readily defined. It was to meet the West on its own terms—i.e., to introduce modern science and technology in order to refashion traditional society on an industrial basis under the aegis of a modern nation-state. But why and how a response of this character developed so rapidly in Japan, while languishing in China and other neighboring nations, are still an elusive issue.

The crucial requirement was the emergence of a new elite with the capacity to face realistically the situation confronting them, to identify their own personal and class interests with the cause of modernization, and to act in the role of leadership before the opportunity was lost. This in turn was more than a question of some special trait—a martial tradition, a propensity to borrow, the habit of command and discipline, the profit motive. For the profit motive may lead only to speculation or political bribery. Militarism can waste a country's heritage. Material borrowing may develop chiefly a penchant for French perfume or shiny Cadillacs. Discipline may create a prison, not a productive enterprise. Everything depends on the social framework and environmental setting, on whether they are conducive to the right kind of change in institutions and give cumulative momentum to the whole process.

Some of the circumstances of this change, as it took place in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in China, will be examined here. The historical context is roughly the seventy-five years ending in 1925. Judgments based upon the history of this era will differ from those which might be derived from the earlier decades alone—say, the twenty years after

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Perry sounded the alarm in 1853. For the Meiji Restoration of 1868 was initially a political rebellion of limited and contradictory objectives. Its true meaning in history emerges only after the revolutionary process that it set in motion is observed over two or three generations. Similarly, the craze for foreign things and foreign ideas which swept Japan in the 1870's would give a false idea of what was in store if one failed to note the reaction after 1880 in favor of traditional values.

Once the twentieth century has run its course, on the other hand, the historian of the future may arrive at quite different conclusions as to the true nature of the Chinese and Japanese responses to the West. Japan led in the process of technical modernization, for reasons we shall explore. Yet there were always hesitant reservations about the inner spirit of Western culture, if not its outright rejection. The secularization, the rationalization, and the democratization of Chinese life may prove to be more profound in the end. For the present, one must be content with a limited perspective.

I

The test of a scientific proposition is said to be its capacity to withstand systematic doubt. How many propositions loosely advanced to explain the contrasting development of Japan and other Asian societies can stand this test? Could not many of them, especially if they were considered singly and in isolation, plausibly be reversed to explain a contrary outcome of events? Would they not have been, had history followed a different course?

To illustrate the point, suppose an observer of 1850—someone like Thomas T. Meadows, the British scholar-diplomat in China—had been asked to forecast the next seventy-five years. Leaving aside immediate uncertainties—Meadows was alarmed over Russian designs on China—one suspects that in estimating the future of Japan and her great continental neighbor he would have placed his bet unhesitatingly on China.

In natural resources, for one thing, Japan would have appeared at a grave disadvantage in the coming contest for power and well-being. She was one-tenth the size of China. Her farmlands were already overcrowded, far more than Europe's on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, and more than most of continental Asia. Her mineral endowment was also meager, except in coal and copper. Yet history teaches that industrial development generally builds on agricultural expansion in the early stages. Soon it comes to depend also on the creation of large metal-working industries. In resource potential for such a development

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one might have ranked Japan with Burma or Spain, but hardly with China and India.

Nor was this deficiency offset by Japan's superior location on the globe. Small, cramped nations may industrialize heavily if they enjoy easy access to great markets and supplies of materials; also if they can readily imbibe knowledge from neighboring peoples whose technology is superior but whose cultural background is similar enough to facilitate borrowing. In this fashion Britain profited from being on the margins of a diversified, dynamic European society. She had access as well to the growing markets and resources of the New World.

By contrast, Japan in 1850 was on the rim of the world, alone and secluded. Even the nations of Southeast Asia—Siam, for example—were more strategically located at one of the world's crossroads. Still more was this true of peoples who bordered on the Mediterranean—say, the Egyptians. They had relatively easy access to the new Western technology of national power. And at least from Napoleon on they were under mounting pressure to learn its secrets if they were to assure their independence. By comparison, both Japan and China were remote latecomers to the industrial and political revolutions of modern times.

Physical disabilities are sometimes compensated by social capacities, of course. But here, as in natural resources, the Chinese might seem to have been better endowed in several respects for the needs of modernization. To cite a major contrast, the feudal tradition of Japan threatened to impose grave handicaps, along with whatever advantages it conferred. European peoples created the modern nation-state and entered upon the Industrial Revolution only as they liberated intellectual, political, and economic life from the bonds of feudalism. This took centuries. Where feudal institutions lingered on, as in Europe east of the Rhine, and in Spain and Southern Italy, the process of emancipation was delayed until the nineteenth century. In Spain the Industrial Revolution had hardly begun even as late as 1900.

To be sure, political power was centralized in Japan to a considerable degree after 1600 by the Tokugawa clan, following its military victory over its rivals. Yet the shogunate, while it held the country together for 250 years, failed to create the moral basis of unity so long characteristic of China.[1] As it decayed, regional separatism threatened again to plunge the country into political anarchy, or at least to cripple any vigorous initiative from the center. Early Western observers like Sir

[1] The Emperor institution as a force for unity was largely the later creation of the Meiji reformers, though of course it was built on ancient foundations.

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Rutherford Alcock, the British Minister, were impressed with the narrow exclusiveness of the clan spirit.

More broadly, the feudal heritage of Japan, qualified as it had become under Tokugawa rule, tended to conserve political power in the hands of a self-conscious warrior caste. Their traditional values were shaken, but still powerful. Their traditional skills and habits of domination over an unfree people were dubious assets for modernization, to say the least. Granted that new impulses were at work after 1750, the restless minority who now sought change faced tremendous obstacles in the inertia and obscurantism of this ruling class as a whole.

By comparison, China alone among the Asian peoples brought to the modern world a tradition of egalitarianism, of personal freedom and social mobility, of private property freely bought and sold, of worldly pragmatism and materialism, of humane political ideals sanctioned by the right of rebellion, of learning as the key to public office. If the Chinese remained imbued with the particularist loyalties of the family, and a certain contempt for commerce as a way of life (ideally), was this not true of all Asia? Was it not also true of the European elites of yesterday? Where else in Asia was there a more open society, a stronger tradition of political unity, a bureaucracy more largely recruited on a merit basis, a more enterprising class of merchants, a more vigorous, industrious people? Are these not among the essential conditions of modernization?

Finally, what about the psychology of success in foreign encounters—in "managing the barbarians"? Were the odds with the zenophobic Japanese, so inexperienced in foreign dealings after two centuries of seclusion? Or was it not more plausible that, as China and Japan both roused themselves to the danger of subjection after 1850, the future would belong to the urbane, self-confident Chinese, secure in the knowledge of their resources and their past glories in the Asian arena, rather than their insecure island neighbors, with their clannish loyalties, their sensitive pride, their anxieties as they looked abroad, their rigid codes of social behavior?

Had China moved ahead steadily with modernization, following the T'ung-chih reforms of the 1860's, while Japan lapsed into anarchy and stagnation with the collapse of her shogunal government, one can easily imagine that historians today would be expounding such factors as these to explain the ensuing development. In some degree, geographic and social influences did operate as described above, despite the contrary progress of events. If they failed to exert a more decisive

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impulse in the manner indicated, it was because they were overborne by other circumstances.

Enough has been said perhaps to indicate that the response of Japan and China to the West was the outcome of a wide range of influences pulling and pushing them in various directions. Only as one seeks empirically to discover how they all worked in combination does the story become intelligible. Social scientists should be wary of any interpretation which gives to history "an appearance of inevitableness"—in R. H. Tawney's words—"by dragging into prominence the forces which have triumphed, and thrusting into the background those which they have swallowed up."[2]

II

What were those forces which triumphed? Where do we look for the operative factors to explain the dynamic and purposeful changes which took place in Meiji Japan (1868-1911), as compared with the faltering efforts of the Chinese to arrest the disintegration of their state and society under Western pressure? How explain the seeming paradox that a succession of failures has delivered the Chinese today into a totalitarian experiment, whereas the Japanese, with far less democracy, humanism, and individualism in their tradition, live under perhaps the most stable parliamentary regime outside the Western world? Why does China only now begin the ordeal of transition to industrial society which Japan passed through as much as forty years ago?

The answer must be sought in those elements of the situation which favored in combination two essential conditions of adaptation and growth: (1) innovating, enterprising leadership in technological and social change, displayed initially at the top but spreading soon through wider strata of the population; and (2) teamwork, discipline, solidarity in group organization, sufficient to give order and momentum to the process of change. One was as important as the other for the tasks of modernization. In Japan more than any other Asian nation they have been successfully joined. Why is this so?

First, and on the most general level of interpretation, it is worth recalling one familiar circumstance. Traditional Japanese society—that is, from the seventh century on—was formed on the rim of Chinese civilization. It borrowed, and did not originate, the Confucian way, blending elements of it with native tradition. This was a rather stable blend, more so than India's attempt to fuse the Muslim and Hindu traditions. Yet, having remained only on the margins of the Chinese

[2] *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century*, London, 1912, p. 177.

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cultural world, the Japanese could perhaps more easily break out of its rigid molds and absorb elements of a new way of life that came to press insistently for attention in the nineteenth century. F. W. Maitland once remarked that "the rapidly progressive groups [in history] have been just those which have not worked out their own salvation, but have appropriated alien ideas."[3]

This may help to explain the flexibility of mind so evident in Meiji Japan. One sees it in the rise of science to a high place in learning, in the increasing acceptance of businessmen as a part of the legitimate elite, in the successful control of graft and nepotism in the military commands, and in the industrial management of the new Japan. Such changes were of immense importance to the modernization process. Yet they ran counter to the Confucian way of life, the most enduring in all history. They were staunchly resisted in China. In Japan the new synthesis was easier because Japanese culture had itself been a still earlier blend of foreign and native elements. The experience of living with different idea systems, and struggling with their disharmonies, accustomed this island people to comparative inquiry. It stood them in good stead when the Western challenge came.[4]

A second historic difference between Japan and China is the fact that Japanese government, above the family, was more pluralistic in structure. The attempt in the seventh and eighth centuries to borrow the principle of the centralized, bureaucratic state from T'ang China ended largely in failure. Though it fostered an ideal pattern of unity, it could not overbear in practice the clan tradition, the regional particularism of the Japanese, sustained as it was by the physical fact of a broken mountainous terrain.

Now this particularism could result in factional disorders leading to anarchy. Such was the case chronically through the Fujiwara, Kamakura, and Ashikaga eras (866-1568). So it had been in India, too, through long periods of her history, including the century preceding the British conquest. Given a framework of political order, however, such as was constructed by the Tokugawas after 1600 and sustained through the Meiji transition, it could give rise to what, in Harold Lass-

[3] Frederick J. Teggart, *Theory and Processes of History*, Berkeley, Calif., 1941, p. 286.

[4] One striking comment on the outlook of the Meiji leaders comes from Dr. Erwin Baelz, a German doctor called to the new Imperial Medical Academy in Tokyo. Writing in 1876, he speaks of "the strangest feature of the situation" in these words: "The Japanese have their eyes fixed exclusively on the future, and are impatient when a word is said of their past. The cultured among them are actually ashamed of it. 'That was in the days of barbarism,' said one of them. . . ." Another Japanese friend, questioned about Japanese history by Baelz, replied, "We have no history. Our history begins today." *Awakening Japan*, New York, 1932, p. 17.

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well's phrase, might be called "creative tension." The resulting balance of centralism and clan autonomy preserved a pattern of political organization less uniform, less centralized, and yet less atomized than the Chinese. It was therefore one more likely to generate initiative and enterprise in a number of centers, dispersed and competing, yet not fragmented to the level of families who would lack any collective strength.[5] Other aspects of this pluralism were the relative independence of the Buddhist clergy as a religious elite until Nobunaga (1534-1582) destroyed their secular power; also the separate identity of the business elite of the Tokugawa era, the rising town and country merchants. The mercantile class, being barred from direct entry into the hereditary feudal aristocracy, had to make the most of business as the road to wealth and influence.[6]

In late Tokugawa times one sees a gathering ferment, involving elements widely drawn from clan administrators and scholars, the court nobility, the shogunate, and the merchants. True, the Tokugawa merchant, unlike his counterpart in fifteenth-century Bruges or Nuremberg, never succeeded in emancipating himself from traditional authority through building urban centers free of rule by the feudal barons. (Nor did the Chinese businessman rid himself of gentry domination.) Yet it is not without reason that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Japan, in the secularized culture of its cities and castle towns, is compared with the Europe of the Renaissance and after, not of the Middle Ages. By 1850 the new forces had already gone far to overbalance and undermine the old order. And, of course, the most conspicuous aspect of "creative tension" is the rise of the Western clans, first as pioneers of new military and industrial technology, then as leaders of the political revolution which swept away the whole *ancien régime*. The opening of the country to foreign contact only intensified this process of differentiation, which had so long lacked the stimulus of outside influence. At the same time the imminent foreign peril served to arrest centrifugal tendencies at work and to forge instead a new unity unprecedented in Japanese history.

In Meiji Japan one must look behind the façade to discern similar competing forces within the structure of the newly centralized, authoritarian state. Yet they are there, increasingly after 1890, in factional

[5] It was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, I believe, who once listed five historical reasons for China's stagnation: (1) unity, as a deterrent to competition; (2) isolation, breeding complacency; (3) the inefficiency of ideographic writing; (4) absolutism, stifling popular initiative; and (5) the straitjacket of Confucian orthodoxy.

[6] Marion J. Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, II, No. 3 (October 1953), pp. 161-97.

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struggles among aristocrats, bureaucrats, and militarists; in the rise of political parties and their business allies; in the blend of business competition and collusion which marked relations among the great industrial combines. Particularist rivalries were held in check by a basic consensus on the goals of national development and the structure of legitimate authority. But the central control, the discipline, the spirit of monopoly so often stressed as features of modern Japan do not themselves account for the rapid pace of technical and social change. And they are easily exaggerated, as regards the later decades especially. Even in the great emergency of World War II, with disaster looming, the Japanese were unable to create a tight, monolithic apparatus of national mobilization. In the long view this is a source of national strength, not weakness.[7]

III

A third factor in the disparate development of China and Japan was the historical timing of the Western challenge a century or more ago. In both China and Japan (and India, too) it found governments heading into internal crisis. The Manchu dynasty and the Tokugawa shogunate were each moribund after two centuries or more of rule. Only in Japan, however, were the disorders potentially revolutionary. The all-important difference is that here they had already produced ambitions and discontents of such a nature that powerful elements of the ruling class now eagerly embraced the cause of Westernization, even at the price of overthrowing the feudal order. Thus the characteristic rigidities of tradition-bound societies were weakened in Japan by the fact that change appealed to segments of the elite—both samurai and merchant—able to command wealth and power. The pluralism mentioned above was no longer merely one of rival factions, but of rival philosophies.

There were times in Chinese history when this might conceivably have happened, given an outside stimulus of comparable strength. The southern Sung era (1127-1279) suggests itself, with its commercial and technical progress and its empirical science. But nineteenth-century China in its inner development was experiencing familiar symptoms of dynastic decay along traditional lines. In a quite different setting this might also be said of the breakup of Mogul rule in India after Aurangzeb. Japanese society, by contrast, was already in motion in an institutional sense, and therefore more open to new influence. It had

[7] As they bear on economic growth, these points are discussed at length in the author's *The Economic Development of Japan*, Princeton, N.J., 1954, esp. chs. 4 and 10.

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long been developing new forms of power in new hands for new purposes. The principal restraints came from the repressive shogunate. Now all sorts of dissidents, reactionary and progressive, joined hands to abolish the feudal regime in 1867.

A similarly heterogeneous coalition of Chinese groups toppled the Manchu dynasty forty-five years later. This was the Republican Revolution of 1911. In the Japanese case, however, power did not dissolve in warlord anarchy, as happened in China on the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916. It was seized and consolidated in the Throne by an extraordinary group of lower samurai, joined by elements of the court nobility, rural gentry, city merchants, and intellectuals. Together they demolished the structure of feudalism and laid the foundations of a new order.

Some of these Meiji upstarts had already been virtually declassed by economic distress. Others were clan bureaucrats restless for wider fields of action. All accepted the compelling need for national reform if their country was to escape subjection. What is truly remarkable—its source remains a good deal of a mystery—is the clarity with which these young reformers saw their country's needs; the pragmatism and patriotism they displayed in linking personal fortune with national regeneration; and the force they brought to the task. Their symbols were traditional—Emperor and nation. Their temperament was authoritarian. But their program served new values of a liberalizing character as well. It steadily widened the scope of personal freedom and opportunity in economic life, in education, in government. And in its instrumentalities and techniques it made a sharp break with the past, absorbing Western knowledge under forced draft and across a broad front.[8]

It is incorrect to contrast the Japanese samurai and the Chinese scholar-official class as a whole, and to find here the key to the divergence of the two countries after 1868. Many samurai were as inert and obscurantist as the typical Chinese mandarin in the face of the Western challenge. As a class they were more idle, more ignorant, more arrogant. Most of them sank into obscurity once their caste privileges were canceled. So did most of the big merchant families of Osaka and Edo.

The essential difference is that there developed within the Japanese elite substantial deviant elements with a fresh ambition and capacity to

[8] The outlook of early Meiji statesmen upon the West was never stated more succinctly than by a leader of the first Japanese mission to the United States, Vice-Ambassador Itō, speaking in Sacramento in 1871: "We come to study your strength, that, by adopting your better ways, we may hereafter be stronger ourselves." John W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, Boston, 1904, p. 346.

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take the nation down new paths. Here we come back to the historical comparisons made earlier. One may be skeptical of national character as a useful concept in this instance. But there is no doubt as to the importance of these new value orientations among elements of Japanese society who, because they already belonged to the upper class, were strategically placed to translate them into social action, with multiplier effects.[9]

Among Chinese officials there were also individuals of vision who correctly read the facts of life. But they were few and scattered. And they were rarely men of action like Itō and Kido and Matsukata. Still more rarely did they bring a taste and talent for military or industrial affairs to their nation's service; their values lay elsewhere. In their complacency the Chinese mandarinate long preserved a solid front. And it was a front that faced backward, not forward, through the nineteenth century. As a result the Chinese merchant class, certainly no less enterprising or numerous than the Japanese in 1850, never succeeded in making that alliance with the State which was so important in laying the foundations of industrial capitalism in Japan, and earlier in Europe. Nor, despite all the talk of national self-strengthening through educational, military, and civil reform, did any resolute minority come forward to wrest power from the guardians of the Confucian state and apply it to the tasks of regeneration. "What can I do with so much hindrance?" sighed the Emperor Kuang Hsü to K'ang Yu-wei in 1898. Action had to wait for the most part until the Kuomintang at last made a beginning under Sun Yat-sen.

IV

We turn now to the realm of organization. Judged by conditions elsewhere in Asia today, the greatest difficulties in modernization often lie in adapting traditional structures of group organization to present-day needs. Stress upon the individualism of the West should not ob-

[9] It is interesting now to see how commonly early Western observers of Japan were struck with what C. R. Boxer characterizes as "some innate core of tough virility in the national character." De Fonblanque comments after his visit in the 1860's: "No Eastern people is so free from the stamp of the slave as the Japanese." Thomas Baty, "The Literary Introduction of Japan into Europe," *Monumentica Nipponica*, VIII, No. 1/2 (January 1952), p. 32. General Grant concluded from his tour of the Orient in 1879 that "a well appointed body of ten thousand Japanese troops could make their way through the length and breadth of China, against all odds that could be brought to confront them." Foster, *op.cit.*, p. 342. Fifteen years later Sir Robert Hart wrote prophetically: "Japan wants to lead the East in war, in commerce, and in manufactures, and the next century will be a hard one for the West." H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, III, New York, 1918, p. 50.

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scure the fact that modern societies have been built only by corporate action in new and diverse forms. In this aspect of social change the Japanese among all non-Western peoples showed a talent. Rather quickly they managed to evolve large-scale organizations capable of functioning with reasonable efficiency in such fields as heavy industry, banking, taxation, police, national defense, and education. The why and how of this are only now becoming the subject of scientific inquiry. But a few remarks may be in order here.

One striking aspect, of course, was the display of social solidarity at the national level: a strong sentiment of nationalism, and the force of national unity. Now this factor is sometimes overrated in appraisals of the Westernization process in Japan. Important as it was, patriotism was only one of the sentiments motivating the activities that went into the building of modern Japan. If nationalism began by fulfilling its historic mission as a unifying and protective force, it ended by wasting the country's resources in military adventure and plunging it into disaster. As an organizing principle, also, it can produce that kind of overcentralization which leads to "anaemia at the extremities and apoplexy at the center."[10] No one would deny, however, its essential contribution during the first quarter-century of Japan's modernization: the almost bloodless achievement of national unity; the absence of puppetry and venality in foreign affairs; the resolute priority assigned to national defense; the comparative success of the Japanese in subordinating family, class, faction, and region to national needs, under the slogan *fukoku kyōhei*, "a rich country, a strong defense." It was China's handicap for the purposes under discussion that her Confucian state was, as John K. Fairbank says, "a peculiarly non-national institution."

Japan enjoyed a crucial advantage here over her neighbors in defending her political independence and building the foundations of a national polity and economy. It is inconceivable that a European invader could have conquered her with substantial aid from native troops, as occurred in India. This did not happen to the Chinese either. But they were plagued on their part with a century of political intrigue and civil disorder (to which Japan herself contributed so much in the later years). And it was their special misfortune that an alien dynasty happened to be sitting on the Dragon throne when the Western intruder came. As political nationalism began belatedly to assert itself,

[10] Japanese government has not been free of these difficulties, of course, with all major decisions tending to be made in Tokyo. It is interesting to hear management experts complain also that Japanese business concerns are overcentralized. Company directors waste time on operating details, at the expense of broad policy, because production responsibility is not properly devolved on plant superintendents.

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it had to be directed first at tearing down the Peking government, just when authority and action were required at the center. Almost from the beginning the Japanese were able to proceed within a framework of centralized decisions made by their own leaders and applied throughout the land so far as physical circumstances permitted.

No less important was the capacity of the Japanese to build other more specific types of group organization for the tasks of modernization. Whether in the new army, the public school system, the Yokohama Specie Bank, or the municipal government of Tokyo, they showed a flair for solving those organizational problems which caused such difficulty in China. One reason seems to have been that group loyalty and group responsibility under feudalism had long had a territorial basis overriding the family spirit to a greater extent than among the Chinese. In any event the Japanese succeeded rather quickly in evolving rational, bureaucratic structures which functioned fairly effectively for the purposes at hand.

Two familiar examples will suffice. The first is the silk trade, which played such a notable role in financing Japanese industrialization.[11] Now sericulture was an ancient industry in China as well as Japan. And Chekiang province was just as well suited to it in climate and labor supply as Nagano prefecture. But after 1890 it was the Japanese who ran away with the world market. The reason was their greater success in achieving collective action on the part of export associations, filature owners, scientific experiment stations, and financial institutions to develop the quality and uniformity of silk desired by American manufacturers.

A second example is the naval battle of the Yalu in 1894.[12] The Japanese fleet was already a businesslike affair under Admiral Itō. The Chinese fleet was fairly well matched in ships. But its creator, the great viceroy Li Hung-chang, had characteristically staffed it with "needy relatives and greedy henchmen." Its commander was Li's fellow Anhui-ite, Admiral Ting Ju-chang. Its Ordnance Supply Department was headed by the Viceroy's son-in-law, Chang P'ei-lun. Now Admiral Ting happened to be an ex-cavalry general, gallant but incompetent. Worse than that, Chang was a champion swindler. His ordnance department even loaded shells with sand. When the shooting began, the Chinese fleet found that its total supply of ammunition amounted to fourteen shells per gun. Two 7,000-ton ironclads had only

[11] Raw silk exports, mostly to the United States, accounted for more than one-third of Japan's commodity exports to foreign countries over the entire period from 1870 to 1930. They also supplied an invaluable margin of money income to farm households.

[12] J. O. P. Bland, *Li Hung-chang*, New York, 1917, pp. 227ff.

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three shells in all for their 10-inch guns. The outcome was predictable. The Chinese navy was put to rout, and soon the army too. That was even more of a paper dragon. Japan handily won the war, with all the inestimable advantages that followed in its wake.

This capacity of the Japanese for organization seems to have two aspects. One is the effectiveness of the leader-follower relation within the well-knit social group. Three observations of John Pelzel are pertinent here:

(1) "Hierarchy [in Japanese society] is a matter of rank among social statuses which individuals or families only happen to occupy." In considerable degree, deference goes to the office rather than the officeholder. This makes it easier to fill the office with a person qualified for its duties, rather than a person whose only claim is that he is a nephew, a business client, or a fellow townsman.

(2) Superior status carries with it a heavy sense of duty, not merely a sense of privilege. This makes for leadership which is trained for its duties and responsible in its attitude, even though inherited prestige may still count for a good deal.

(3) Within social groupings, one is apt to find among the lower ranks a large measure of voluntary consent—responsive imitation rather than merely servile acquiescence. This, too, is an essential quality of good organization, East or West. It goes with easy social relations among classes, and a surprising degree of mobility in a society only recently released from feudal restraints. In modern Japan it helps to account for the relatively rapid diffusion of new values and techniques among large numbers of small businessmen, officials, farmers, students, etc., once a leadership had emerged which was technologically progressive. It has likewise spared the Japanese the more acute class antagonisms which have appeared elsewhere in the wake of industrialization.[13]

These remarks relate to the strength of vertical organization within the hierarchical group. There is another aspect of Japanese behavior to be noted, i.e., facility in reaching a lateral consensus among groups. This, too, depends upon overarching hierarchies of prestige and power culminating in the nation-state. Social conflict has been kept within bounds by an inclusive sense of community. One need only mention the latest illustration of the strength of the Japanese social fabric in withstanding the strains of the past century: the disciplined acceptance of defeat and occupation in 1945. But such resilience requires flexibility

[13] "The Small Industrialist in Japan," *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*, VII, No. 2 (December 1954), pp. 79-93; also "Some Social Factors Bearing upon Japanese Population," *American Sociological Review*, XV, No. 1 (February 1950), pp. 20-25.

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as well as tensile strength. And this seems connected with a peculiar skill in decision-making which arrives at a basis for common action through conciliating the difference among competing groups, especially as it appears on the outside, without necessarily causing their suppression.

In big business, for example, the characteristic structure of power is oligopoly, not monopoly. In politics it is oligarchy, not dictatorship. Among the component elements there may be an unstable balance of power, perhaps one so delicate as to make any decision impossible. (Thus the decision to end the war in 1945 was long postponed by the stalemate among factions around the Throne. In the end it called for the intervention of the Emperor himself.) But sooner or later, perhaps through resort to higher authority, group opinions and interests are traded out in some compromise that gives effect to the underlying balance of power. Each of the elements tends to retain its own identity and purpose, and collectively they preserve multiple sources of initiative within a general framework of consensus. Most Asian nations are run by oligarchies today, but it is uncommon for them to display the stability, the cohesion, *and* the flexibility exhibited by the Japanese through much of the modern period.[14]

Japan's response to the West was thus strengthened by propensities for social organization which enabled a leadership, technologically progressive in outlook, to foster change in an orderly, cumulative fashion. Initiative at the top soon began to elicit a widening response from the people, as knowledge and opportunity grew. With the new freedom came a new spirit of enterprise, encouraged in all walks of life where it did not directly challenge the basic goals of the nation's leaders or their structure of political power and economic privilege. In short, the Japanese brought to the problem of organization not only a tradition of hierarchical discipline, which is more or less essential to

[14] A small constellation of men, drawn mainly from the Western clans who led the Restoration, ruled Japan for forty years with scarcely a break. Until 1918 these Meiji leaders passed the Premiership around from one to another; they dominated the Privy Council; they commanded the army and navy. From 1885 to 1918 only twenty-nine men served as Premier, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Minister of the Imperial Household, Minister of War, Minister of Navy, President of the Privy Council, and President of the House of Peers. Five were court nobles, and sixteen came from the clans of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa. The others were mostly their henchmen. Robert K. Reischauer, *Japan: Government—Politics*, New York, 1939, pp. 108-9.

After World War I, as the old oligarchs faded from the scene, and the forces of industrialism and political democracy gathered headway, the pattern of leadership became more divided, uncertain, and unstable. The decision-making process referred to above came to work much less consistently and smoothly in national affairs. It finally broke down altogether when the Kwantung Army took matters in its own hands in 1931.

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the operation of large social structures today, but also a growing diversity of aims and outlook, and a quality of voluntarism or popular consent, which are equally important if a society is to venture and compete and grow.[15]

V

To recapitulate, the Meiji Renovation, like modernization programs elsewhere, had to combine two ingredients of success. It had to institutionalize change and to institutionalize stability in some workable compromise. Four factors have been mentioned as working to these ends, in Japan more than in China or elsewhere in Asia: (1) Japan's historic position as a frontier society, a cultural borrower, with the flexibility of mind and institutions that this encouraged; (2) an added dynamic impulse growing out of the fact that Japanese society was traditionally more pluralistic in its organization of power and responsibility, but at the same time not atomized down to the family level, or (after 1600) fragmented into political anarchy; (3) the historical circumstance that the Western challenge arrived at a time when internal developments were already preparing great changes in Japan, particularly the alienation from the traditional order of powerful elements within the ruling elite; (4) a propensity for group organization beyond the family, combining solidarity within the group and flexible adjustment of differences among groups, provided they did not challenge the foundations of authority symbolized in the Emperor.

One final set of circumstances is crucial: physical environment. Earlier Japan's geographic location, her size, and her limited resources were described in terms unfavorable to the process of modernization. But that was only half the picture, the lesser half. For the social factors outlined above as conducive to innovation and growth were themselves an interaction between the Japanese people and their island environment. And, in a more direct fashion, physical circumstances so aided and accelerated Japan's response to the West in the nineteenth century that the contrasts between her and the other nations of Asia—China and India particularly—become intelligible only as one grasps their significance.

Four points require mention:

(1) While remoteness from Europe and the United States had its drawbacks, as noted earlier, it also spared Japan the full force of Western imperialism after 1800. It gave her a breathing spell in which she

[15] Cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 496-507.

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could observe the fate of her neighbors, and take action to avoid a similar fate. Also, by the time the British, the French, and the Russians had reached the shores of Japan, they were already becoming heavily involved along the route. And in the Northwest Pacific, where they converged on Japan, these rival powers could more effectively check each other than on the Asiatic mainland or the archipelagoes to the south. In any event, to the Western merchant and empire-builder the Japanese islands offered no glittering prize: no market of 400 million, no unfilled lands, no great trade in tea or spices or precious metals.[16]

Thus the political and territorial thrust of Western imperialism had largely spent itself by the time it reached Japan, and was further weakened by its own inner rivalries. The Japanese, united in their resistance to encroachment, did their best to play on these rivalries to exclude everyone. In the end they were largely successful. Even the odious unequal treaties they managed to cancel by the turn of the century. By this time they were well launched on their own career of expansionism.

(2) Two other physical aspects of Japan, her relatively small size and her island character, served directly to facilitate rapid, purposeful change. Less than one-tenth the size of China in 1868, both in area and population, it was far easier on this count for Japan to complete the all-important task of forging a new national unity. Moreover, she has good internal communications by sea—three times the coastline of China. Most of her people live within fifty miles from some port city which has also come to be an industrial center in greater or lesser degree. Under these conditions the inflow of new technology and values from the outside, and their diffusion through the population, were immeasurably easier than in China or India. China's 500,000 villages have formed a vast, impenetrable hinterland until quite recent times.[17] Had her territory consisted only of the lower Yangtze valley, hers might have been a very different story, too.

[16] The attitude of the British is significant. Their factory at Hirado was abandoned in 1624, only ten years after its charter was granted. The conclusion was that the Japanese trade would never amount to anything, since only copper was available for export from Japan and this competed with the output of British mines. Again in 1792 the same argument was cited by a Select Committee of the East India Company against a venture in Japan. Even the energetic Sir Stamford Raffles failed to win adequate support in 1814 for his ambitious proposals to oust the Dutch and move in on the Japanese.

[17] Japan and China again illustrate Adam Smith's dictum: "As by means of water carriage, a more expensive market is opened to every sort of industry than what land carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is frequently not till a long time after that those improvements extend themselves to the inland parts of the country." *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Nicholson ed., London, 1886, Bk. I, ch. III, p. 8.

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In international politics, of course, mass can be a decisive factor. Here Japan's modest size tells against her security in the twentieth century. Earlier this was less true. Indeed, insularity afforded defenses even more formidable than those of England on the other flank of the Eurasian continent.[18] Nevertheless, a sense of national insecurity has clouded Japan's outlook abroad from the beginning of the modern era, and even before. Whatever the less fortunate results of this anxiety, as played upon by the militarists, it did serve to spare her the complacent self-deception of her continental neighbor. It led her to search feverishly for the secrets of national strength in the West, and to apply them at home, whatever the cost to ancient institutions. Frank Gibney speaks of Japan as "a spirit, insular and protesting . . . —a troublesome spirit, unsure of its place, but jealous of its station."[19]

(3) Finally, poverty in agricultural resources, coupled with a maritime position in the world, worked also to accelerate the modernization process. For expanding wealth and income Japan could not look mainly to her extractive industries after 1868. Industrialization was the only answer. But industrialization meant urbanization and education and good communications throughout the country. And it meant a growing dependence on imports of equipment and raw materials in exchange for manufactures sold abroad in competitive world markets. Thus the only pattern of economic growth open to Japan, and one she eagerly adopted, was also the very one which makes for the most rapid technical and institutional change.

Such changes centered in the port cities. There expanding industries and services absorbed most of the increase in the working population after 1900. But they spread in increasing measure through the countryside, as well. The point here is that they could do so with relative ease in Japan, given her physical characteristics. Moreover, if traditional tendencies to authoritarianism and combination failed to exert a more stifling effect on technical progress than they did, perhaps again it was because the geographic position and endowment of this island nation exposed her to the full force of world competition, both economically and politically. Measured against her ambitions her margin for such inefficiencies was narrow.

In a different *social* setting these physical circumstances would not necessarily have worked in such fashion. History reveals many nations which have not been saved from conquest by remoteness, or unified

[18] The Straits of Tsushima are 120 miles across, not 20. Moreover, through most of history the main centers of power have been farther inland in Asia than in Europe.
[19] *Five Gentlemen of Japan*, New York, 1953, p. 3.

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by smallness, or catalyzed by maritime opportunity, or turned to industrialization by lack of arable land. Conversely, in a different environmental setting, Japan's feudal heritage could well have exerted a more stifling influence on social change in modern times. For history has also seen societies with structures so authoritarian as to stultify all impulses to modernization growing out of location or resource endowment. Finally, physical factors and social heritage worked together to produce the result they did only because the Western challenge happened to present itself at a critical moment in Japan's internal development. In this sense there is an element of historical accident—of strategic timing—in the whole story.

Japan's response to the West thus gave expression to a number of forces, each insufficient to explain what happened, some quite unpredictable in their influence except as one sees them acting and interacting with each other in a special conjunction of circumstances. The corollary is that fuller understanding requires the collaboration of both historians and social scientists, each helping to set the questions and find the answers.

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THE POLITICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI*

"WE ARE living in an age in which all roads lead to communism," Molotov proclaimed confidently in 1947. Kaganovich re-echoed him in 1955 by maintaining that "if the nineteenth century was a century of capitalism, the twentieth century is a century of the triumph of socialism and communism." This serenely optimistic viewpoint sees the victory of communism as all-inclusive, leaving no room for any mutual adjustment between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Indeed, the First Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita S. Khrushchev, has repeatedly made it clear that the concept of coexistence relates simply to a transitory phase prior to the final assertion of the Communist mode of life over the entire globe. It would be idle to dismiss these claims as mere expressions of blind fanaticism, for whatever the element of fanaticism in the thinking of Soviet leaders may be, such proclamations of faith in final victory are also supported by observation of recent trends in world affairs. These trends have shown a marked expansion in the territorial base and ideological appeal of the Soviet system. This extension, as has often been noted, has been most marked in areas that are economically underdeveloped and essentially pre-industrial in nature. On the whole, the recent Communist expansion has been most successful in environments approximating that of Russia prior to the Bolshevik Revolution.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss some political implications of the aspirations of the newly independent Asian peoples (and soon, it is to be expected, of the African peoples as well), in the context of the existing global competition between the Communist world, specifically the USSR and China, and the non-Communist world, particularly the United States. Almost inevitably, the projections developed and the conclusions reached will be largely speculative and merely represent an attempt to assess the shape of future developments if present trends continue. Of course, it is quite possible that some completely unforeseeable factor or combination of factors, such as the impact of an outstanding personality, war, or domestic developments in the USSR or the United States, might intervene to change the course of history entirely. This paper does not attempt predictions; it is simply an essay on the meaning and potential significance of existing trends. Its broad

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thesis is that in the present epoch non-democratic forces enjoy a definite advantage over the democratic countries in being able to export their political structure to the newly liberated peoples not only through conspiratorial action, but also through the dynamics of the situation, given the economic and political aspirations of these peoples. As a result, the totalitarian pattern of political and social organization is more likely than not to engulf an even larger portion of mankind. If this happens, it will be exceedingly difficult for these new totalitarian systems to avoid following the Communist model and they will tend to gravitate toward the Soviet orbit. That this may have dire consequences for the democratic world need hardly be said.

Just prior to World War II, the population of the globe was estimated at roughly 2.1 billion. Of these, 170 million were living under a Communist regime, about 1.1 billion were living in countries enjoying national sovereignty in political systems other than Communist, and 815 million were living under colonial tutelage. The revolutionary changes produced by the war and the subsequent period of dislocation, internal strife, Soviet expansion, and the spread of violent nationalism brought about a drastic rearrangement in the political distribution of the peoples of the world. The Communist orbit expanded rapidly, chiefly by absorbing many of the peoples living in sovereign nation-states, while the majority of the colonial peoples were granted, or won, their independence. In 1955 the estimated population of the world stood somewhere in the vicinity of 2.5 billion. Of these, 955 million were now in the Soviet bloc, 650 million were still in the sovereign nation-states that existed in 1939, 170 million were under colonial administration, and 750 million people were living in recently created states which formerly were part of various colonial possessions. It is to be expected that this final category will grow even larger in the near future, in view of events in Morocco, Algeria, British Central and West Africa, etc. Unlike the experience of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe in the age of nationalism, the emergence of former colonies into independent statehood comes at a time when the world is divided into two political blocs—one highly integrated and, by its own definition, fundamentally antagonistic to the other, which is rather loosely held together by a series of treaties, certain common traditions, and a Christian heritage. These two blocs offer radically different approaches and solutions to existing economic, social, and political ills in the newly liberated and largely underdeveloped countries. It is not unlikely that the fate of either bloc will depend to a

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large degree on the course that these newly liberated areas follow, given the existing polarization.[1]

In the initial stages of their statehood, these new sovereign states have adopted, by and large, the political forms of the Western democratic world. It must be remembered, however, that these forms are the product of a long evolution, by trial and error, and arose in response to certain political and economic difficulties. They are thus inextricably linked to the history of the Western nations, and for this reason more capable of withstanding many a contemporary storm. French republicanism, for instance, is so much a product of French historical development (both political and economic) of the last 150 years—and the intellectual tradition behind it is older still—that despite an almost permanent crisis situation it has been able to maintain its institutional forms successfully. Such is generally not the case in these new states. On the contrary, their intellectual climate, fraught with memories of inequality, of shame, of submission to racially and culturally alien masters, and frequently of economic misery, is characterized by a violent rejection of the past. To these new states, it is the future that justifies the present, and the present is accordingly to be subjected to major reconstruction, eradicating the vestiges of all that was unwanted in the past. Thus, the test of the political institutions to be adopted from alien patterns by these new states will be largely a matter of their ability to operate in response to requirements yet to be put before them. Democracy will survive only if it can both satisfy the aspirations of the people and deal effectively with the consequences of satisfying them.

The dominant aspirations of the new states are largely a product of the thinking and activity of a small minority of leaders, drawn from and supported by a relatively restricted intelligentsia. These intellectuals (the word is used loosely), chiefly Western-trained but also containing a sprinkling of Communists, are on the whole elitists, despite their protestations. This is true of men like Nehru or Soekarno, and even more so of the younger generation of leaders around them. Lacking the Western religious tradition which influenced to such a great extent the concept of the dignity of man, and surrounded by millions

[1] It does appear, however, that the Soviet bloc, larger and geographically more coherent, is more likely to endure in the form it has had in the past, if the post-colonial areas veer to the other bloc, than the loosely organized and in some respects directionless and self-doubting non-Communist bloc is, if these new sovereign states veer toward communism. It is to be observed, furthermore, that in periods of crisis a democracy tends to develop many non-democratic characteristics. The debatable question of the inner resiliency of the respective blocs is, however, beyond the scope of our present inquiry.

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and millions of retarded, illiterate, often filthy, and certainly pliant masses, they tend to approach their fellow countrymen with a thinly concealed contempt, or at least an implicit sense of superiority. They feel that, to be operative, such concepts as individual freedom or the dignity of man must be preceded by a drastic educational and economic readjustment of the existing societies, a readjustment which they themselves are prepared to effect. This sense of elitism and their consciousness of intellectual achievement and leadership incline them particularly toward a faith in the accomplishments of social engineering as an answer to existing ills. Man's reason can provide the answer, and man's reason put into action can produce the desired results without a lengthy evolutionary process, such as that undergone by the West. The leadership and the intellectuals of these countries thus tend to believe in man's capacity to steer political and economic development at an accelerated pace toward the achievement of desired ends.

Viewing the past with distaste, deeply conscious of their economic and social backwardness, fully aware that both the USSR and the West are far ahead of them in power, prestige and, in the case of the latter, standard of living, the intellectuals tend to see one factor as paramount in causing this state of inequality: the technological revolution of industrialization. They realize that in the age of technology both power and wealth depend on a solid industrial base, and they note with bitterness that the colonial powers, and their local, conservative, and largely landed allies (sheiks, maharajahs, sultans, etc.), prevented—or at least did not further—industrial development in the colonial areas. But it is not only the industrialization of Western Europe and the United States that has created such a strong impression; they note with particular envy the rapid industrialization of the USSR and its consequent (as it seems to them) rise to world prominence as further proof that industrialization must be achieved if their aspirations, both national and social, are to be fulfilled. Industrialization has thus become a sort of panacea—a key to the future.

If these leaders, already operating largely within the framework of institutions of the Western type, had had only the Western experience as a guide, they might well have leaned toward industrial development on the basis of foreign credit, balanced between a consumers' goods policy and a capital investment policy, gradualist in character. Such a program might even have enlisted the support of some of the local wealthy elements anxious for a large supply of consumers' goods. But the Soviet experience points to an alternative route, in many ways

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more attractive because it is a shortcut.[2] Not that it contains no disagreeable elements—this the intellectuals would be the first to concede. But it is important to remember that these disagreeable elements are less important to them than to their Western counterparts. To the Western intellectual, Communist totalitarianism means, after all, the destruction of values and standards built up through many years. To an Asian, Communism is merely an alternative to liberal democracy, and an alternative which produces the desired effects faster. Furthermore, accepting the Leninist concept of imperialism, they feel themselves free of any responsibility for the unhappy situation prevailing in their countries, blaming it all on their "capitalist oppressors." This, of course, makes the Western model even less acceptable. In addition, some of them are confident that they can avoid these undesirable consequences—a matter to which we will return. The point here is that rapid industrialization appears not only possible but also desirable. Few human beings are truly patient—and the Asian leaders have just been liberated after years of frustration. Their will to action is therefore that much more intense. It is hence quite natural that almost all of the newly liberated countries have adopted programs of industrial development.[3]

These programs—and it must be emphasized that they are still largely modest and preliminary in character—have been initiated in a setting where there is little confidence in slow and chiefly self-directed economic development. The Indian Congress Party has thus made it crystal clear that its goal is a "socialist pattern of society." Private investment can hardly be expected to find comfort in such intentions. Furthermore, the basis for a capitalistic type of economy seems to be lacking. These areas, in general, do not have a large bourgeoisie which could provide the basis for entrepreneurial action, nor do they have local capitalists with the necessary financial resources. They do have large, dormant masses and a few privileged rich with a vested interest in the status quo. In short, there are no cadres other than the intellectuals to launch the desired changes. And, according to all accounts, these people are predisposed toward not only a state-planned and di-

[2] Japan might have been an alternative model, but the collapse of the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere has eliminated the possibility.

[3] To cite one example, the Indonesian National Planning Board in its 1954 estimates for the first Five-Year Plan envisages the following pattern of development: agriculture and social improvements—12 per cent; transport and roads—25 per cent; industry—25 per cent; irrigation—25 per cent; education and health—13 per cent (*Indonesia*, VII, No. 1 [August-September 1955], p. 11).

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rected economic development, but one intended to produce tangible returns at an early date.[4]

Of course, one cannot dismiss altogether the possibility that Asian industrial development will continue at a moderate pace. At the present time, however, the influential intelligentsia and the youth (university students in particular) appear to be hypnotized by the image of large-scale industry. Evidence of this was furnished by the enthusiastic responses that Khrushchev and Bulganin evoked by their frequent adjurations that these areas industrialize.[5] It would be imprudent, therefore, to assume that the Asian elites, wielding power to the extent that they do, will be either willing or able to have patience and act in terms not of their own lifetime but of that of their grandchildren. A very real likelihood exists that the present modest beginnings in industrialization will be followed by an acceleration in pace, particularly

[4] According to the *New York Times*, February 10, 1956, the new Indian Five-Year Plan calls for ". . . total capital outlay by the Government of $10,080,000,000, and $4,830,000 by private enterprise. Of the Government outlay, $4,777,500,000 will be spent on industry, minerals, transport, communications and power.

"By the end of the second plan in 1960-61, food production is expected to go up by 10,000,000 tons, or 15 per cent, cotton by 34 per cent and sugar by 29 per cent. Nearly 21,000,000 acres of new land would have been brought under cultivation.

"Output of steel is to rise from the present 1,300,000 tons to 4,300,000 tons, coal from the present 37,000,000 to 60,000,000 tons, and cement from 4,800,000 to 10,000,000 tons."

The emphasis on industrial development becomes even more evident when one compares the financial outlay for industrial development in the first and second Five-Year Plans: first plan, $1,543-5 billions; the second, $4,783-5 billions, or a 300 per cent increase.

[5] They pursued this line with dogged determination. For example, Khrushchev said at the Taj Mahal: "You are going through the wonderful spring of your country's national liberation and independent government. But I would like to warn you that freedom and independence can only be made lasting if you develop your industry, particularly machine building [Applause]" (*Pravda*, November 21, 1955). Khrushchev told the Indian Parliament: "The course of social development shows that in order to become truly independent and to ensure the welfare of its people each country must have its own developed economy, independent of foreign capital. History teaches that the colonizers' efforts to bring about the foreign enslavement of a less developed country can take the most varied forms. They try in every way to hamper the development of native industry in these countries, fearing that the establishment of its own industry, the creation of its own intelligentsia and the raising of the living standards of its people will strengthen a formerly dependent country, and help it along the path of independent development [Applause]" (*Izvestia*, November 22, 1955). And, again, in the same speech: "In order to create conditions for the country's full independence, it is necessary to create a firm foundation in the form of good industry, and to rely on it. In so doing, it is important to rely first of all on your own resources, especially since certain rich countries, in giving aid to others, want to place those whom they aid under their authority." Speaking at Madras, Khrushchev said: "From personal experience we know that it is not enough to gain national independence; one must strengthen the independence gained in order to be able to defend it. [Stormy applause] The path toward strengthening the independence gained is the path of setting up one's own powerful industry and the path of steadily raising the people's welfare. [Applause] We sincerely wish the Republic of India to have its own powerful, highly developed industry and its own national economy, independent of foreign states" (*Pravda*, November 30, 1955).

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when Chinese economic development begins to gather momentum. What will be some of the political consequences of a more rapid industrialization?

Industrialization involves a number of things. It means building factories; it means the displacement of the small handicraft entrepreneur; it means increasing overpopulation of the urban centers; it means the flow of labor away from rural areas; it means the breakdown of the kinship system, rooted in the villages; it means, in brief, a tremendous change in the existing way of life. But the status quo always has some adherents, who vary in number depending on the attraction of the status quo. In the areas that were formerly colonies, the status quo is buttressed by centuries of tradition, ancient authority and privilege, and the caste system. Industrialization, especially as it begins to spread, will inevitably come into conflict with a variety of established interests. Landlords will resent the loss of cheap labor, local patriarchs will object to the shedding of tradition by the youth flocking to the factories, pre-industrial entrepreneurs will fear the economic consequences of industrial competition, the middle class will be apprehensive of the economic squeeze resulting from capital investment in largely impoverished areas. Resistance, both passive and active, is likely to develop.

It will be accompanied, one might expect, by considerable dislocation. Agricultural production may suffer temporarily; consumers' goods may become scarce; all sorts of temporary adjustments to the requirements of the situation may follow: barracks for the new factory labor, a variety of government measures to prevent serious economic crises, obligatory state loans to raise capital, low wages and high taxation.[6] An atmosphere of conflict may be artificially stimulated to raise morale and induce mass enthusiasm. Discontent, however, will probably not be alleviated by these measures as wants and sacrifices increase and the standard of living is leveled. A crisis situation may develop rapidly.

In such circumstances, those in leadership will be faced with a dilemma: the more moderate, democratic elements, abhorring violence, may suggest slowing down; others, more fanatical or extremist, may demand that industrialization be pushed forward. History shows, unfortunately, that in moments such as these power is usually retained by those willing to keep abreast of the social dynamics, once they have been set in motion. The moderates, to keep power and maintain a mod-

[6] The middle-class elements in India cannot take much comfort in the suggestion made by a taxation inquiry commission, and re-echoed by the Indian Planning Committee, that a "reasonable" ceiling on personal income would be 30 times the national average, which is 280 rupees. The ceiling would then be 8,400 rupees, or $1,764.

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erate program, would have to turn to the conservative elements, finding in them their last refuge and hope. In time, the moderate program might even become one of reaction. This, some of the moderates would not be willing to face. Some might hesitate, others might drift to the extremists. Measures to overcome social resistance would follow accordingly, even though modestly at the beginning.[7]

The modern society is so complex, however, that to effect real change, such as large-scale industrialization, especially in the face of resistance, a high degree of governmental control is necessary lest society disintegrate into anarchy. Western democrats, despite their willingness to engage in governmental planning and direction, have always been careful to avoid a complete commitment of the governmental powers to an artificially induced process of social and economic change. Similarly, in Russia in 1917, it was the fact that the more democratic elements shied away from a total application of coercive power to a society in a stage of transition that gave such a tactical advantage to the Bolsheviks. It is doubtful that all of the present and particularly the future leaders of these new Asian states, given their elitist and dedicated character, will be able to resist the temptation of employing the power at their disposal, both to organize society and to eliminate resistance. Opposition may even encourage the use of force because, once the process of internal revolution has been launched, resistance inevitably takes on the form of interference with the progress of new measures; this, in turn, seems to those in control an attempt to destroy the future so firmly outlined in their minds, and the charge of sabotage follows. Furthermore, once the programmatic plans of the leaders have been launched, not to employ force is to risk anarchy and civil war. Force thus acquires justification in the eyes of those willing to wield it, and far-reaching political control becomes necessary.

But more than this is needed to account to the people for the sacrifices, confusion, and dislocation that an action-program involves. They require a simple but convincing explanation of past evils and a guarantee of future happiness. There is no doubt that ever-growing numbers of people throughout the world are asking questions and searching for the meaning of the baffling conflicts and struggles they are undergoing and the sacrifices that are demanded of them. They must be made to believe that their efforts have some meaning and that these efforts are bound to succeed. True, some of the disruption may be explained by

[7] For a reasoned discussion of the general problem of power, see Barrington Moore, Jr., "Notes on the Process of Acquiring Power," *World Politics*, VIII, No. 1 (October 1955), pp. 1-20.

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pointing to enemies who are preventing the attainment of utopia (e.g., Nasser and Great Britain, Soekarno and the Netherlands). But these regimes need further justification—they must raise capital for investment, they must push forward since their image of the future is to be realized within a generation or two. Effort and sacrifice must be mobilized and channeled. In Asia, within the context of a movement of reform and change, of rejection of the past and efforts to rebuild society through the instrumentalities of the state, the people's need for an explanation may lead to the emergence of an official state ideology which explains the past and provides the key to the future. Social control, reaching deep into society, may thus become more and more necessary. Pluralism, the basis of democracy, may become an awkward impediment to the monolithic unity essential to success.

The question arises, however, of how this control is to be organized so as to be effective and how this ideology is to be developed and carried forward. It is one thing to rule a status quo society through a traditional form of dictatorship which avoids all major change. Such a dictatorship can rely on the support of a number of vested interests and traditions, and hence can rule from above without penetrating society very deeply, depending merely on this balance of interests to maintain itself in power. At the same time, authority is accepted by the population as part of the traditional order, especially since that authority, subscribing to the traditional norms, does not seem to invade all aspects of their daily existence. The situation becomes radically different when a regime, ruling largely from above (as is now the case in Asia, with the educated minority at the helm), proceeds to tear up the social fabric. It then has to devise an institutional apparatus that can be used to penetrate society, rally it around the official action-program, and channel its energies. In modern times, the single-party system has emerged as such an instrument of institutionalized revolution, and the Asians have not been blind to this development. The need for a single party is all the greater in a society where age-old social forms are crumbling and the people, torn from their villages and accepted norms, seek a new sense of belonging and new institutional forms to provide the security they desire.[8] This party then becomes the chief instrument of rule (*vide* the Congress Party) and inevitably—although not necessarily at once—the standard-bearer of the ideology.

Indeed, if one looks at the existing situation, it readily becomes apparent that those countries which are already turning away from the

[8] Cf. F. G. Friedman, "The Impact of Technically Advanced Civilization on Underdeveloped Areas," *Confluence*, IV, No. 4 (January 1956), pp. 391-406.

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past (e.g., India and Egypt[9]) are moving in this direction. Others, still wobbling between the legacy of the past and the promise of the future, and with very uncertain control of the present (e.g., Indonesia and Burma, in both of which the Communists have recently scored electoral successes), do not give much indication that their multi-party systems are likely to endure for long. The one-party system with an official ideology appears more likely to succeed in launching, and certainly in executing forcefully, the type of program that the more ambitious elements among the newly liberated peoples desire. Even when such programs are launched in a setting which largely resembles the Western democratic model, it is probable that the revolutionary consequences of such a program will eventually place power in the hands of a single party with the will to push the measures through and with an ideology that justifies them. The totalitarian pattern is incipient in such a development, to say the least.

It could be argued that this in itself need not be alarming. After all, the great majority of mankind has lived for centuries under non-democratic forms of government. Constitutional democracy is a relatively recent phenomenon which, at best, is the realization of a certain potential inherent in some men and societies. That such are in the minority is not surprising. Furthermore, democracy has succeeded in emerging from and surviving in seas of non-democratic systems.

The point is, however, that a vast difference exists between traditional dictatorial systems and the new totalitarian variety. The latter are revolutionary, universalistic in their goals, and dedicated to the destruction of all systems that differ from themselves.[10] The development of these new totalitarian systems, furthermore, would take place in the context of a world-wide struggle between the Soviet and the Anglo-American blocs. The failure of the Fascist and Nazi types of totalitarianism has left few models for new totalitarian regimes to emulate, and it must be remembered that these new countries, insofar as their social and

[9] In Egypt, President Nasser's book on the goals of the revolution, together with the constitutional draft, already comprise the embryo of such an ideology. At the same time, press restrictions assure the government a complete monopoly in the field of mass communications.

[10] This distinction is developed in the writer's *Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) and in an article, "Totalitarianism and Rationality" (*American Political Science Review*, L, No. 3, September 1956), where the following definition of totalitarianism is offered: "Totalitarianism is a system where technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population."

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economic conditions are concerned, are very similar to China and the USSR prior to their industrial drives. It is also to be anticipated that the Soviet orbit will tend to encourage the undertaking of large-scale internal changes in the expectation that these will produce irreversible trends favorable to an ultimately Communist pattern, especially since they will be occurring in the context of anti-colonialism. That seems to be the implication of Shepilov's remarks at the Twentieth Party Congress:

"One of the characteristic features of our epoch is the combination of the socialist revolution in individual countries with the struggle on a mass scale of any and all oppressed and dissatisfied people. Great Lenin rejected as pedantic and ridiculous the point of view that somewhere an army will take positions and say: 'We are for socialism,' and in another place another army will say: 'We are for imperialism,' and that would be the social revolution.

"What happens in actual fact, under the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism, is the confluence into one mighty stream of the popular liberation struggle of many socialist and non-socialist currents and streams, which wash loose and undermine from various sides the worn-out capitalist building."[11]

In Shepilov's analysis, the destruction of capitalism will leave the uncommitted lands only one alternative—socialism; and socialism has been clearly defined as a society like that of the USSR. Implicit, therefore, in the statements made before the Twentieth Congress is the belief that although there may be varied ways of reaching socialism, there is only one kind of socialism, that which has already been erected in the USSR. The destruction of the capitalist structure will leave the world only one choice. In the Communist view, rapid industrialization is to be encouraged, for it makes it less likely that the new nations will be able to maintain their democratic forms.

The confidence of Communist leaders is buttressed by the fact that the USSR and China are excellently equipped to influence these new states. Unlike the West, they share with them a history of underdevelopment and a sense of national inferiority. These the USSR has overcome, to a great extent, by constructing its own industrial base. Furthermore, both the USSR and China are in a uniquely strategic position to aid and abet the new Asian nations and lead them by example.[12] Their geographical proximity makes them logical partners

[11] *Pravda*, February 17, 1956.

[12] The Soviet leaders, while on their Asian tour, frequently emphasized their willingness to share with Asiatic students the latest Soviet industrial know-how. The USSR indicated in February 1956 that it was prepared to grant 200 scholarships to Asian stu-

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in trade and economic development. Unlike the West, with its relatively longer history of gradual development, both the USSR and China can point to themselves as models for a rapid achievement of the desired objective—intensive industrialization. They also share with these nations a large peasant class that accepts authority which is distant from it and is traditional, that fears the machine and yet wants to harness it, that senses the breakdown of the existing social framework and is at a loss as to what to do about it. Into this situation step the Marxist program and the Communist Party.[13] At the same time, the USSR and China claim that the future is theirs, and there is no doubt that many Asians (and Africans) have become convinced that what they say is true. The electoral successes of the Communists in Burma in the spring of 1956 certainly seem at least a partial indication of this. With excellent insight into this state of mind, Khrushchev and Bulganin repeatedly stressed the theme of the inevitable victory of communism on their Asian tour.

It would therefore be idle to assume that the Communist countries will limit themselves to gracious encouragement. In the Communist conception, political developments the world over are part of an unfolding process of struggle between diametrically opposed economic and political systems. This being so, the fate of these new states will be determined in terms of their future coalescence with one or the other bloc. Recent Soviet statements indicate that the Soviet leaders have already become confident that present trends in these states are bringing them into the Soviet orbit, which they identify by the Aesopian term, "the peace-loving bloc."

This theme, so heavily stressed at the Twentieth Party Congress, was to some extent anticipated in an article which appeared in *Nowe Drogi*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party (United Workers' Party), in January 1956. The author of the article, a specialist in Asian affairs, first points out that Asia has witnessed two types of national liberation, one led by the Communist parties and one which has left "the frame of the social structure untouched." He then frankly admits that until recently the Communists "were not able to appreciate fully the significance of the fact that four hundred million Hindus and eighty million Indonesians obtained state

dents to study Soviet techniques. Also, the USSR is now constructing a large technological institute in Rangoon, a hospital, an exhibition hall, and a sports center. In India, the Soviets have undertaken to build a steel mill with a capacity of one million tons.

[13] See the stimulating discussion of this problem by Adam B. Ulam, "The Historical Role of Marxism and the Soviet System," *World Politics*, VIII, No. 1 (October 1955), pp. 20-46.

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independence and national sovereignty. We tended to simplify the matter, seeing in the act of proclamation of the independence of India and Indonesia something in the way of a maneuver making possible further continuation of colonialism under a new label."[14] It is now clear, he says, that these events were the beginning of an even greater struggle.

After quoting the premier of Indonesia to the effect that the major task of the day is the removal of colonial vestiges from the Indonesian economy, the article continues: "The struggle for economic independence, for complete self-sufficiency of the liberated countries, is not an easy matter. . . . The most consequential fighter for full and real independence of the liberated countries is their Communist parties."[15] These new countries thus have a choice: either to remain exploited and hence not really independent, or to become economically independent. And here the organ of the Central Committee comes to the heart of the matter: to become economically independent, the new countries must take "the way of independent industrialization."[16]

Such industrialization, says the article, must avoid any Western entanglements, "for industrialization may become a trap of even greater dependence when it is carried on through 'aid' from great capitalist countries, and particularly the United States. First of all, such industrialization does not develop according to criteria of the economic interests of a given country, but is dictated by the interest of foreign capitalists. . . . Secondly, such industrialization involves burdensome political conditions which sooner or later will vitiate their independence. . . ."[17] China avoided such a situation because the leadership of its revolution was in the hands of a Communist Party. Its industrialization is entirely independent of foreign capital. The other Asian nations might easily lose their independence, *Nowe Drogi* points out, if it were not for the changed international situation: "Fortunately, a new political and economic factor has appeared in the arena: the strength of the countries of the socialist camp and their economic potential. This factor has become a great stimulant to the political and economic emancipation of the young Asian and African republics. On the one hand, it neutralized and paralyzed the direct military and political pressure of the imperialist camp; on the other, it opened up previously unknown perspectives of economic independence and independent industrializa-

[14] Stefan Arski, "Wielka podroz" ("The Great Journey"), *Nowe Drogi*, 1, No. 79 (1956), p. 14.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[17] *Ibid.*

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tion.[18] The article concludes by suggesting that, with the Western monopoly broken, these new countries can count on Soviet aid and proceed to industrialize at will. "These nations find support in the political and economic might of the socialist camp. . . . 'The result of the struggle in the final analysis depends on the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., constitute the great majority of mankind' (Lenin)."[19]

This matter being crucial to the victory of world revolution, we can expect Communist propaganda to continue to emphasize the importance of Soviet industrial achievements, and to suggest that only the "imperialistic capitalists" of the West would urge the Asians not to engage in it. The local Communist parties can be expected to be particularly vociferous in urging rapid industrial expansion on the Soviet and Chinese model, and to attempt to take advantage of any split within the leadership that might arise when the difficulties of such a program become more apparent. And in areas still under colonial control, the Communists have the added advantage of being able to pose not only as the architects of an industrial society but as fighters for the liberation which must precede such industrialization. In a sense, the local Communist leadership may even calculate that the economic situation in most of these states, especially in terms of raw materials, makes industrial development difficult, and may therefore urge its adoption so as to accentuate the crisis and make the choice between moderation and extremism that much sharper. Their opportunity may be even greater when modest industrial development begins to bear fruit—appetite grows with the eating—and pressures for further expansion mount accordingly.

This strategy of the local Communist parties is made all the more effective in that they can claim to possess a monopoly of understanding the nature of Soviet development. In this, they enjoy a considerable advantage over other competing political groups: the adherents of free enterprise are few and are handicapped by the fact that most Asians identify capitalism with colonialism, while Asian social democrats have no real experience on which to base their actions, except perhaps that of Israel. Western European socialism is, after all, a product of capital-

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 19. The ideological aspects of this were discussed recently by D. Tumur-Ochir, "O nekapitalisticheskom puti razvitiia otstalykh stran k sotsializmu" ("On the non-capitalist way of development of the backward countries toward socialism"), *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 1 (1956), pp. 47-63. Tumur-Ochir, using Soviet Mongolia as a case study, develops the thesis that the Soviet experience demonstrates a desirable non-capitalist way of development of backward countries.

[19] *Nowe Drogi*, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

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ism and nowhere has a truly socialist state been set up without a prior capitalist phase. Dismissing the Western experience as inapplicable, the Communists can point to themselves as the only group equipped to push through a program like the Soviet Union's. And if internal difficulties mount, and some moderates become disillusioned and even veer away from industrialization, it may be the local Communist Party which will emerge in the guise of a leader, willing and determined to push through the original policy. Their task may appear all the more attractive to some of the semi-democratic leaders since Khrushchev's declaration that dictatorship of the proletariat in its violent form is no longer the logical consequence of Communist activity, and his acceptance of alternative ways of achieving socialism. Thus dedication to the goal, existing conditions of crisis, a splitting-away of adherents, and a general tendency toward political totalitarianism may force the leadership to cooperate more and more with the local Communist parties. Whether this in itself will mean that they will become Communist totalitarianisms remains to be seen. At the moment, however, there appear to be no viable institutions or alternative programs of sufficient appeal and scope to match the Communist Party organization, with its Soviet support, and its ideological explanation of the past and "scientific" assessment of the future, once the disintegrative consequences of rapid industrialization begin to make themselves felt in largely backward and traditional societies.

The West must therefore consider the real possibility that the areas now in flux will ultimately fall within the Communist orbit. Can this outcome be prevented? And if so, how? Basically, there seem to be two available courses of action. One is to encourage those social and political elements which are opposed to rapid and large-scale industrialization. To some extent, this alternative finds cogency in the fact that such elements are usually sympathetic to the West. Why then, the argument runs, should we undermine them either by helping their nations to industrialize too fast, or by failing to obstruct such developments, which can only destroy them and produce consequences inimical to us? Instead, we should grant them military aid to buttress their spirit of resistance to external aggression, and indulge in limited ventures like the Point Four Program to alleviate the more obvious sources of social unrest. Stable and sympathetic governments will be the result. Certainly, the apparent success of our policy toward Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan and Iran may be considered a justification of this line of reasoning.

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It is not easy to dismiss such an argument. It has considerable support in this country, and it is doubly attractive because its positive consequences become manifest immediately. Its weakness, however, lies precisely in its strength—the positive consequences it produces are essentially static in character and do not take into account the changes that are occurring in those areas. Such a policy, in the short run, might be successful; it would probably result in pro-Western but rather conservative regimes which would rely for their internal support on a balance of various established interest groups. In the long run, it would probably produce a complete collapse. It would result in the alienation of the younger generation—the students, young journalists, former fighters for independence—it would be exploited by the Communist parties as indicating our determination to maintain economic supremacy in these areas, a charge believed even by Asian observers friendly to us,[20] and it could produce only temporarily stable and conservative dictatorships, the fall of which would precipitate an even more rapid rise of hostile totalitarianisms. Such a policy would be meaningful only in the context of a determination on our part to resolve our differences with the USSR in a radical and final fashion in the near future.

But if we are to continue to be faced by a fundamentally hostile and energetic Soviet bloc, then our efforts vis-à-vis these areas must aim at a more positive relationship with them which takes into account the future consequences of our present actions. Given the desire of these nations to industrialize, and recognizing the political danger of the shocks that rapid industrialization produces, the other alternative is to attempt to ease the pains of that industrialization. Our hope would be that, with these pains eased, more moderate elements would succeed in maintaining themselves in power and a growth of democratic tradition would ensue. In the context of such an analysis, the current political views of Nehru or Soekarno become less important; the chief aim is that they succeed in satisfying the dominant aspirations of their articulate elites without opening the floodgates to totalitarianism, ultimately of a Communist variety. If they succeed, they may be able to raise cadres imbued with their own spirit (which is fundamentally unlike that of the Soviet Marxists), which, when time washes away the more bitter (and exaggerated) memories of colonialism, will tend to coalesce with the West.

Some argue that, to do this, the West will have to be willing to help these areas with a vast program of sharing its industrial know-how and

[20] Cf. A. K. Brohi, "Asia and the Western Man," *Confluence*, IV, No. 3 (October 1955), pp. 302-12.

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financial resources.[21] The burden of that aid would fall on the United States, although the United Kingdom and the German Federal Republic ought to carry their share. The object of this aid would not only be to change somewhat the intellectual atmosphere in which the development programs are now being undertaken, but also to minimize the degree of social coercion which dependence on their own efforts will inevitably produce in these backward countries. Foreign capital might make it possible for these regimes to increase the production level of consumers' commodities and also to limit the commitment of national energy to heavy capital development, part of which would then be shouldered by foreign capital. In this manner, the social pressures in the direction of totalitarianism would be lessened.

The difficulty with this argument, and the writer's consequent pessimism about it, are based on a twofold consideration. It seems highly unlikely that Western capital will be available in sufficient quantities to produce the desired effect. Such capital could be forthcoming through private investment or through state loans. Foreign private investment in the new Asian countries, except for a few modest ventures, is not likely to develop, because the necessary confidence is absent. Private investment, by its very nature, depends on profit, and these states offer little encouragement to private business not only because of their political instability and hostility to the West, but also because their announced goal is a socialist society. In fact, foreign investment is viewed by many Asians as another form of colonialism, and stringent measures to ensure native control of foreign companies have been adopted. Under these conditions, any long-range investment program is faced with the prospect of expropriation and socialization. The Abadan incident serves as a warning. Short-range ventures, based on high interest, are unlikely to have the desired social effect and their open profit motive is not apt to engender much sympathy among the Asian elites.

The second alternative, therefore, is for the United States, as well as the United Kingdom and the German Federal Republic, to engage in large-scale programs of economic aid. A few influential voices on behalf of this policy are being heard in the United States on both the Democratic and the Republican side of the political fence. Such a policy would mean large-scale investment and, probably, major purchases of Asian surpluses and staples. Multi-billion dollar programs of

[21] The scale of this program is suggested by the fact that India alone needs $2,520,000,000 to close the gap between the estimated cost of the development program through 1961 and the resources it will be able to raise internally (*New York Times*, February 10, 1956).

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But note what has happened. (My & data)
& note that became developed to grow faster on
per capita basis relatively > aid available
than time.

this kind, when coupled with existing military expenditures, would demand at least the maintenance of, if not an increase in, the present level of taxation. This degree of taxation, in the eyes of the political opponents of such a program and of the American public in general, would seem designed to give aid to regimes whose foreign policies could be construed as hostile neutralism. The fact that this may be irrelevant to the future of world politics would certainly not be readily apparent or even explicable. Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that it would be politically feasible for any United States administration to engage in a long-range program of this sort. Only if the need for it became overwhelmingly obvious in the face of imminent danger would the program be possible. Then the American people would probably respond, as they did in the past with the Lend-Lease Program and the Marshall Plan. Unfortunately, in this case we are dealing with imperceptible developments which, by the time they become perceptible to public opinion in the West, will be irreversible.

The second major consideration that makes for pessimism about the prospect for success of even a reasonably forward-looking American policy with respect to these areas is the very assumption on which the foregoing discussion was implicitly based. Western capital, if generously applied, might help the underdeveloped countries to start fulfilling some of their most urgent aspirations while alleviating some of the more dangerous consequences of such reforms and undertakings, and at the same time winning friends. But this assumes that there is a fixed time limit in the aspirations of the elites of these countries. Unfortunately, there is some likelihood that these elites would merely utilize our aid to speed up the achievement of the goals (or maximize them), matching our aid with the maximum of effort. Any attempt by us to encourage them to slow down would be exploited by the Communist parties as foreign intervention (and be so viewed by most Asians) and would negate our purpose. Many Asians sympathetic to us still feel that ". . . most, if not all, of the countries in Asia are not yet free from economic bondage. Although the European powers have disappeared from the stage, they continue to pull wires in the wings."[22] Our efforts to slow down their pace would certainly be interpreted as further proof of this. In such an event, the USSR would probably express its willingness to aid them while encouraging maximum internal effort—advice more to the taste of many Asian intellectuals.

The political consequences in either case would thus be the same. The great tragedy of the present situation is that any effort to slow

[22] Brohi, *op.cit.*, p. 306.

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down the development of these areas will immediately play into the hands of the extremists, particularly the Communists, who are waiting on the sidelines. The only hope of the moderates is therefore to go along, but once the program is launched, the danger that they will eventually be obliterated mounts. Immoderate methods of wielding power are necessary in such situations, and modern totalitarianism seems to be well equipped to meet this requirement.

Insofar as the immediate future is concerned, it thus appears that the democratic world is severely handicapped, both ideologically and instrumentally, in intervening in the political struggle which is implicit in the economic development of these new nations. Its basic assumptions make it difficult to respond on either ground with the desired effect and still remain true to itself. From the ideological point of view, a true democracy is always handicapped when faced by a militant, universalistic totalitarianism, for it is contrary to the spirit of democracy to formulate a closed, foolproof system of thought which can compete with the totalitarian ideology. Instrumentally, the democratic system, being the complex product of long philosophical tradition and institutional growth, is not able to organize those who subscribe to its ideals into effective action-oriented movements as the totalitarian conspiracies do. As a result, the major focus of democratic efforts to influence the new nations is on external action, i.e., governmental action, usually in the form of grants and loans. Unfortunately, efforts to channel aid in such a way as to make it maximally effective are viewed with suspicion or are rejected outright.[23] It appears that existing hostility to the West is not diminished even by liberal grants, while Communist trade or loans are viewed with favor by many.

It thus may well be that the time has come for the United States to reconsider its aid policy. The moment may have arrived for a radical shift from the position of an active external "doer" (so characteristic of United States policy since the great success of the Marshall Plan) to that of a sympathetic observer, willing to engage in such activities as will benefit both us and the Asians without exacerbating the presently unfavorable trends. It is not within the scope of this article to outline in detail the nature of such activities but primary among them could be economic trade on the largest scale possible (this might even leave some room for behind-the-scenes government sponsorship), to make

[23] E.g., Asian countries have been unwilling to take advantage of the American offer of $100,000,000 for regional development under the Colombo Pact because they do not want to engage in regional cooperation; Indonesia is not using its $100,000,000 credit with the World Bank because it is unwilling to accept help in surveying and other technical prerequisites.

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available to the Asians (if they want it) our machinery in exchange for whatever they have to offer. Such a policy would also make it clear that, while we are willing to help the Asians, we do not want them to become dependent on us, since trade is a matter of partnership, while aid is not. Simultaneously, we could offer, on bilateral grounds, military aid to those nations that want it, without necessarily engaging in cumbersome and largely illusory structures, such as SEATO, which merely serve as irritants to the uncommitted Asians. A simple declaration to the effect that we will defend any free nation against Communist aggression would probably be as effective militarily and more acceptable politically.

In other words, we would cease struggling actively for Asia under conditions manifestly unfavorable to us while in fact creating the basis for cooperation should the time come when the Asians desire it. In the final analysis, the fate of Asia is up to the Asians and neither the West nor the USSR is in a position to steer the economic and political development of these areas. There are certain trends now in motion that are highly inimical to us and these we ought to avoid augmenting. We can neutralize direct Soviet efforts at conquest by a firm military stance, but there is little we can do to prevent internal subversion. Our present involvement, albeit with the best of intentions, can only produce adverse results in certain key areas, such as India or Indonesia. A policy of competing with the USSR in extending aid can only serve to strengthen the already prevalent belief that it is politically activated, without substantially eliminating the political dangers of a rapid economic revolution. But a policy of sympathetic observation and disengagement can do much to eradicate the hatred of colonialism and the suspicion of imperialism which even our present actions breed. The result might be a clearing of the atmosphere which would create a more favorable climate for eventual democratic victory.[24] The time may eventually come when some Asians will perceive more accurately the nature of our motives, especially when the mist of alleged American imperialism lifts to reveal the real motives of Soviet aid. The latter may become even clearer when the Communists proceed to exploit the internal difficulties caused by rapid industrialization.[25] That such awak-

[24] This victory, however, is unlikely to mean that an industrial India or Burma would resemble the United States or even the United Kingdom. The most we can hope for (although present trends are to the contrary) is that, despite the probable socialization of their economies, they will succeed in retaining political freedom and the values connected with it.

[25] Alexander Gerschenkron makes the point that the tendency toward political radicalism in Russia consequent upon industrialization waned after the critical period passed. Cf. his thought-provoking study, "The Problem of Economic Development in Russian

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ening may come too late is possible, but that happens to be precisely the nature of our disadvantage in the present epoch in Asia. In such delicate circumstances, it is sometimes more difficult and more fruitful to do little than to do too much.

Intellectual History of the Nineteenth Century," in *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, ed. by Ernest J. Simmons, Cambridge, Mass., 1955.

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COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

Their Nature and Function

By BERNARD S. MORRIS

IT was once suggested that the basic trait of psychological warfare—and, incidentally, the greatest asset to those that practice it—is its lack of known positive results.[1] No satisfactory method has yet been developed to measure the effects of a propaganda campaign on its chosen audience. This characteristic is at once the greatest weakness of propaganda and psychological warfare (how does the operator know whether his effort was well spent or not?) and their greatest strength (if there is no reliable evaluation of the effort, it had better be continued, or even intensified, lest ground be lost).

The difficulties standing in the way of an assessment of the value of any propaganda effort hold true for Communist international front organizations, but the problem is eased by the very nature of these organizations, which function less for the benefit of an outside audience than for themselves. This is, of course, a fundamental characteristic of many organizations, but it is particularly true of the international fronts. A brief résumé of the role of these organizations in Communist strategy and some examination of their actual performance may help to establish this point.

The use of mass organizations in the Communist movement is as old as Communist history itself. As far back as 1902, Lenin made a distinction between the function of the party organization and of such general organizations as trade unions which, under the secret control of the party, could attract far greater mass support than the doctrinaire and disciplined party could ever hope to acquire.[2] After the Bolsheviks seized power, Lenin spoke of the impossibility of effecting the dictatorship of the proletariat without a number of "transmission belts," as he called them, from the Communist Party to the masses.[3]

Elaborating on Lenin, Stalin pointed out in 1924 that the prole-

[1] Renzo Sereno, "Psychological Warfare, Intelligence, and Insight," *Psychiatry*, XIII, No. 2 (May 1950), pp. 266-73.

[2] "What Is To Be Done?" in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (2 vols.), Moscow, 1946, I, p. 235.

[3] "The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Comrade Trotsky," in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, IX, New York, 1943, pp. 5-6. Also, " 'Left-Wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder," in Lenin, *Selected Works* (2 vols.), *op.cit.*, II, p. 592.

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tariat has a number of organizations aside from the Communist Party ". . . without which it cannot properly wage the struggle against capital: trade unions, co-operative societies, factory and works organizations. . . ." By virtue of its special qualifications, Stalin continued, the Communist Party is ". . . the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the [working] class."[4]

"Why," Stalin asked himself subsequently, "are these 'transmission belts' or 'levers' in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat necessary?" Characteristically, he proceeded to answer his own question: "The proletariat needs these transmission belts, these levers, and this directing force, because without them it would be, in its struggle for victory, a weaponless army in the face of organized and armed capital. . . . The systematic help of these organizations and the directing force of the vanguard are needed because without them a dictatorship of the proletariat to any extent durable and firm is impossible."[5]

It seems clear from the above that Lenin and Stalin were primarily concerned with the role of mass organizations after the seizure of power, and after the seizure of power in Russia at that. It does not strain the imagination, however, to envisage the use of this type of organization by Communist parties not in power. Yet some distinction must be made between the mass organization pictured by Lenin and Stalin and the camouflaged front organization, making its appeal to the non-Communist sympathizer.[6] The former was regarded as an instrument of control, an agent for effecting party decisions. This type of mass organization is a step removed—and a big step, at that—from the front organization, which is largely concerned with propaganda. This distinction is particularly necessary for an understanding of the role of the international front organization.

It was left to the Comintern and, in the first instance, to the genius of Willi Muenzenberg, founder of the Communist Youth International and architect of the front organizations, to open a channel to non-Communist sympathizers ". . . through a series of organizations loosely

[4] "The Foundations of Leninism," in J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1940, pp. 77-78.

[5] "On the Problems of Leninism," in *ibid.*, pp. 131-32.

[6] Philip Selznick in his study, *The Organizational Weapon* (New York, 1952, pp. 114ff.), suggests "peripheral organization" as a generic term for various types of front organizations. Although the term "peripheral" is an improvement over "front," it is not clear in his text whether he distinguishes these organizations from the mass organizations, as Stalin depicted them, or includes them within the general category.

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connected with the party by common aims, but free from the same commitments to revolutionary action and from the same stringent requirements of doctrine and discipline."[7] With the establishment in 1921 of the International Workers' Relief to help alleviate the famine in Russia, Muenzenberg set the pattern for the front organization and provided an organizational reference for the "fellow-traveler." By 1926 the Comintern functionary, O. V. Kuusinen, was telling the Executive Committee: "The first part of our task is to build up, not only communist organisations, but other organisations as well, above all mass organisations sympathising with our aims, and able to aid us for special purposes. We have already such organisations in some countries, for instance the International Red Aid, the Workers' International Relief, etc. . . . Besides this we require a number of more or less firmly established organisatory [organizational] fulcrums, which we can utilize for our further work, ensuring that we are not condemned to the Sisyphus-like task of only influencing the masses politically, only to see this mass influence constantly slip through our hands. We must create a whole solar system of organisations and smaller committees around the Communist Party, so to speak, smaller organisations working actually under the influence of our Party (not under mechanical leadership)."[8]

It may be that the Communist movement did not exactly create a "whole solar system" of special organizations, but the endless lists of captured organizations and nostalgic recollections of intellectuals and others testify to some success in this venture during the interwar years.[9]

Although they had their counterparts in the interwar period, the contemporary international front organizations are products of wartime unity, which conditioned both their creation and their development.[10] Once the quarantine on the Soviet Union had been lifted in

[7] E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, III, London, 1953, p. 404. On Muenzenberg, see also Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, pp. 610-15; and Muenzenberg's own *Die Dritte Front*, Berlin, 1930.

[8] *International Press Correspondence*, VI, No. 28 (April 15, 1926), p. 429, "Report of the Commission for Work Among the Masses," given at the Seventeenth Session of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International, March 11, 1926.

[9] See, e.g., Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing*, London, 1954, pp. 194-212 and *passim*.

[10] The more prominent Communist international front organizations are the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions (including a number of trade union internationals organized along craft lines, paralleling the non-Communist International Trade Secretariats), the World Federation of Democratic Youth, its "autonomous affiliate," the International Union of Students, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the International Organization of Journalists, and the International Federation of Resistance Fighters.

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the fight against the Axis, the way was open for the USSR to construct a network of front organizations linking itself to professional, social, and economic movements in the West. Successful initially in creating international organizations that included substantial non-Communist representation, the Kremlin soon saddled them with policy requirements which inevitably drove out the non-Communists and reduced the organizations to glorified paper mills, forms without substance, drums beating on the ears of a large, but captive, audience.

The histories of all international front organizations during the postwar decade have followed an identical pattern. Set up under Communist control, they were at first sufficiently tolerant to allow for divergent opinion. They split when it became clear beyond doubt that the organizations were exclusively devoted to support of Soviet political warfare against the West and of Communist military actions in Asia. In a number of cases, non-Communist contingents established their own groups, which have since been concerned largely with counterpropaganda against their respective parent organizations. The original international organizations were reduced to Communist rumps, their support drawn chiefly from Communist countries. Subsequent efforts of the Communists to retrieve the old and win over new non-Communists when Soviet tactics required them to do so have failed completely.

The postwar cycle of the international front organizations is well illustrated by the experience of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), initially the most hopeful of such Communist ventures. The WFTU represented a unique opportunity for the Soviet Union to gain the support of world labor, for which it had made an unsuccessful bid during the interwar years through the medium of the Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern). Set up as a subsidiary by the Comintern in 1921 in order to bind the trade union movement of the world to Moscow, the Profintern failed to make any important inroads on the Western trade unions.[11] During the period of the Popular Front in the 1930's, the Profintern found itself unable to reach any agreement with the International Federation of Trade Unions—the so-called Amsterdam International. Consequently, it advised its affiliates to make

[11] E. H. Carr sets 1922 as the high-water mark of the Profintern's success in western and central Europe (*op.cit.*, III, p. 459). He writes: "It continued from time to time to have its value as an instrument of propaganda: and its embarrassments in Europe were probably outweighed by its usefulness in Asia . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 461), a characterization that has some validity for the WFTU today. Carr deals with the origins of the Profintern in *ibid.*, pp. 398-401 and 459-462.

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such arrangements as they could with the Socialist trade unions and dissolved itself in 1937.[12]

During the war, the Soviet trade unions re-established contact with the British Trades Union Congress through the medium of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, formed to exchange views and information on problems of common interest arising from the war. A prospect was thus opened for the Russians to entrench themselves in a new, all-inclusive trade union international. Success would have enabled them not only to prevent the re-emergence of the Amsterdam International, but also to influence non-Communist affiliates whose support was vital to the postwar governments.

Under pressure from the Russians, the American CIO, and the French and Latin American unions, the British TUC reluctantly set the machinery in motion for an international conference in 1945, at which the WFTU was formed. From its foundation, the Communists could count on a majority of votes in the WFTU Congress and also in the smaller General Council. What is more, with the election of Louis Saillant as General Secretary, the Communists took control of the WFTU's administrative machinery, an outcome partly facilitated—unlikely though it seems—by lack of interest on the part of the TUC and the CIO.

During the first years of the WFTU's history, when the Communists were following the strategy of a "united front from above," they made no attempt to dominate the non-Communist unions. They preferred to have the WFTU appear as a non-partisan labor organization, lending respectability and universality to their protests, their appeals, and their investigations. But as issues were drawn between the United States and the USSR, particularly over the Marshall Plan, cooperation between the Communist and non-Communist unions on a non-political basis became more difficult. On January 19, 1949, the British TUC, the American CIO, and the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions walked out of the Executive Bureau meeting. By 1950, all the non-Communist affiliates of the WFTU had withdrawn.

Since the split that year, the WFTU has become an exclusively Communist-controlled organization. The bulk of its claimed (and doubtlessly exaggerated) membership of 84 million lies within the Communist orbit. Of its estimated 65,000,000 members in 1953, for example, 58,500,000 were in Communist-governed countries, where the so-called trade unions are instruments of the government and in no sense subject to WFTU influence. Another 4,500,000 were in the Communist-

[12] William Z. Foster, *History of the Three Internationals*, New York, 1955, p. 398.

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dominated trade union federations of Italy and France, in whose affairs the WFTU also plays only a minor role. This left only 2,000,000 members in the entire non-Communist world, outside of Italy and France, and of these, two-thirds were in Indonesia and India.

It might be noted parenthetically that not only do the Communists vastly exaggerate the number of members in each international front organization, but they also conveniently forget to mention the duplication of membership among the various organizations.

Given the fact that the WFTU is completely controlled by the Communists, with a membership that is overwhelmingly Communist, it is probably more accurate to characterize the WFTU as an international propaganda agency operating in the field of labor than as an international trade union organization. Moreover, as a propaganda agency, the WFTU's output appears to be directed less to the non-affiliated trade unions than to its own members.

As an organization bound by the interests of Soviet foreign policy, the WFTU is by its nature unable to represent the bread-and-butter interests of the working class. The WFTU's constant appeals for unity of action to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Christian Federation of Trade Unions have fallen on deaf ears. It has been no more successful in weaning away individual affiliates of these Internationals, which is the basic purpose of the unity of action campaign. In fact, it is doubtful that the WFTU expects its appeals to be successful. This was made plain, for example, at the meeting of the WFTU's Executive Committee in Budapest on October 10-12, 1955, when its president, Guiseppe Di Vittorio, said of past rejections of WFTU invitations for unity of action: "What do we care about taunts? For the trade unions and for the workers of the world the importance of their unity, or at any rate their agreement, is so great that it compels any honest militant of the working class to neglect any question of personal pride."[18] This is a sample of the political paranoia which characterizes the conduct not only of the WFTU, but of the other Communist front organizations as well.

It is also important to note that whenever the WFTU's strength has been put to the test at the local trade union level, it has become clear that the WFTU's influence is strictly limited in matters that concern it most. In 1949, for example, the WFTU launched a propaganda campaign against American military shipments to Europe, but the French CGT and the Italian CGIL, its two most important strongholds in

[18] *World Trade Union Movement* (the WFTU's monthly journal), No. 10 (October 1955), p. 6.

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Western Europe, were unable to pressure their own dockers into boycotting the unloading of material and had to give it up after two years of trying.

Even the community of interest between the Soviet trade unions and the Communist trade unions outside the orbit is wholly artificial. WFTU-affiliated unions outside the Soviet bloc, whether Communist-dominated or not, generally use their control over the membership to challenge both government and employers. In the Soviet orbit, labor organizations are the government's guardians of labor discipline. Thus the basic functions as well as the basic interests of these different types of unions are diametrically opposed. A clash often results when Soviet foreign policy compels the leaders of the Western Communist unions to subordinate the domestic interests of their movements. By the very terms of its organization, therefore, the WFTU is unable to represent the interests of its non-captive affiliates.

If, as has been argued, the WFTU's range of influence has in fact become as narrow as the Profintern's, why is it permitted to exist? There is always the possibility that the responsible functionary in the Kremlin has simply not considered it important enough to abolish it. But apart from that contingency, never to be overlooked in the case of a bureaucracy, the Communists must see the organization as accomplishing some purpose. The explanation would seem to lie more in the realm of political faith and organizational practice than in the WFTU's effectiveness in the field of labor.

The WFTU, first of all, serves as a symbol of the solidarity of the working class, the instrument that, in Marxian theory at least, is historically destined to bring about the change to a new social order. The fact that the industrial working class is not indispensable for the seizure of power, and that those Communist revolutions that have taken place have done so where the proletariat was weak, does not gainsay the usefulness of the myth.

Secondly, the WFTU exists, and because it exists, it has a tendency to perpetuate itself on the basis of its perhaps useful, but not indispensable, functions—for example, as central dispenser of Communist propaganda on labor. Moreover, it exists because the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions exists. In fact, the mere existence of the two rival internationals almost guarantees their perpetuation, regardless of their effectiveness.

Thirdly, the WFTU is held up to Soviet labor as a symbol of the support given by foreign labor to the workers in Communist countries. As the activities of the WFTU are represented to him, the Soviet worker

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is persuaded that there is some substance to international solidarity in the capitalist countries as well as in the Communist orbit.

Fourthly, WFTU interest in the former colonial and dependent areas may yield some dividends. Invitations to international meetings, training of potential leaders, and small grants of financial assistance are expressions of international solidarity that are welcomed in areas that have recently cast off Western tutelage. The WFTU is in a better position to make these gestures than the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, precisely because the latter organization, based largely in the Western countries, bears the stigma of Western colonial exploitation. In areas where trade unions are amorphous bodies, lacking class consciousness, and supremely susceptible to manipulation from above, the WFTU leaders may expect to accomplish a great deal with very little. There is small evidence to date, however, that any degree of success has attended WFTU efforts in this respect.

In sum, it cannot be maintained that the WFTU is an effective propaganda agency in the field of labor. The acid test of its effectiveness today is the success or failure of its unity of action campaign—the key to all its activity. Thus far, the WFTU has failed to link up any non-Communist international in a joint endeavor or to dislodge any affiliate from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. As an international trade union organization, the WFTU is merely a Communist propaganda agency, but even in this more modest role its accomplishments leave something to be desired.

By far the most spectacular contemporary international front organization is that directed by the World Peace Council, a product of the Partisans of Peace movement launched in 1949. In contrast to the other front organizations, which appeal to specific interest groups, the World Peace Council purports to be "classless" and non-partisan; it tries to enlist the support of "all men of good will, regardless of race, nationality, political or religious connection." It has occupied a central position in Communist propaganda since 1949, when the Cominform designated the peace movement as the ". . . pivot of the entire activity of the Communist parties and democratic organizations."[14]

In the peace movement, the Communists had all the ingredients for a successful front action: a world torn by political warfare and revolution and threatened by the prospect of atomic devastation; the universal appeal of its "peace" slogans; and an approach that was ostensibly free of political, racial, or religious barriers.

[14] "Resolution of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, November 29, 1949, p. 1.

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Of all the campaigns mounted by the peace movement, the first—the Stockholm Appeal to ban the A-bomb—was the most noteworthy. Subsequent signature campaigns modeled after the Stockholm Appeal —the one for a Five-Power Peace Pact and the so-called Vienna Appeal for a Five-Power Conference and top-level negotiations—were pale, routine affairs by comparison.[15]

The Stockholm Appeal, formulated at a meeting of the Partisans of Peace in Stockholm on March 15-19, 1950, demanded absolute prohibition of the atomic bomb, which it defined as an aggressive weapon; asked that the government which first used it be treated as a war criminal; and, finally, demanded strict international control to ensure that the ban was carried out. The motivation behind the Appeal was simple: since the military strategy of the United States centered around its superiority in atomic weapons, it was to the USSR's advantage to create an atmosphere in which use of the atomic bomb would be considered morally indefensible. (The Partisans of Peace, never lacking in cheek, even took credit subsequently for the fact that the United States did not avail itself of the atomic bomb during the Korean War.)

The campaign that was mounted to secure public support for the Stockholm Appeal had no precedent for intensity and magnitude in the postwar activities of international communism. All the resources of the Communist movement and its front organizations were brought into play: the press, mass meetings, demonstrations, house-to-house canvassing, etc., etc. What were the results?

The bulk of the claimed half-billion signatures to the Appeal came from the Communist countries. Nevertheless, an indeterminate number of non-Communists signed the Appeal, many of them no doubt attracted simply by the illusive merits of the Appeal without giving any thought to its uses for Soviet policy. The campaign presented the Communists with an opportunity to proselytize not only on behalf of the Soviet Union's peace policy, but also on behalf of membership in the Communist movement itself. By associating the United States with the A-bomb and emphasizing American refusal to ban its use, the Partisans of Peace propaganda may have convinced some that United States policy, in contrast to Soviet policy, was aggressive. But whatever success the Stockholm campaign achieved, it was largely nullified by the Communist invasion of South Korea shortly after the campaign got

[15] Of necessity, each campaign was required to produce more signatures than its predecessor. Thus the World Peace Council claimed that by August 6, 1955, 655,963,811 signatures had been collected for the Vienna Appeal as compared with 612,522,504 for a Five-Power Peace Pact and 482,482,198 for the Stockholm Appeal. *Bulletin of the World Council of Peace*, No. 16 (September 1, 1955), p. 2.

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under way. The peace movement itself never seems to have recovered from the blow dealt it by the invasion; the movement was trapped, as it were, between its professions and Soviet performance, and non-Communist opinion, official and otherwise, took a more active part in combating the movement.

Since the Stockholm campaign, the Communist peace movement, directed by the World Peace Council, has tried to multiply its affiliates, increase its propaganda dissemination, launch a number of campaigns, and hold innumerable meetings—all with progressively poorer results, culminating in its virtual eclipse in the shadow of Soviet diplomatic activity during 1955. It is difficult to trace any solid achievement to the peace movement or to detect any significant trend of public opinion or shift in policy on the part of any non-Communist government that may be attributed to it. Its importance seems to lie in other directions.

One of the curious aspects of the World Peace Council's conduct is its inability to act as a "front" organization even when it wants to. Controlled exclusively by Communists and fellow-travelers, its efficacy hampered by its association in the public mind with the Communist movement, the Council convoked a "World Congress of Peoples for Peace" in December 1952 in Vienna that was advertised as a non-partisan affair, not confined to the Council's affiliates. Although it was represented as a great new adventure on behalf of world peace, with assurances that free discussion would prevail, the Congress turned out to be undisguisedly Communist-controlled. It failed so badly that Pierre Cot, one of the leaders of the peace movement, stated afterward that the peace organization would have to adopt new methods and speak a new language if it were to be successful.[16]

About two years later, at the Council meeting held in Stockholm on November 18-23, 1954, the peace movement seemed to suffer from the same inadequacies. Though it took credit for an increase in its strength, the Council noted: "The [peace] movement has not always developed its organizational activities in proportion to the influence which its ideas and activities have acquired. In some cases, international campaigns have not been adapted to the concrete situation in a given country. . . . In other cases, there has been a tendency to abandon our own program of action, or to depend entirely on the support of leaders and organizations to the detriment of our own activities among the people. . . . Some national committees have betrayed a tendency in their organizational principles, forms of activity and argumentation, to merge with political organizations and

[16] *Défense de la Paix*, No. 20 (January 1953), p. 6.

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advance slogans that are too restricted to interest all sections of the population, irrespective of social standing, political and philosophical views."[17]

These organizational recommendations nevertheless failed to make the "World Assembly of Peace," held in Helsinki on June 22-29, 1955, any more broadly based than similar previous meetings. The Assembly could not in any case have equaled the flair shown by Soviet diplomatic activity in Austria, Yugoslavia, and India. For the World Peace Council, 1955 was a year requiring rapid readjustment to Soviet policy, with consequent loss of direction and vigor.

Finally, in reading the texts of many of their proceedings, one gets the distinct impression that many Communist leaders and some of the party cadres frequently become disenchanted with the peace movement owing to the time-consuming efforts needed to carry on activities that show so little reward.

The international front organizations have a certain importance in the Communist scheme, but for reasons other than those that are usually offered.[18] There is no doubt that in the afterglow of World War II the front organizations made it easier for Communists to identify themselves as the principal and, frequently, the only champions of the cause of peace, the interests of labor, and the like. Later this advantage disappeared when their claim was belied by Stalinist policies in Europe and the Far East. As a result, they have found it increasingly difficult to influence non-Communist opinion and it may even be argued that they doubt their ability to do so. If, then, the work of the "fronts" is to be judged by their success in recruiting non-Communist support, they have, by and large, been failures.

This does not mean, however, that front organizations cannot justify their existence to their Communist organizers or followers. They are—to distort a term of David Reisman—essentially "inner-directed."[19] Their functions have more relevance to the internal needs of international communism than to any real purpose in the outside

[17] "Recommendations on Organizational Problems of the World Peace Movement," supplement to *New Times*, No. 49 (December 4, 1954), p. 11.

[18] Hugh Seton-Watson, in *The Pattern of Communist Revolution* (London, 1953), devotes less than two full pages (pp. 327-29) to the international front organizations in his survey of international communism, on the grounds that most of them are of "little importance" and, at any rate, ". . . have little bearing on the social conditions and political systems that favor or hinder communist action, or on the methods used by communists to seize power, which are the subject of this book." It is not quarreling with his conclusion to point out that he has not thereby provided a rationale for their existence.

[19] For a psychological analysis of why Communists build front organizations, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, 1951, pp. 353ff.

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world. The endless round of meetings, and the agitation prior and subsequent to these gatherings of peace, labor, youth, or women's groups, are an affirmation of the participants' loyalty to the Cause. It matters less that some non-Communists are temporarily enticed into the front activity than that the committed remain committed. Their activities follow the "law of multiple involvement," which requires the participation of Communists and fellow-travelers in as many party and front functions as possible to keep them busy and, hence, to ensure their loyalty.

In the Communist-held countries, where the bulk of the front organizations' strength lies, participation in peace signature campaigns and the like is a demonstration of loyalty to the regime that is usually coupled with appeals for increased production and performance. For the citizen of a Communist country, signing his name to a peace appeal is not simply a token gesture; it generally involves pledges to raise norms, contribute leisure time to working for the state, and so forth.

The campaigns of the front organizations also serve as supplementary mechanisms for indoctrination of the population of Communist-controlled countries. For example, the charge that the United States was using bacteriological weapons in Korea was designed to instill anti-American sentiments in the peoples of the Communist bloc more than to convince any substantial number of non-Communists.

More generally, we can say that with the establishment of a network of local and international organizations, the "fronts" have acquired a stake in sheer organizational existence. They all adhere to the universally practiced organizational principle of engaging in a ceaseless round of activity in order to keep themselves intact. In the process, they may exert some influence on the thinking of the non-Communist and may stimulate old-line non-Communist organizations with parallel aims to compete with them. However, their efforts are counterproductive, in the sense that they arouse counteractivity on the part of public and private non-Communist agencies which vie with them for a monopoly of the slogans and symbols cherished by mankind. At the very least, the interplay between the groups assures the perpetuation and multiplication of all these organizations—Communist and non-Communist alike—and their corresponding progressive bureaucratization.

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Review Articles

A NEW LOOK AT THE NAZI MOVEMENT

By CARL E. SCHORSKE

Maurice Baumont, John H. E. Fried, and Edmond Vermeil, eds., *The Third Reich* (published under the auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies and with the assistance of UNESCO), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955, 910 pp. $9.00.

I

HOW close we are still to the terrible reality of Nazism! The American-sponsored UNESCO resolution launching the project that became the volume here under review bespeaks an almost naïve surprise at the totalitarian whirlwind. The resolution calls for "a report on the methods and procedure used to propagate Fascism and Nazism. . . . This should help to make possible the identification of similar movements in the future, from the first moment of their appearance"—a practical, political aim to be realized by a clear, direct method. The committee of scholars summoned to organize the report found the problem less simple. Where was one to locate "the first moment of the appearance" of the Nazi and Fascist movements? The committee unanimously agreed that their report, to be useful, must "trace both movements to their underlying causes, and place them in the historical setting from which they had emerged." The search for a broad, scholarly understanding of the origin and nature of the disease took precedence over the identification of symptoms.

Though a scholarly work, *The Third Reich* is still saturated with politics. With twenty-seven contributors from various countries, including Germany, an absence of national and social preconceptions would be improbable and perhaps undesirable. However, he who seeks for a cohesive, synthesized view of Nazism, a scholarly consensus, will not find it in this volume.

Indeed, the chief value of *The Third Reich*—aside from a few articles which contribute to a new understanding of Nazism—lies in its representative character. It shows the sadly riven state of scholarly opinion on the origin and nature of Nazism, and the burning need for new conceptions and new empirical work if we are to transcend

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our limited horizon and achieve a deeper view of totalitarianism as the peculiar political phenomenon of the twentieth century.

The organization of the volume indicates some measure of agreement in approach on the part of UNESCO's working committee. The arrangement of the three major divisions suggests an essentially idealist view of the emergence of Nazism. The "philosophic origins" of the movement are considered first, in a series of eight articles. Part II covers "the circumstances which made possible the transformation of the ideology into a political program." The techniques and methods of Nazism are discussed in the thirteen essays of the third part, which necessarily overlaps with Part II.

The depth of national differences among academic historians is most strikingly illustrated in the introductory articles to Parts I and II, written respectively by Edmond Vermeil and Gerhard Ritter, the deans of German historiography on either side of the Rhine.

Vermeil's chapter on the origin and development of nationalist ideology reaches back into the remote past to sunder Germany as early as possible from Western Europe. By 1500 he perceives clearly tendencies of future pan-Germanism: "on the one hand, a sort of national religion, a communal sense which seems to find inspiration in the decay of the Holy Roman Empire itself, and, on the other hand, a sort of Republic of Principalities and towns in the midst of which Prussia rises like the lodestar of future unity" (p. 11). Thenceforth, Vermeil reviews the familiar series of thinkers who brought us, step by step, from Herder to Hitler.

The isolation and arrangement in series of specifically nationalist ideas represent a well-worn historiographical tradition which reached its peak in the battle of the books during World War I. Vermeil draws heavily on one of the French field marshals in that battle, Charles Andler. The unilinear intellectualist analysis suffers from two defects: First, it cuts off German intellectual developments from those of other European countries (one must learn in other essays of the centrality of Bergson and le Bon in National Socialist thought, while the relation of German imperialist ideology to that of other nations is quite ignored). Second, even if one accepts a purely German framework, the methodology lacks historical depth. To break the ideas out of their social and political context means wrenching them from their living roots. Although Vermeil does not go as far as Andler in this direction, it is dismaying to see so great a master, whose *L'Allemagne contemporaine* (Paris, 1925) remains a model for the contextual treatment of ideologies, slip back toward that shallow ante-bellum historiography

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whose essential presupposition was not too far removed from the G.I.'s lapidary formula: "A Kraut's a Kraut!" The unilinear method in the hands of the non-German historian is, moreover, not without its irony. Was it not the German nationalist historians who developed the theory of Germany's essential apartness in European culture, and who distorted the history of German thought by using nationalism as its *Leitmotiv*? The Frenchman who accepts this thesis borrows from his German enemy, only changing the sign from plus to minus.

Constantin Frantz, Paul de Lagarde, Nietzsche, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Stefan George, Moeller van den Bruck: to each of these forerunners of National Socialism *The Third Reich* devotes a separate essay. The reader unfamiliar with these thinkers will find their ideas systematically summarized, if not genetically explicated. The authors all succeed in avoiding rash identification of the ideas they discuss with National Socialism. Each ends his essay with an attempt to evaluate the contribution of his protagonist to the Nazi movement; but none can pass beyond a guess based on a direct comparison of ideas. By far the most interesting essay is Claude David's treatment of Stefan George's ideas, in which aristocratic aestheticism and that dangerous phenomenon which Schnitzler once called "the politics of fantasy" are briefly in conjuncture.

The transmission and diffusion of proto-Nazi ideas remain one of the central unsolved problems of the scholarship of National Socialism. Vermeil and his collaborators touch upon it only in passing. Previous study of the subject has concentrated largely on explicitly nationalist organizations, such as the Pan-German League and the German school associations. But we are beginning to realize that non-nationalist elements—vitalism, *Lebensphilosophie*, neo-primitivism—made contributions to the National Socialist disposition fully as important as nationalist ideas. Correspondingly, the search for the mechanics of diffusion must be broadened. How can this be done? One thinks of Daniel Mornet's painstaking establishment of the vehicles for the dissemination of eighteenth-century ideas in *Les Origines intellectuelles de la revolution française* (Paris, 1933). Would it be possible to emulate Mornet's method for the flow of ideas in the dynamic, fluid society of the past seventy years? Surely not with the same precision, for National Socialism is less a system of ideas than a complex of emotions, less a matter of *Weltanschauung* than of *Lebensgefühl*. Yet certain centers of ideological influence can be isolated for more thorough study than they have yet received: e.g., the various components of the youth movement; the German army's psychological branch in World War I,

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the method and content of whose morale-building methods were far more closely related to the Nazi than to the traditional German military outlook; certain of the intellectual *Kreise*; the Protestant churches and their political currents; the changing political views and allegiances of business, artisan, and agrarian organizations. Through such social institutions as these, ideas were transfused into the stream of political history.

II

Gerhard Ritter introduces *The Third Reich*'s second part, dealing with the transformation of the ideology into a political program. Approaching the problem of National Socialism from the point of view of general history, Ritter launches a direct assault on the whole attempt to seek Nazi origins in Germany's intellectual heritage. He rightly objects to the tendency to regard militant nationalist and anti-liberal thought as peculiarly German, and to buttress this view by excessive reliance on extremist examples. "History," he says, "can never be written by means of quotations from literature" (p. 386). Ritter's counterthesis is that the movement toward dictatorship was—and presumably still is—a general European phenomenon, the product of the collapse of liberalism. Whether dictators actually came to power or not was a matter of specific historical circumstances. For Germany the critical period was that of the Weimar Republic, but especially the three years leading up to the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. Thus Ritter broadens the problem to European dimensions on the one hand, while narrowing its German aspect to the years when the Nazis became a major political factor. He treats the history of the Weimar Republic as a German variation on the European theme of liberalism's decline in "post-bourgeois" society under the impact of industrial concentration and the leveling effect of World War I. With a clarity so sharp as to suggest nostalgia, he contrasts the "spiritual impulses" of politics in the nineteenth century—the "ideals" of national unity and liberty—with the "materialistic" motives of the twentieth. When "the idea of liberty was eclipsed by the idea of social justice, . . . politics stopped striving toward an ideal, and the prestige of parliaments declined" (p. 391). Ritter does not seem to understand the idealistic moment in the socialist movement, or the degree to which, in Germany as elsewhere, it represented not a negation but a projection of the idea of liberty. He tends to identify liberalism with a happily stratified society, and the *fin des notables* with the beginning of the end of liberalism itself. Despite his awareness of social complexities, he seems to view modern society

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as composed essentially of two classes: the "educated" and the masses. With respect to the Nazis' coming to power, the "educated people" only began to discuss the movement when "the masses began to be drawn toward the Party" (p. 382). "There is no doubt that the majority of educated Germans was very distrustful of Hitler propaganda . . ." (p. 384). According to Ritter, the final blame for Hitler's rise to power falls heavily on the masses, who "were moved by their feelings, as the masses usually are, not by intellectual considerations." The "educated," who, with negligible exceptions, represented traditional values, were implicated primarily by their underestimation of the Nazi threat and by their mistaken attempt to render it harmless by absorbing the Nazi Party into the normal functioning of parliamentary government.

The political outlook which informs Ritter's categories of "educated classes" and "masses" is explicitly anti-democratic in the Burkean, non-totalitarian sense. Ritter sees Nazism as the logical, if not the historical, projection of Rousseau and the Jacobin tradition of radical democracy (pp. 394-97). Democracy is presented as the enemy of liberalism and the principle of social and political compromise. It is not our function here to take issue with the author's political ideas. Their application as categories for understanding the Nazis' rise to power, however, must be challenged. Ritter asserts that "Hitler's party was brought to power primarily by his efforts to overcome the old and fatal conflict between the nationalist bourgeois *parties* of the right and the *masses* of the left" (p. 403, italics added). Is this not a part of Hitler's appeal rather than a statement of historical fact? And to whom did this program appeal? Surely not to the "masses" of the left, who continued to vote the Social Democratic or Communist ticket until the end. It was the followers of the national bourgeois parties—and many of their "educated" leaders—who swung to Hitler's support, as the election statistics and the political record from 1930 to 1933 amply show.

Ritter's conception of the attitudes of the educated is seriously undermined by Theodor Litt, whose essay in *The Third Reich* sensitively describes the intellectual currents and historical experiences which rendered the academic and professional classes vulnerable to National Socialism. Ritter's loose categories impede social analysis of the groups which were capable of being transformed into Hitler's classless mass of followers. His essay, which begins as a serious protest against the excessively intellectualist and nationalist interpretations of Germany's political tragedy, runs out in oft-reiterated and not very helpful generalizations.

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One of Ritter's generalizations, however familiar, remains crucial: that National Socialism arose in a society well on the road to disintegration. What characteristics of Nazism enabled the movement to capture the victims of that process? There are two possible approaches to the problem: the first is to examine the specific grievances of particular social groups and the Nazis' exploitation of them; the second, to examine the general psychological nature of the movement, the source of its power of attraction.

Arthur Schweitzer follows the first path in an essay on the nazification of the middle class and peasantry. Schweitzer traces the developing resentments born of economic insecurity and political impotence in the various sectors of the middle class. His essay has the merit of careful discrimination of sub-groups, each with its distinct problems: artisans, white-collar workers, shopkeepers, etc. He distinguishes pro-capitalist, anti-capitalist, and pre-capitalist currents in the middle-class outlook. The Nazis not only formulated the grievances of these groups, but partially diverted their hostilities from specific social targets—labor, the bankers, the large industrialists—to the Weimar "system" as a whole and to the foreign powers which it allegedly represented. Schweitzer's most interesting contribution is to show that the influence worked the other way as well: the leaders of the discontented middle-class organizations themselves joined the party and began to put their stamp upon it, strengthening its "middle-class socialist" character. This penetration of the Nazi Party by a genuine counter-revolutionary movement threatened Hitler's flexibility in his intrigues with the industrialists and conservative politicians in the final acquisition of power. It helps to explain why the SA had to be crushed in the purge of 1934. The fate of the middle-class groups thereafter has not yet been explored in detail. The power they brought to Hitler, however, was only useful in gaining the helm of the state. Once in command, Hitler built his state on only those social interests that held centers of power outside the party—which the artisans and white-collar workers assuredly did not have.

III

The peculiarity of Nazism was its capacity to detach the emotions of masses of individuals from their social groups and transfer them to the "movement." In this process, the espousal of a specific grievance was only a first step toward the absorption of the individual into the Dionysian mystical body where earlier interests and loyalties would be completely forgotten. The Nazis successfully substituted for these

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not new social goals but rather, as Alfred Rosenberg put it, "a mode of life . . . the mode of a column of soldiers, marching no matter where or to what goal." Rosenberg's formula reminds us that, even if we understand the social origins of Nazism as a mass movement, we cannot identify its origins with its essence. The Nazis distilled out of the groups they organized a kind of dynamism of rancor which colored, yet transcended and outlived, every specific idea or political project they put forward.

In analyzing the Nazis' methods for achieving this objective, Henry Pachter contributes one of the outstanding essays of *The Third Reich.* Pachter shows how Nazi propaganda pursued its primary aim: the strengthening of an organization of will-less individuals, the creation of a fanatical herd. The propaganda of terroristic acts and the ritual form of mass meetings performed the double function of weakening the resistance of the outsider through fear and inducing in the insider a sense of communal power. The function of the mass meeting, as is well known, was not the presentation of programs for the solution of problems or even the formulation of a party line, but the creation of a fanatical solidarity and loyalty. The speaker was not a debater but a "drummer." His function was to arouse unlimited aggressiveness toward the world outside the party. It was therefore a maxim of Hitler to address only multi-group audiences. "Never try to speak to the intelligentsia or to trade associations. Whatever you may be able to teach them by reasoned enlightenment will be eradicated the next day by opposite information." A large and socially mixed crowd was the proper audience. "Whatever you tell a crowd when it is in that receptive state of fanatical abandonment . . . will remain like an order given under hypnosis; it is ineradicable and will withstand any reasoned argument" (p. 714). Hitler accordingly did not try to reconcile group interests; he sought to avoid mentioning them, in order the better to sever the individual from his social group.

It is consonant with this procedure that Nazi symbols and imagery—the swastika, the "night of long knives"—were entirely devoid of social or rational content. It follows, too, that Hitler played on a desire not for social adjustment but for revenge, that he substituted, as Pachter says, moral indignation for politically relevant action, sadism for revolution. The traditional—and rational—concern for a better world was transformed by Hitler into a total hostility to everything outside the "movement." In this process, Hitler clearly indicated how, as a matter of conviction, he transposed means and ends: "The conviction that it is right to employ the most brutal weapons is always associated with

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(always depends on) the fanatical belief in the necessity of a new and revolutionary transformation of the world. A movement that does not strive for such high aims will never be capable of using such extreme methods" (p. 720). Sorel, too, believed in the effectiveness of a myth of social transformation, but he valued it as a basis for a dynamic morality of sacrifice. Hitler carried Sorel one step further: the myth is useful only to produce a commitment to the use of "the most brutal weapons."

The political theorist Carl Schmitt, in his Nazi phase, reduced all political life to the "friend-foe" relationship. This theoretical postulate reaches to the heart of National Socialism, revealing its essence as affective rather than rational: loyalty within, hatred without. Pachter does not deal with Schmitt's "friend-foe" conception, which both substantiates and explains a phenomenon which Pachter illuminates: that propaganda and organization were not directed jointly toward a larger goal, but fed each other in a closed circuit: propaganda (including propaganda of the deed) aimed at enlarging the organization, the organization aimed at enlarging the scope and effectiveness of the propaganda. The absolute *Gemeinschaft* which the Nazis created had its meaning only in terms of the absolute negation of the human world about them. It is no accident, I think, that the Nazis referred to their policy as *Raumpolitik*, a term which superseded the earlier imperialist *Weltpolitik* with a characteristic intensification of de-humanizing abstraction. Negation of the life of others was the paradoxical ground of this "vitalistic" movement's existence, which could only be affirmed in terms of a perpetual creation of new enemies.

Pachter's analysis of the autodynamics of National Socialism provides a theoretical structure within which the extraordinarily Protean character of the Nazi ideology could be profitably re-examined. The Nazis shifted their public ideology from a central preoccupation with German "national regeneration" to the more abstract concept of the master race, which was defined "psycho-biologically" rather than nationally. This change could perhaps be correlated with the need for creating successive self-definitions in order to face an ever-new succession of enemies. Is there not also a possible relationship between the evolving internal value system of the party—especially as developed in the SS, in which a complex ideological credo was finally reduced to the single abstraction, *Meine Ehre heisst Treue*—and the changing series of enemies, domestic and foreign, against whom Hitler hurled his power? Pachter's suggestions, if employed in concrete historical investigation, might give access to the interior of National

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Socialist thought, so difficult of approach for our generation, whose power of empathy has been paralyzed by the bitter experience of Nazi deeds.

IV

The few other essays in *The Third Reich* which rank with Pachter's as contributions to our understanding of National Socialism can only be mentioned here: Canon Grégoire's illumination of Ernst Krieck's pan-vitalism, through which philosophy was subordinated to *Weltanschauung*; Theodor Litt's subtle if somewhat impressionistic analysis of National Socialism's use of moral tendencies in the German intelligentsia; John Fried's description of the Nazis' impregnation of society with military forms of thought and organization; and Claude David's sensitive treatment of Stefan George's relationship to Nazism.

Taking the volume as a whole, I find its value in the very failure of its bold attempt to illuminate the history of Nazism in all its dimensions: social, political, economic, intellectual, psychological. Not since the publication of Franz Neumann's *Behemoth* (New York, 1942) has such an effort been made; the earlier work, though diffuse and sometimes falsely concrete, stands out clearly as the better of the two, even if one makes allowance for the disadvantage of multiple authorship in *The Third Reich*. To Neumann's work and to Alan Bullock's *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (London, 1952), with its careful chronological analysis, the reader must still turn for a general introduction to the Nazi era.

The collective character of *The Third Reich* dramatizes the degree to which the scholarship of National Socialism, still lacking anchorage in empirical investigations, is dominated by contradictory speculations based all too often on narrow social and intellectual attitudes. It is dismaying to see how little use has been made—even in the best essays of *The Third Reich*—of the principal specialized studies which have appeared since the war: Wheeler-Bennett's, Gordon Craig's, and Telford Taylor's works on the relations of party and army; Robert Waite's study of the Free Corps; the analyses of the relations of party and career bureaucracy contained in Gordon Craig's and Felix Gilbert's *The Diplomats*.[1] The gaps between the intellectual historian, the social psychologist, and the political historian yawn deep. No illuminating

[1] John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, London, 1953; Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*, New York, 1955; Telford Taylor, *Sword and Swastika*, New York, 1952; Robert G. A. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952; Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats*, Princeton, N.J., 1953.

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comprehensive history of National Socialism will be written until we have begun to bridge them.

The Third Reich reminds us, by its omissions, of what work lies ahead. It is natural and proper that the efforts of historians have hitherto been devoted to clarifying the Nazi military and foreign policy. The opening-up of the secret sources for the dramatic story of Nazism's adventure in international aggression made this the logical focus of attention. Temporally, the major emphasis here has fallen on the period since 1938. The work of social and intellectual analysis of the origins of National Socialism, begun in the 1930's when the rise of the Nazis to power occupied the minds of the democratic world, has been too long neglected.[2] I have tried to indicate above the areas in which it might profitably be resumed. But this carries us only to 1933.

The most significant gap in our empirical knowledge of National Socialist history—reflected in the eloquent silence of the volume under review—is that of domestic history between the seizure of power in 1933 and the beginning of foreign expansion in 1938. Surely this is the crucial area in which to clarify the Nazis' relationship to the traditional centers of political and economic power: the civil bureaucracy and industry. (The army seems well attended to!) These belonged to a world Hitler hated—he always hated a world he never made—yet it provided him with the means for his conquests. Here the limits of Hitler's radicalism and the limits of corporate traditionalism came into conjuncture. To explore the administrative, psychological, and economic history of the consolidation of Hitler's power should throw new light not only on the nature of Nazism but on the strengths and vulnerabilities of the centers of social power in contemporary Western society with respect to the totalitarian threat.

UNESCO and its collaborators have performed a real service in bringing into focus the scholarly status of the problem of National Socialism. *The Third Reich*, by its shortcomings as well as by its contributions to knowledge, should stimulate renewed interest in a subject of vital concern to the modern world.

[2] The political aspects of the rise of National Socialism have been fruitfully re-examined by Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie*, Stuttgart and Düsseldorf, 1955.

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WEST GERMAN DEVELOPMENT IN AN EXPANDING WORLD ECONOMY

By WOLFGANG F. STOLPER

Horst Mendershausen, *Two Postwar Recoveries of the German Economy* (Contributions to Economic Analysis, Vol. VIII), Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1955, 130 pp. 12 guilders.

Henry C. Wallich, *Mainsprings of the German Revival* (Yale Studies in Economics, Vol. V), New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1955, 401 pp. $4.50.

I

THE West German recovery has fired the imagination of observers to an unusual degree. From a defeated and despised enemy whose factories were bombed and whose productive power was to be destroyed forever by dismantling and control has emerged a new country with new economic power, an honored ally whose contributions to the economic progress of the world and to the maintenance of its military security are eagerly sought.

Although it has been hailed by some as a miracle, responsible German statesmen as well as responsible economists have tried to minimize the role played by the supernatural in West German recovery. To attribute it to a successful free-enterprise market economy, to the German willingness to work, or to sheer good luck are explanations that contain a greater element of truth. As it is, we are fortunate that the emergence of a new and productive Germany has attracted two highly competent analysts, Horst Mendershausen and Henry C. Wallich.

The phenomenon can be analyzed in various ways. The two books which are the occasion for this article complement each other to an astonishing degree. Both begin with the prewar years, and both deal with the postwar Germany that is allied with the West; references to the eastern part of the country chiefly register surprise that the surgical operation has not caused more damage than it seems to have done. Both authors possess fundamentally the same view of how the re-emergence of Germany is to be explained. Even though Mendershausen uses the term "recovery" in his title, like Wallich he considers the postwar German development to be essentially a growth phenomenon; however, he is not quite as explicit on this point and does not provide a theoretical schema, as Wallich does.

But this is about the extent of the similarity of treatment by the two

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authors. Mendershausen assumes that the reader is familiar with the details of the currency reform, and in general his references to institutional matters are exceedingly concise. He concentrates on a statistical analysis of the development of the Federal Republic (i.e., Western Germany) as compared with that of the Weimar Republic. And he draws a second interesting comparison: how have the development of the Weimar Republic and of the Federal Republic fitted into world-wide economic development? It is this aspect of the book, enabling us to see the West German experience in proper perspective, that I wish to discuss more fully further on.

Mendershausen lays himself open to one misunderstanding. In setting the 1920's and the 1940's and 1950's side by side, he seems to assume that he is dealing with a homogeneous universe in the two periods; yet population and territory have drastically changed, to mention only two of the obvious differences.[1] But while Mendershausen's approach poses real problems, it has its points. First, this objection is always valid, but if strictly enforced it would make any historical comparison impossible. Secondly, in a perfectly meaningful sense, the Federal Republic is as much the successor of the Nazi regime as the latter was of the Weimar Republic, which in turn succeeded the Empire. Thirdly, Mendershausen's comparisons are intended to bring out differences as much as similarities, and it must be gratefully acknowledged that he accomplishes this very well.

One further comment. As we have indicated, Mendershausen omits a full discussion of the currency reform. For his purpose, this is a legitimate procedure; for him, the currency reform of 1948, like the monetary stabilization of 1923, marks the caesura between an initial recovery period and a period of growth. Yet he cannot escape the necessity of referring to the currency reform of 1948 again and again—in discussing, for example, the reasons why the market economy after 1948 was apparently more acceptable to the German people than it was after 1923. His brief treatment of this reform and his cutting short of institutional discussions can be attacked (unjustly, I believe) on the grounds that he compares the two spans of history too mechanistically, that he does not stress sufficiently the great differences in the spirit of the times. But his method has the inestimable advantage of preventing an oversimplified explanation of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, and of placing the German development in an historical and international frame-

[1] I am told that a Soviet Russian critique of the book stresses this point and complains that East Germany is left out of the picture. This article tries to amend the "oversight."

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work which, while robbing it of none of its luster, makes it more real and understandable.

What are the achievements, what are the problems of the West German economy as compared with those of the Weimar Republic? With Germany shrunken to half its former size in area, but not commensurately in population, production in 1946 had fallen proportionally much further from prewar levels than in 1919. Yet there was a major difference in the two instances: during World War II, industrial production kept increasing substantially (although perhaps in the wrong direction), while it fell markedly during World War I.

This fact deserves to be stressed more than it usually is. It indicates something about the industrial capacities that remained, even after bombing and dismantling, and about the sheer physical possibilities of getting production going by repairs and by feeding raw materials into the emptied economies. Mr. Wallich has something to say about this when he discusses the low marginal capital-output ratios of the first postwar years. The fact also suggests that during World War II a breakthrough in production occurred in Germany, as it did in the United States, and it suggests fundamental wartime changes in technology, outlook, and economic organization that need more explanation in regard to Germany as well as elsewhere.

Compared with the recovery after the First World War, production growth started from a lower level after the Second, but it proceeded more steadily and more vigorously. Mendershausen ends his comparison with 1928 and 1953, when the production indices stood at 114 per cent and 132 per cent of 1913 and 1938, respectively. Wallich carries us a little further. If 1954 and 1929 are included, the index would read 148.93 for 1954, while there is evidence that German production had reached a postwar peak in 1928, or possibly even earlier.[2] Between 1954 and 1955 production rose another 15 per cent. However, per capita real income increased more in the 1920's than in the 1940's and 1950's, since "the vastly larger population increase in post-war II [absorbed] the greater rise in the aggregate" (p. 10) and perhaps also made it possible.

There can be little doubt that the influx of a skilled though destitute

[2] The index given by Mendershausen (Table 1, p. 6, taken from *Vierteljahreshefte zur Konjunkturforschung*) does not agree with the index published in *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1939-1940, p. 57*, which uses 1928 = 100 as the index basis. In the following, Mendershausen's index has been recalculated on the same basis:

	Stat. Jahrbuch	*Mendershausen*
1926	78.7	78.07
1927	101.2	97.36
1928	100.0	100.0
1929	100.9	

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population from the east was turned into an asset in Western Germany, even though this conversion of unemployed masses, concentrated where there were houses rather than jobs, from a liability to a productive force required suffering, time, skill, and luck.[3] One can only speculate as to how this absorption of the population influx came about. No one will deny the will to work, the urge to make good; but an economic machine, while requiring willing labor and imaginative entrepreneurs, also needs good economic policies and favorable conditions for its proper working.

Some of these conditions have been supplied by technological changes which make the truncated Germany less, rather than more, dependent on foreign trade. Agricultural production in comparable areas increased vigorously after World War II and is now 18 per cent above 1935-39, while it reached only 90 per cent of the 1909-13 average by 1928. The import volume, which despite huge capital imports had reached only 101 per cent of 1913 by 1927, and had fallen to 97 per cent by 1928, reached 121 per cent of 1938 by 1953. The export volume rose to 158 per cent of 1938 by 1953, compared with 95 per cent of 1913 by 1928.[4]

Some of these differences in the two postwar developments are due to the fortunate fact that the new Germany grew in a world which was growing with her, and indeed ahead of her. Moreover, not only her own policies but also those of her former enemies were rather more reasonable after World War II than after World War I: equilibrium in the balance of payments and currency stability were only one, albeit a very important, aspect of government policy, which this time also worried about employment and living standards.

In the change of attitude toward Germany, the cold war of course played a crucial role. Another factor was her complete defeat, which robbed her of her status as a great power for any foreseeable future. The policies toward Germany have become more reasonable precisely because she has had no choice but to stay with the Western powers or become a Russian satellite. The East cannot be played off by her against the West, and a new Rapallo is hardly possible, for Russia has become more powerful while Germany has become weaker. At any new Rapallo, Russia would call the tune, not Germany. This is the context in which Germany quickly became an ally of the West. Capital move-

[3] Or is one man's luck another man's miracle?

[4] In this particular case, comparison with 1938 raises difficulties in that the Nazis pursued autarkic policies. But these policies probably affected imports of certain products more than imports as a whole.

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ments into Germany started early, at a crucial moment and in massive volume.

In postwar Germany herself, a new spirit in favor of a free economy prevailed. One need have no illusions about the degree of free enterprise prevalent in Germany, and one has every right to feel irritated when Germany is presented to Americans as a model free-enterprise economy. For, as both Mendershausen and Wallich point out, the term "social market-economy" is no mere catchword, but denotes a very real state of affairs, which can be measured by such ratios as the share of the government in national income, or the share of national income going to recipients of public assistance. But regardless of the fact that the German economy is subject to greater state control than the American or possibly even that of "socialist" Britain, what matters is the startling change it has undergone since the end of the war. This alteration was deliberate, to a large extent voluntary and, it should perhaps be added, performed with a sigh of relief.[5] Experiences with Nazi and wartime planning (and perhaps also what the Germans observed in Russia) had induced a revulsion akin to horror. After the war, it was not the market economy which was discredited but rather the Nazi regime. Even the controls maintained by the occupying powers may have reinforced these feelings.

II

A great deal more could be said about the fact that the Bonn Republic is much more acceptable to the Germans than was the Weimar Republic, which had both greater admirers and fiercer detractors. In part, this greater acceptance may be due to the fact that the defeat of the Nazis was more clear cut than that of the Kaiser. Perhaps the personalities of Adenauer and Heuss have had something to do with it. And an important point, it seems to me, is that the collapse of the Hohenzollern Reich marked the end of an era. It was then that the world of normalcy broke down. Weimar was suspect as an abnormal interlude. The days of Hitler were but another. Perhaps Bonn, too, is one in the eyes of most Germans, but at least Bonn is not burdened with the charge of having brought an end to the pre-1914 stability.

Beyond this, there remain some puzzling facts: the war and tech-

[5] Wallich's book contains an interesting discussion as to whether this reversal was due to the fact that Adenauer rather than Schumacher won the elections. There is little doubt that at present the Socialists would not deviate much from Erhard's policies, although they might from Schäffer's. But what they would have done in 1949-1950 is uncertain.

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nological developments have opened up perspectives which not only make the talk of secular stagnation silly in retrospect, but seem to have the awesome quality of irreversible natural events. Large strides have been taken by all the Western economies, regardless of the details of their economic policies; even devastated Russia has rebuilt hers much faster than was anticipated and now produces much more than ever before. In Germany, no doubt the change in spirit was helped by wartime destruction, which swept out deadwood and brought new people and new ideas to the fore. Yet when all this is said, the uneasy feeling remains that we have merely touched on superficial conditions. It seems to me that conditions for economic growth and expansion are generally more favorable now than ever, everywhere, almost (though certainly not entirely) regardless of economic systems and economic policy. But I cannot prove it. Whatever the explanation, this basic trend seems to me the background against which the new Germany developed, against which this development must be seen, and against which the personality of an Erhard and the skillful policies of the Bank Deutscher Länder have had a chance to work.

Let us look at this basic and world-wide trend. First of all, it is astonishing how similarly different countries have developed, to an extent that almost obliterates differences in their starting points, in their degree of industrial development, and in economic policies. Take the various indices of industrial production shown in Table 1, based on 1938 and 1913, respectively.

TABLE 1

	All Industries			*Investment Goods Only*		*Power Production*	
	1954/38	*1955/38*	*1929/13*	*1954/38*	*1955/38*	*1954/38*	*1955/38*
Germany	145.8	166.4	117[a]	157	192.2	192	236.1
Finland	191.8	204.5	198	239	251	211	237.9
France	154.3	169.1	143	178	202.6	211	227.9
Great Britain	152	161.3	109			214	233.3
Italy	173.7	189.9	138	179.7[b]	202.7	213	225.4
Netherlands	175	187.5	187			254	271.4
Sweden	172.6	187.1	151			291	306.7
Canada	242	262.5				256	276.9
Mexico	186					249	
United States	260	288.4	181				
Japan	122	131.3		134		181	193.6

[a] Areas not comparable; includes the Saar.

[b] There are serious discrepancies between the figures given in the 1955 and the 1956 editions of the *Stat. Jahrbuch.*

SOURCES: Recalculated from *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,* 1955 ed., pp. 48*, 49*, and 1956 ed., pp. 50*, 51*; Economic Commission for Europe, *Growth and Stagnation of the European Economy,* Geneva, 1954, pp. 304-5.

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The evidence clearly suggests that the expansion was generally more vigorous after the Second World War than after the First. Not only are the indices higher, but in all countries in 1938 the base itself was substantially above the 1929 level as well as above that of 1913. Moreover, after World War II unemployment all but vanished, and even in the countries that still suffered from it—Italy, Japan, and Germany until recently—it was due to special reasons. The kind of unemployment which can be cured by sufficient spending was no problem after the Second World War, while it certainly was a major problem after the First. Unemployment percentages of the labor force in 1929 were 10.4 per cent in the United Kingdom, 13.1 per cent in Germany, 10.7 per cent in Sweden, and so forth.[6] At that time, no country seems to have been within the range of unemployment that is now considered tolerable.

What caused these differences between the two postwar developments? I cannot give a complete answer. The following suggestions, put rather briefly, must suffice.

First, and perhaps least important, there has been a change in attitude toward economic policy. The world as a whole is determined and able to prevent a recurrence of the unemployment disaster of the 1930's. There is disagreement as to what has brought about this change, and about how best to achieve the common aim. But no longer will anyone defend mass unemployment as a necessary price of progress, or will unemployment be accepted as a natural and inevitable state of affairs.

Secondly, certain technological developments have occurred which make rebuilding and further development easier than it was before. The growth of engineering industries is startling. It certainly began during the 1920's; in England, for example, these industries developed vigorously while other, older industries stagnated. But what has happened recently to the electrical industries, or to such new ones as electronics, plastics and other synthetics, chemicals, etc., is so much bigger than what happened in the 1920's as to be a new phenomenon. I am not suggesting that it was the war alone that caused this phenomenon—that war is the father of all things is, after all, as dubious a maxim as it is old. It is certain, however, that the war gave these industries tremendous impetus by sweeping away all non-technological obstacles to their development. Shifts in the distribution of the labor force tell part of the story.

Thirdly, in all countries, regardless of specific economic policies, the

[6] ECE, *Growth and Stagnation, op.cit.*, p. 31.

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role of the government has increased, as measured by the share of national income or product going through public hands or being directly influenced by public measures. The ways in which this control is exercised may vary: via the budget, via direct government ownership in even the non-Communist world, or via legislation affecting such crucial sectors as housing. The aims may differ: redistribution of income in favor of war victims and the poorer classes, purchases of goods and services for the vastly expanding military establishments, or flows of funds to finance residential housing and road construction. The universal result is that precisely those industries that are crucial for economic development are affected and spending is stabilized. This is bound to have an expansionary effect.

Fourthly, since World War II the terms of trade have changed drastically in favor of raw material producers and agricultural sectors among and within countries, while the opposite occurred after World War I. This is of course far from being an unmixed blessing for the industrial nations. The point to be made is that population has been expanding even in the "older" countries, that the underdeveloped countries are anxious to develop and are doing something about it, that they have more money for development than before, and that the beneficiaries of these changes are precisely those industries in which a striking increase in output has occurred.

Fifth, to put the foregoing into perspective, the "older" countries themselves have begun these new developments, and the technological changes involved have made them less dependent than before on imports per unit of national income produced.

III

Enough has been said to indicate the background against which the impressive German development took place. Both Mendershausen and Wallich are right: what happened in Germany is no mere recovery; it is part of an upward sweep, of a new development.

No doubt, Germany shares the world's progress and problems, but her postwar development has peculiar aspects, to which it is now necessary to turn. If the world wage level is under pressure, this is aggravated in the German case by the unusual size and nature of the population change. If balance-of-payments problems have dominated the postwar era, this has been aggravated in the German case by complete loss of foreign assets and by partition—factors which make her achievements all the more remarkable. Since economic growth in the world is general and almost (though certainly not entirely) inde-

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pendent of particular economic policies—since "socialist" Britain, "middle-of-the-road" Sweden, and "statist" France are not exactly stagnant either—we should be on guard against overfacile generalizations about Germany. But economic policy, after all, is not irrelevant. Perhaps the Germany economy is "lucky," in that it can supply precisely those goods for which the world is hungry. Even though the German economy grew with the world's economy, which in fact was growing ahead of it, skillful policies were still needed to make sure that the world would buy at least part of what it needed from Germany, rather than from the other industrial nations.

Of the major German problems, I intend to deal in some detail with three: (1) the balance of payments, (2) the boom, and (3) the possible effects of partition and ultimate reunification.

(1) The balance of payments undoubtedly represents a great achievement on the part of the German economy. A worthless international currency at the close of the war, the mark became one of the hardest currencies; convertibility became a feasible aim; gold and dollar reserves rose from nothing to the respectable level of $2.4 billion. All this was accomplished with rising employment and falling unemployment—two conditions that do not necessarily move in the same direction in a country with a sharply increasing population—without deflation (which was easy) and, until recently, with reasonably successful control of inflation (which was substantially more difficult).

So far as the composition of imports and exports is concerned, the following generalizations can be made. Although food imports as a whole play a smaller role in the German economy than before the war, bread grains are imported in relatively larger amounts. This change reflects the loss of the eastern bread basket and the relative unsuitability of densely populated West, North, and South Germany for the production of bread grains. In 1939, the area that is now the German Democratic Republic (i.e., Communist Germany) was estimated to have an export surplus of bread grains of about one million tons. It is possible, as some writers claim, that the Federal Republic benefits from the loss of its bread basket, because it can buy its needs on the cheaper world market rather than, as formerly, in a protected domestic market. To the extent that this is true, the increased imports of bread grains may indirectly represent a favorable change, even with respect to net foreign exchange earnings. But this reasoning, though plausible, is not necessarily sound. To be sure, in 1936 Germany would have gained from purchasing bread grains in the world market. By the 1950's, however, the situation had changed somewhat. With in-

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creased application of fertilizers and machinery, Central German rye or wheat would not necessarily be more expensive than imports from abroad. Moreover, the Federal Republic appears to have exchanged greater bread grain imports for increased protection of dairy products—a not inexplicable development.

The trade changes in industrial raw materials and finished manufactures are more difficult to summarize, but they are essential to an assessment of the future. Except for coal, petroleum, and ores, dependence on imports has declined. The greatly increased dependence on petroleum imports is important, but there are countervailing trends. Domestic production of crude oil has risen sharply. And, for the future, it is relevant to note the possibility of utilizing atomic energy and the economic feasibility of reducing low-grade iron ores (which Western Germany has) with coke made from lignite (of which West German supplies are abundant) by techniques successfully developed in East Germany.

The surprising thing, however, is that "contrary to the expectations . . . it is in finished industrial products rather than in foodstuffs and raw materials that Germany is now relying more heavily on imported supplies" (Mendershausen, p. 100). Yet this is precisely what one would predict on the basis of abstract economic theory, comparative advantage, and the like.

Mr. Wallich suggests still another reason for these developments in West Germany's trade: the share of wages in the GNP has been rather low. In part, this is simply concomitant with the investment boom. However, it also reflects the postwar moderation of the German trade unions, the willingness of labor to work and to get the economy as well as itself in a viable position. And perhaps it reflects a better understanding of economic realities on the part of labor. (I am not referring to an acceptance of wage-cutting, but to the awareness, now fairly common in Europe, that exports are needed to maintain the necessary imports and that the wage level is directly related to these exports.) Imports will probably increase substantially with rising living standards.[7] In fact, this effect is already noticeable. German tourists are traveling abroad in greater numbers than ever before, and Mr. Erhard, one of the guiding spirits of the German economy, is calling for lower tariffs and increased imports in order to control the inflationary tendencies and prolong the boom.

[7] This is, for instance, the opinion of Professor Karl Schiller. See his discussion in *Deutschland und die Weltwirtschaft*, Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, N.S., Vol. x, Berlin, 1954, pp. 191ff.

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On the export side, finished manufactures are even more important than they used to be. But, as both Wallich and Mendershausen warn, there are major differences among industries. Here a comparison of prewar and postwar figures is especially difficult because of the partition of Germany. For example, if exports of precision and optical instruments declined relative to production between 1928 or 1936 and 1952, this was surely in part a reflection of the fact that the Carl Zeiss concern, formerly in Jena, had to be relocated in West Germany after the war.[8] As of 1952, Mendershausen could summarize the export situation as a whole by stating that "the content of the export sector shifted further and heavily in the direction of investment goods and away from consumers' goods, especially non-durables" (p. 103).

Whatever their ultimate causes, these achievements are justly a source of pride for those who are responsible for German trade developments. Yet it is worth while to pause here and consider future balance-of-payments problems. Debt servicing is to be resumed on a larger scale, and rearmament will be a drain. Much of the successful balance-of-payments adjustment resulted from offshore purchases and EPU settlements. To be sure, both factors may persist, and if armaments become too much of a drain, some American rescue operation will probably be effected.

The EPU settlements in particular were perhaps more important to the accumulation of gold and dollar balances than has been commonly recognized by those who have noted chiefly the credits that Germany extended to her partners in EPU. And, to a substantial degree, these credits themselves were perhaps more voluntary than appeared on the surface, so long as Germany had an interest in maintaining her exports (or at least so long as German export interests were sufficiently strong to force the adoption of this kind of policy, possibly coupled with export credits granted domestically).

I have already mentioned Erhard's attempts, complementing the efforts of Bank Deutscher Länder, to increase imports as an anti-inflationary device, in addition to controlling investments through interest policy. During 1950, Germany had an import surplus of over 3 billion DM. In 1951, she still had a small import surplus, but by 1954 the export surplus had increased to the respectable total of almost 2.7 billion DM. During 1955, the export surplus declined to 1.2 billion DM, with imports rising by 5 billion DM above the 1954 level and exports rising by

[8] Many Central German businesses continue to exist as nationalized enterprises in East Germany, and as newly developed private enterprises in West Germany, using the same trademarks, etc. Zeiss and Breitkopf and Härtel are but two well-known examples.

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"only" about 3.7 billion DM. During the first quarter of 1956, the export surplus was 411.2 million DM, and (if seasonal movements are discounted) promises to be larger for the year as a whole than it was for 1955.

The existing tendencies regarding the commodity composition of imports and exports have continued to operate, as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

	% of Food Imports in Total Imports	*% of Raw Material Imports in Total Imports*	*Exports* *% of Raw Materials*	*% of Finished Goods*
1950	44	3	14	64.8
1951	39.9	3.6	9	73.1
1952	37.4	3.5	7.6	75.1
1953	36.6	3.3	8	74.7
1954	37.0	2.8	7.7	76.9
1955	31.1	3.0	6.1	80.7

SOURCE: Monthly Report of Bank Deutscher Länder, February 1956 (English ed., p. 82). Calculated from DM figures.

These trends raise a number of questions. Is not the German economy especially vulnerable because of its dependence on exports in general and on exports of durables in particular, in view of the well-known sensitivity of the export of durable goods to cyclical fluctuations? How long can Germany keep up exporting and financing her exports by loans? And are not some of her trade developments due to "luck"? Is not her present government policy inviting disaster?

A talent for prophecy is not one of the necessary qualifications of an economist. Yet some answers to these questions may be ventured. No one will deny the role of good luck—in Germany or elsewhere. But luck, after all, means no more than opportunity, which can be grasped only by the skillful. Certainly Germany is pursuing active anti-inflationary policies; the discount rate was at 5½ per cent as of June 1956, interest rates are high, the federal budget has had a substantial cash budget for some time. Moreover, the authorities are trying by hook or by crook to prevent prices from rising excessively, often by means which make no sense but seem to work, at least temporarily. Furthermore, as shown in Table 3, productivity has been rising, particularly in such important export industries as chemicals, vehicles, and electric goods. So long as present policies are pursued, and so long as productivity increases are not more than offset by wage increases, there seems reason for optimism.

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TABLE 3

Productivity per man-hour of work, 1936 = 100

	1950	*1954*	*1955*
Potash mining	87	115	115
Chemicals	109	156	167
Machine construction	97	120	131
Vehicles	91	147	164
Electro-technical goods	95	131	135

SOURCE: *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1956 ed., p. 215.

Two further problems remain to be mentioned. Granted that Germany's development is due to the success of her domestic policies and to the fact that the rest of the world has avoided a serious depression and, under the leadership of the United States (who practices only imperfectly what she preaches), has succeeded in liberalizing trade, Germany's comeback on the world market is still most impressive. However, even in 1955 she accounted for only 6.7 per cent of world imports and 7.5 per cent of world exports. The figures for Germany's share of world imports in 1913, 1929, and 1938 were 12.9 per cent, 9.1 per cent, and 9.2 per cent, respectively, and for world exports they were 13.1 per cent, 9.9 per cent, and 9.6 per cent.[9] On the other hand, the post-World War II percentages have been and are still rising steadily, and they apply to a much smaller area now than before the war.

More important is another question. Once full employment has been reached and armaments act as a drain on Germany's resources, can she afford to finance great export surpluses without increasing the savings ratio? It is to be noted that her exports have a heavy component of capital goods which go to countries that are pressing their development programs and are therefore eager to postpone payment. In this context, the American program for aid to underdeveloped countries and what has been called the Point Four-and-a-half program, attributed to Alfred Krupp, may help. Obviously, American foreign assistance and German exports to underdeveloped countries can fortify each other. In effect, this means that the dollar deficit of Germany would be covered by American assistance to third countries and, so far as Germany herself is concerned, would be offset by a German export surplus with the underdeveloped countries.

That triangular trade and multilateral payments offsets are a good thing for everyone concerned is not a new idea, but at this juncture of

[9] *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1955 ed., p. 75*. The pre-World War II figures refer to the area of the Reich, and the post-World War II figures to the area of the Federal Republic. Interzonal trade is not included.

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history it is particularly appealing. Its implementation would not only cushion disturbing effects of changes in the structure of the world economy—changes which are always going on and which, in the heyday of classical economics, were supposed to be cushioned by precisely such capital movements. It would also offer twin benefits. Underdeveloped countries would get the aid they want and get it more gracefully than through bilateralism. The balance-of-payments position and industrial structure of an important new ally (as well as those of important old allies) would be aided simultaneously and, again, in an unobjectionable manner. And, what is politically most important, the new Germany would gain a sense of mission from integration with a multilateral world economic program, in which the real donor might be expected to have the sense not to call attention to his own generosity all the time.

Furthermore, Germany's economic development has progressed sufficiently for us to cease thinking of her as very poor. She has an interest in building up foreign assets, and with unexpected swiftness she has achieved a position where she herself can supply some of the capital that the underdeveloped world so desperately needs. Thus, while her present huge export surpluses should perhaps be considered unusual, there is no real cause for pessimism, provided the world does not once more fall victim to senseless policies.

(2) Can the boom continue? This is, of course, a difficult question to answer with respect to any country. But it is particularly pertinent to raise it after a discussion of Germany's balance of payments. It has already been mentioned that her comeback in the world market and her domestic growth, while impressive when viewed in terms of their low postwar starting points, appear less conspicuous when viewed against developments in other countries. However, it should be repeated that the purpose of such comparisons is only to guard against overfacile generalizations.

To assess the future of the German boom, it is necessary to summarize the various foundations of Germany's recovery, as Mendershausen and Wallich see them: plain good luck; a willingness to work, combined with the characteristic German ability to organize; sound monetary, fiscal, and general economic policies, combined with a "social market-economy"; American aid at a crucial moment; the cold war, which changed Allied policies more quickly than could otherwise have been expected; a willingness on the part of German trade unions to be moderate in their wage demands and to avoid strikes; and favorable developments in the world economy which made the reabsorption of

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German exports easy and avoided the difficulties of a major depression.

All of these factors played a part. The expansion of the economy was sparked by investment programs that were in the long run aided by the influx of population. Gross investment fluctuated between 19.5 per cent and 21.7 per cent of GNP between 1950 and 1954, and net investment between 16 per cent and 20 per cent of national income—which are very respectable rates indeed. The (net) capital output ratios, which had risen from about 1.55 in 1949 (when much investment was for repairs and could be expected to yield quick and big returns) to 3 in 1952, fell to 1.91 during 1954. At the same time, average annual employment rose from 13.5 million in 1949 to 17.2 million in 1955, and in March 1956 it stood at 17.5 million, about 900,000 above March 1955. Unemployment had proved recalcitrant until 1955, when for the first time it fell below one million. The unemployment problem, which is of a peculiar structural nature, is at long last ready to be solved, and in fact labor shortages are now beginning to show. However, Germany can draw on additional labor resources, if need be, and the attraction to East Germans of the opportunities offered by the Federal Republic has been strong enough to make *Republikflucht* a capital crime in East Germany.

The fact is that Western Germany has been enjoying considerably more freedom of choice in its policies than has been assumed. As Wallich and Mendershausen show, she has been both willing and able to make use of this freedom. With her high savings ratios and her low (net) capital output ratios, there is no reason why she cannot maintain a high level of investments if investment opportunities do not dwindle, and if her balance of payments does not create difficulties.

And why should either of these contingencies arise? Surely we have learned enough to avoid those serious depressions that are caused by insufficiencies of demand. Large investments and a rapidly rising national income may even permit Germany to play a bigger role in the development of underdeveloped countries than was thought possible only a few years ago. Seven years ago there was serious doubt whether and when Germany could pay her way internationally. Even the optimists thought that, to do so, Germany would have to become a super-Belgium, with an unusual dependence on foreign markets. The German adjustment, however, has not occurred in the anticipated manner.

Furthermore, Germany has pursued a more flexible and sensible domestic policy than both her ardent admirers and her disgruntled critics have admitted. Policies designed to redistribute income, monetary measures, trade liberalization, etc., were handled with finesse, even

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when the theories expounded were atrocious. Incentives were skillfully created, and thoughtless orthodoxy was more often avoided in practice than foreign observers seemed to realize. No exclusive reliance was placed on monetary policy; employment policy was not forgotten; trade was not liberalized at any cost (even in sectors other than the recalcitrant agricultural sector, which causes the same kind of trouble in all Western nations).[10]

There is no question that, in the aggregate, German consumption could be substantially increased, for the share of wages and salaries in national income is still comparatively low. Moreover, in Germany as elsewhere, consumption of durable goods absorbs a larger share of the consumer's dollar than before. Both from the balance-of-payments side and from the viewpoint of the internal stability of the economy, it is justifiable to assume that Germany can handle anything except a major economic crisis in the United States—which is not to be expected. Even more important are the Germans' imagination and apparent willingness to use the available freedom of action and to maintain the boom. When Dr. Erhard asks us to disbelieve those business-cycle theorists who hold that slumps necessarily follow booms as night follows day;[11] when he of all people calls for new concepts in business-cycle policy and urges us to believe that full employment and rising income may be the normal and maintainable state of affairs in the free market economy—then this is news and good news at that. It may also be the moment for those of us who have held this view for some time to inject a healthy note of skepticism as to the degree of perfection that can be attained.

(3) A word should be said about the economic effects of Germany's partition and the possible effects of a reunification. Mendershausen and Wallich do not deal with this problem except incidentally, which, given their purposes, is a perfectly legitimate limitation. The influx of talent from the east and its effects have already been mentioned. The question of whether the loss of her bread basket benefited West Ger-

[10] For an interesting account of German foreign trade policies and attitudes as of 1954, see H. Reinhardt, "Gegenwartsprobleme der deutschen Aussenhandelspolitik," in *Deutschland und die Weltwirtschaft, op.cit.*, pp. 123ff. Mr. Reinhardt is an official in the Erhard ministry.

[11] The differences between the new and the old economics are partly real and partly semantic. What is certainly real is that we are much less willing than we were in the 1920's and early 1930's to take things lying down and accept depressions as if they were earthquakes. Yet, at least in Schumpeter's scheme of things, in which recession and depression have technical meanings (the former being a movement toward equilibrium, the latter being a movement away from it), depressions were always unnecessary, and unavoidable recessions could theoretically be kept at a level at which they were neither social catastrophes nor much more than statistically observable phenomena.

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many economically by securing her better terms of trade in world markets cannot be fully answered without investigations too detailed to be included in this article. Let it suffice to remind the reader that the West Germans appear to have exchanged relatively cheaper bread for relatively more expensive butter and eggs, products which now receive extensive protection.

Before partition, Germany's was a well-integrated economy. After it, omitting the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line, the structure of the two Germanies was not too dissimilar, with some important exceptions. Though both parts had about the same proportion of their labor force in industry and agriculture, heavy basic industry was concentrated in the Ruhr, while important elements of machine production and many light industries were concentrated in the areas of the Soviet zone. Furthermore, the west had the soft coal and particularly the coking coal, while Eastern Germany had abundant lignite resources and developed industries based upon it, such as those chemical industries that do not require soft coal tars as a raw material, ranging from the hydrogenation of oil to the manufacture of synthetic rubber.

The division of Germany appears to have produced frantic attempts by both parts to build up missing industries. In West Germany, this has not been a deliberate policy, but the result of the arrival of refugees who have brought and applied new skills. In fact, the manufacture of certain textiles and cameras, book publishing, etc., formerly heavily concentrated in East Germany, are now more intensively developed in the west than before. The situation was extraordinarily favorable to the expansion of these industries—a nice example of the movement of factors of production taking the place of the movement of goods.

In East Germany, the removal of disproportionalities—to use a favorite Communist phrase—had top priority. But while in West Germany this involved the comparatively easy establishment of light industries and utilization of available skills, in the east it meant creating a heavy industry based on lignite with labor that had to be newly trained for this purpose. East Germany has built up a small steel industry out of virtually nothing; its production of lignite has about doubled; it has succeeded in making metallurgical coke out of lignite; and it has developed methods of reducing low-grade iron ore with about 23 per cent iron content, high acidity, and other undesirable characteristics with this lignite coke. At the same time, there is no question that these achievements have exacted immense suffering. They have been accompanied by great inefficiencies, unavoidable under the circumstances but severely aggravated by stupid planning and the fact

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of occupation. And they have meant a reduction of light industry and a denial to the population of all but essential goods in order to induce them to build up the heavy industry sector—a policy which has been reversed only recently. Actually, no one need starve or remain unclothed. But all goods and particularly housing are scarce, qualities are poor, and variety is lacking.

Thus even East Germany has succeeded in making herself somewhat less dependent on imports. Her industrial development undoubtedly has lagged far behind that in the west, but structurally the two Germanies are now more similar than before.

If reunification came about tomorrow, what problems would arise? I shall refrain from discussing political and social problems, beyond pointing out that restitution of expropriated property to farmers is generally considered impossible because of obligations to the new farmers involved, and that restitution of industrial and commercial property to former owners is apt to run into the same kinds of difficulties which the restitution of Jewish property has encountered. Sometimes one hears of West German fears that labor and industry would move east again, causing hardships in the west. This seems extremely unlikely in the case of those firms or workers that have found a new home. It seems much more likely for those who have not been successful in the west. Their exodus might or might not solve their personal tragedies, but it is difficult to see how it could harm the West German economy. One also frequently hears of fears that East German labor will underbid the higher-wage West German labor—a prognostication that is usually coupled with the contradictory statement that the East German economy will need subsidies to compensate for its comparative inefficiencies. If one talks with persons expecting to return east, one even hears expressions of hope that West German competition may be temporarily prevented by outright prohibition of imports.

If reunification came tomorrow, there probably would have to be eastward shipments of some consumer goods, such as decent shoes, on a large scale. And since the East German economy seems to be operating with exceedingly slim raw material and other inventories—to the point of inefficiency where the flow of work is frequently interrupted—the necessary expansion of inventories might have to be financed by Western Germany.

But the people who foresee so many difficulties underestimate the viability of a market economy, and they probably underestimate the substantial growth impetus which the world enjoys at present and which would form the background against which economic reunifica-

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tion would take place. To be afraid of "duplications" in industries not only reveals mercantilist prejudices—of the "You produce raw materials, I sell you industrial goods" kind—but is an anachronism in a world which ought to have learned by now that underconsumption is hardly the problem of the day.

Finally, technological progress may even justify the existence of the new steel works on the Oder (which still bear the name of Stalin). They are based on imported Upper Silesian coal and Russian ores, but are so located that Swedish ores could be brought in cheaply. In general, it is a familiar phenomenon that as regions or countries develop, the smaller units tend to become more integrated within themselves and their relations with the outside world tend to become quickly and intricately enmeshed. Thus there is no reason to expect reunification of Germany to lead to difficulties simply because the structures of the two economies have become more alike and each part has developed industries that were formerly concentrated in the other.

It is impossible to write in detail about a situation that cannot now be defined with precision. No doubt, detailed planning for reunification would have to be undertaken—economic and political, social and legal. But it is very difficult to see why any economic problems could not be solved, within six months to a year, by such comparatively simple means as the financing of inventories and consumption and temporary preferential tax treatments. It is equally difficult to see why the establishment of a larger area of free trade and free mobility should have bad consequences for as productive a nation as the Federal Republic. The danger that individual industries might be hurt and obtain protection is no greater in this than in any other case.

This article has concentrated on a few aspects of the economic changes that have come to Germany and the world. The reviewer hopes to be forgiven for omitting other important aspects; after all, Wallich devoted 400 pages to the problem and Mendershausen's extremely concise treatment takes up 127 pages. Both books, each excellent in its way, complement each other. Both are more cautious than this reviewer in appraising what has happened. But then, a review is an ephemeral matter and a reviewer can go out on a limb without fear of falling too far if the limb breaks off. Mendershausen sets the German recovery in a historic and international context, while Wallich concentrates much more on imponderables and on domestic economic policies. In looking at the problem as a whole, what struck this re-

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viewer most forcibly is not so much the miraculous nature of the German *Wunder*, as that it is part of a world-wide miracle of economic expansion, of a breakthrough in production which seems to have occurred everywhere, and of a long-run inflationary trend. The full explanation of these developments must await future historians.

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RUSSIAN UTOPIANS AND SOVIET IDEOLOGISTS*

By ALFRED G. MEYER

Ernest J. Simmons, ed., *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955, 563 pp. $7.50.

I

SOME years ago, an odd question was frequently being asked which dealt with the meaning or motivation of Soviet world politics. It took the following form: Are Soviet policies to be understood as a continuation of Russian imperialism or are they dictated by the interests of revolutionary communism? After being debated hotly for some time, the question died down, either because the debate turned out to be inconclusive or because the problem was happily "solved" by a verbal synthesis—in other words, by a phrase: "Communist imperialism," which many of us use today.

Of course, phrases do not solve such problems, and the question still remains whether Soviet policy is a continuation or restoration of tsarist policies, or is based primarily on motivations superimposed onto the Russian scene by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Similar problems of continuity and change are inherent in the examination of any society; for among the questions we have to ask ourselves are some of the following: What are the society's links with the past? What is old and what is new? And, of the features which have remained from the old society, which are form and which are content, essential or incidental? Problems of this kind are particularly acute in the study of revolutions not only because revolutions are, by definition, periods of rapid and sweeping change, but also because revolutionary thought implies a very specific attitude toward the past. If we glance at some outstanding revolutions, we find that this attitude usually is far from simple. While revolutionary thinkers inevitably reject the immediate past, they have often thought of their revolution as the restoration of old values. Numerous examples could be given for this.

Other revolutions change their minds (if we may thus endow them, figuratively, with this human attribute), the Russian revolution among them. "To its more extreme adherents," writes Ernest J. Simmons, in

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the volume under review, it ". . . seemed to represent a complete repudiation of the past. The old Russia was officially declared to be dead. . . . A clean sweep was to be made of history" (p. 3). This spirit prevailed in Soviet Russia for about a decade and a half, but it was followed by a selective "restoration" of the Russian past, comprising not only the radical thought of dissenting intellectuals, but also the colorful pages of tsarist military history, tsarist expansive international policy, and a great deal of Russia's cultural past, including even the spread of Christianity. This obvious ambivalence toward the Russian past makes the problem of continuity and change both interesting and baffling. The difficulties are increased by the fact that in accepting the past, the Soviet regime has attempted to tamper with it, sometimes with a good deal of success; unconsciously, Western scholars sometimes see the Russian past through Soviet eyes (just as many of us see Hegel through Marxist eyes simply because we do not get around to reading him and possess few or no secondary works by Western scholars, while the Marxists refer to him frequently).

For these reasons, the appearance of a thought-provoking symposium devoted to a discussion of the complex problem of the links between Russian and Soviet thought is a welcome and valuable addition to the voluminous literature of Soviet studies. While ostensibly only intellectual matters are discussed, the best essays in this collection show a clear awareness that ideas cannot be understood in abstraction, but only in relation to the society which caused or allowed them to develop. The fantastic decline of biological science in the Soviet Union cannot, perhaps, be fully grasped; but it is clear from Professor Dobzhansky's essay that the political and ideological climate alone could breed the cancer of Lysenkoism. Vyshinsky's scholasticism and the writhings of Soviet dialecticians are nothing but ideological veils drawn, by higher command, to hide the realities of Soviet society. Similarly, the development of Russian and Soviet literature cannot be understood without a knowledge of tsarist censorship policies, the great social issues that were reflected in literary works, and the demands of the reading public, which was virtually sovereign from 1905 to 1927. After that period, the demands of the reader were replaced by the demands of the state or the Party, now the sole Maecenas of art, determining both the style and the content of literary works.

The development of this "monopolistic" control, incidentally, makes it very difficult—if not impossible—to conduct a meaningful analysis of continuity and change in Russian thought since tsarist days. For it is doubtful whether the comparison of an official ideology with free

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thought makes much sense. Party control over thought implies a process of selection and elimination. It is impossible to say how representative the selection is, or what ideas would have flourished if Soviet thought were subject only to the censorship of a Nicholas I instead of total control. It might well be argued that the product of Soviet thought should not be compared with the best which tsarist Russia produced. Instead, is not the "social command" of the Party comparable to the market command of the broad public in a democracy? To be sure, the market does not demand that artists and social theorists brazenly manipulate the public, even though the Marxist theory of ideology maintains that it makes and enforces precisely this demand, albeit subtly. Still, the market does force the writer, at the penalty of starvation, to conform to the intellectual level and the taste of the reading public. In both cases, form and content are not chosen freely, and the level of perception and discernment is bound to go down. If this is true, then Soviet Party culture should be compared with America's mass culture, with best-selling novels and paperbacks, mood music, and *Saturday Evening Post* cover art; Soviet political and legal theory with the wisdom of Independence Day orations; the intellectual level of Dialectical Materialism with that of a Billy Graham or a Norman Vincent Peale; Lysenko with the anti-intellectuals in some of our engineering schools. Comparisons of these products with the non-conformist thought tolerated in contemporary America or in tsarist Russia are not very enlightening, especially if a book devoted to such comparisons shows little awareness of this problem.

Some awareness of it there is indeed: Taking for granted that Soviet thought, at least in the last generation, is the product of a totalitarian society, many of the contributors in discussing the thought of tsarist Russia are looking for the origins of totalitarianism in these ideas, without, however, getting a sufficiently close grip on this problem either. A number of contributors point to Russia's backwardness as the major force in the emergence of totalitarianism; Professor Gurian points to the dogmatic *hybris* of Marx and Engels; Professor Ulam appears to blame Lenin's and Stalin's lust for power; and yet others, vaguely enough, imply that different features of Russian radical thought favored the growth of totalitarian practices or, at least, ideas. The reader of these essays receives the impression that Russian and Soviet thought had a good deal of affinity. Both were totalitarian or absolutist in the philosophical sense, in that they tended to believe in absolute principles which have to be applied universally, in one all-embracing philosophical system. In addition, a number of principles

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happened to be generally accepted in both Russian and Soviet thought —for instance, the idea of dialectics and the rejection of Hobbesian individualism together with its Darwinian counterpart, the idea of intraspecific competition.

II

The book under review makes fascinating though difficult reading. It is fascinating because some of its thirty-odd essays provide valuable material for students of Russian and Soviet thought. The range of the subject matter gives the reader a good idea of the vast literary and philosophic treasure of both Russian and Soviet thought, which is still far too little explored. The going is tough not only because of the very uneven quality of the essays, but also because even the excellent editorship of the major contributors has not succeeded in combining the different papers into an organic whole. Perhaps the subject matter simply does not lend itself to satisfactory organization; in any event, there is a good deal of overlap and repetition, and many serious gaps.

The book, which is the result of a conference at Arden House, discusses the problem of continuity and change in Russian and Soviet thought under six sub-headings: Part I, "Realism and Utopia in Russian Economic Thought," presents the views on Russian economic development of such thinkers as Radishchev, Belinsky, Pisarev, Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Chernov, and Stalin. Part II, "Authoritarianism and Democracy," contains essays devoted to one reactionary, two liberals, and two Bolshevik thinkers. Various attempts to define the relationship of the individual and collectivity are presented in Part III, "Collectivism and Individualism"; outstanding among them is an essay on Russian and Soviet views of the hero in literature. Part IV, "Rationality and Non-rationality," contains discussions of religious thought, Soviet philosophy, and two interesting articles on the development of biological science. Under the heading, "Literature, State and Society," are found some fine essays on literary criticism and informative articles on censorship policies. The final section, "Russia and the Community of Nations," discusses the ideas of two notorious Russian nationalists, Danilevsky and Dostoevsky, Comintern ideology, and the postwar Party line on world politics. It also includes a brilliant essay on Herzen's and Bakunin's contribution to the political philosophy of individualism. Each section is followed by a résumé in which an attempt is made to find a common denominator for the group of reports.

Obviously, no more than a sampling of Russian and Soviet thought

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is represented here; but the book will undoubtedly whet the reader's appetite for more and stimulate him to pursue some of the subjects discussed. Some familiar facts and ideas are looked at from new angles of sight, and there are some surprises, such as Professor Radkey's sharp critique of the ideas of Victor Chernov, and Professor Berlin's praise of Herzen's originality. At one time, Oliver Radkey seemed to think more highly of the Social-Revolutionary leader, and Isaiah Berlin seemed to think that Russia had not produced any original thinkers. As a political scientist, the reviewer cannot forego noting with regret that the papers devoted to political ideas tend to be weaker than those on economic, literary, or scientific thought, a token perhaps of the general aridity of American political philosophy. While it might be inherently difficult to find a more workable organization for all the contributions, some of the headings could have been defined more carefully. Thus it seems unfortunate that ideas concerning Russia's relation to the world are discussed in terms of the very fuzzy concept of messianism, especially since the essay devoted to the ideology of the Comintern deals with the period in which the Third International seemed less "messianic" than in any other period of its history. At least the résumé of Part VI attempts to define "messianism." This has not been done for the concept of rationality, which provides the heading for Part IV. The writer of the résumé of that section asserts that Soviet thought is lacking in rationality and that, furthermore, this lack is to be explained in part by a correspondingly low level of rationality in pre-revolutionary Russian thought. This section contains some of the most interesting papers of the entire symposium; but, although some participants in the conference almost came to blows over this thesis of non-rationality, the discussion helped neither to define the concept nor to make the assertion convincing. It is not clear whether the term "non-rationality," as used in this section, denotes discussion of god, national destiny, human progress, and other abstractions not directly related to everyday experience. If it does, then we must conclude that the thought of the entire nineteenth century and preceding eras was lacking in rationality not only in Russia but in the whole Western world. Or does "non-rationality" mean a certain immaturity, a certain lack of moderation, an uncritical attitude toward concepts and ideas such as many Russian thinkers tended to manifest? If this is meant, we should remember that Russia had its moderate and circumspect thinkers, just as Europe had its utopians and other types of *unreasonable* theorists. Does not the word "rational" mean a belief in reason, a conviction that knowledge and its scientific pursuit are high

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aims either in themselves or for some ulterior purpose; as contrasted with a disdain for reason and scientific study, a trust placed in feeling, emotion, revelation, and similar ways of finding a relationship with the world? If this is what is meant, then the conclusion is that there were irrationalists in Russia, who usually were inspired by irrationalists in the West, and that against them fought a host of thinkers who believed in reason and fervently strove to liberate it from its fetters.

A more serious consequence of the form of organization of the book is the fact that Soviet thought is not treated as one coherent system of ideas, which undoubtedly it is. Chopping it up into several aspects makes it easier to trace continuities and contrasts, but obscures the ties which bind all aspects together. It is well in line with this neglect of the unity of Soviet thought that the ideas of Lenin have been omitted almost totally. There is one article on Lenin's authoritarianism, another on the concept of partisanship in philosophy. But that is all. Although there is further material on Soviet thought before 1930, Leninism and its highly interesting development before 1930 simply have not been treated. As a result, a curiously static conception of Soviet thought appears to underlie much of the book.

A number of very interesting questions could and should have been asked about the relationship between Leninism and Russian thought. Take the fact that a Marxist movement grew up in Russia. That this was not in tune with Marxist preconceptions is now a commonplace. But was it in tune with Russian thought? Had previous generations of Russian thinkers prepared the ground for Marxism more effectively than thinkers in other European countries? Most scholars will doubtless answer in the negative. But what about Leninism? Were its ideas more Russian than those of other Marxists? Although the wealth and range of Russian thought in the century before the revolution make it impossible to define any set of ideas as more specifically Russian than others, Russia's special social problems, tsarist attempts at thought control, age-old traditions and lore, the country's geographical setting, and a host of other conditioning factors led to the suppression, elimination, or stillbirth of some ideas, preoccupations, attitudes, and motives, and to the emergence and flourishing of others. For instance, all Russian social thought had to deal with Russia's relation to the West and thus take a stand in the controversies started by the Slavophiles and Westernizers. Although both these "schools" were preoccupied with Russian national problems, the impression persists that the Slavophiles were more narrowly nationalistic than the Westernizers, or were rooted more firmly in Russian traditions. Moreover, Leninism is often re-

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garded as the more "Slavophile" branch of Russian Marxism. To be sure, in a brilliant essay, Professor Mathewson sees some aspects of Leninism as a logical continuation of Belinsky's and Chernyshevsky's ideas, and Professor Karpovich correctly stresses the lack of continuity between Slavophilism and Leninism; certainly there was no direct line by which Slavophile ideas descended to Lenin. Nevertheless, more than some rival ideologies, Leninism was a blend of Slavophile and Westernizing thought, accepting, for instance, the anti-capitalism of the former and the utilitarianism of the latter, while rejecting the democratic element in both. In these and many other instances, Leninism tackled problems with which Russian thinkers had been preoccupied for decades, and often found similar solutions that were not infrequently at variance with Marxist traditions. Did Lenin make these amendments because he was rooted in Russian thought, or did he find similar solutions merely because the Russian environment naturally favored them? Further, did Leninism succeed in seizing power because it had absorbed Russian thought, or because its own ideas were more suitable for Russian conditions than those of its rivals? If they were not, then the October revolution was a freakish adventure, and the continuities to be discussed are likely to have been accidental and unimportant. If, on the contrary, the success of the Bolsheviks is to be explained by their relevance to and adequacy for the Russian environment, did Leninism succeed because of the features it had in common with previous Russian thought, or because of the new ideas it introduced? Finally, if Leninism was particularly adequate for political success in Russia, is it similarly adequate for other societies? And, if so, would not its adequacy for such societies be more significant than its continuity with Russian thought? These are some of the questions the symposium under review might have asked, had it paid greater attention to Leninism as the fountainhead of present Soviet ideology.

III

There is one further reason to assert that the scant attention paid to Soviet thought before Stalin obscures the very purpose of the symposium, the study of continuity and change in thought. For what is being obscured is this: Up to the late 1920's the continuities far outweigh the elements of change, while the fundamental break between Russian and Soviet thought comes only in the years between 1928 and 1935. In making this statement, we must be careful to point out that, just as Soviet thought in itself is discontinuous, so there are different

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trends and currents in Russian thought, at times running side by side or in opposition to each other, while in other periods one of them is so strong as to overwhelm and submerge all others. If the first five-year plan produced a major epoch in Soviet thought, the Emancipation, the famine of 1891, and the year 1905 were similar epochs for pre-revolutionary thought. What becomes apparent in the work under review is a remarkable continuity of Soviet thought before the five-year plans with the attitudes and ideas of the radicals of the 1860's, while later Soviet ideology has some affinities with the conservative apologists of autocracy and pan-Slavic expansionism.

What are some of these continuities? Both the revolutionaries of the 1860's and the generation of the 1920's were devoted idealists, determined to swim against the current of history. They were dogmatic in their conviction of being on the side of history and justice; they were autocratic in their attempts to rule their followers and manipulate the masses. Both generations were radical progressives, iconoclastic in their attitude toward the past, scientific and rationalist in their attempt to understand the present, utilitarian and pragmatic in their effort to manipulate their environment for the purpose of realizing their utopias. Both generations were internationalist Russians who discussed the fate of their country in terms of world history. Both were emphatic in accepting the fruits of Western science and technology, and making them the foundation of their utopias, and equally emphatic in rejecting the bourgeois order of Western Europe. Both were professional revolutionaries who devoted their lives to bringing salvation to all mankind, self-styled members of an international holy order of socialists.

The firmness of the continuity of Russian and Soviet thought revealed in the symposium is surprising. True, the Bolsheviks came to power, and in politics their special school of thought prevailed. But it did not prevail, for instance, in literature, where the pre-revolutionary controversies continued and the solutions, though enforced by the Party and fitted into Party ideology as well as possible, were reached on the basis of these old controversies. And, although the volume does not point this out, continuities also existed in such fields of thought as science, pedagogy, criminology, and philosophy. Even in economic thought, Bolshevism was tempered by the dominance of Mensheviks in high advisory and managerial positions, and the great debates within the Party, conducted on a high intellectual level, were but continuations of the great debates about Russia's economic development which had begun early in the nineteenth century. Moreover, to the extent to

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which some of these controversies may be on the way to being revived, or to which some of the ideas prevalent in the 1920's live on as hidden currents of contemporary Soviet thought, the continuity still exists. Professor Simmons hints at such subterranean streams in the field of literature. Similar continuities may exist even in political thought, where Marxism, despite its taming by Stalinist scholasticism, remains as the official doctrine, an iconoclastic, non-conformist, rebel ideology which undoubtedly continues to foster rebels even in Soviet society.

The great break comes after 1927, in the period of the first five-year plan, when Stalin refused to call things by their right names any longer. Vyshinsky hailed the restoration of law in the Soviet state, not only because a firm administrative routine had to be imposed on the vast machinery of the Soviet government and economy, but also because by this lip service to law he was concealing the actual withering-away of law (in its individualistic-normative conception) in the USSR. The Bolshevik jurists of the 1920's had demanded just this withering-away. But, when their wish was fulfilled, it could no longer be called by its right name. This is the period in which Leninism changed from an utopia to an ideology; from an attempt to come to grips with reality in a rational manner to the irrational veiling of reality by incantation; from a messianic revolutionary doctrine to a theory of state; from the revolutionary elitism of a Chernyshevsky to the conservative paternalism of a Pobedonostsev. The sharpness of this break is obscured (surely intentionally) by the use of the same words; but we should recognize that Leninist dialectics was at least meant to be a tool of rational analysis, whereas under Stalin it turned into ideological mumbo-jumbo designed to hide the ugliness of the existing system; that even *partiinost'*, which under Stalin was a command to kill all independent rationality, was seen by Lenin as a wholly rational means of assuring the cognition of reality.

If Soviet thought in the 1920's was continuous with the radicalism of the 1860's, Soviet thought of the five-year plan period bears many resemblances to the ideology of the tsars, just as Stalin's policies seem often to be a continuation of tsarist acts. Still, there is a decisive difference, brought about by the five-year plans themselves. Though Stalin's aim was the same as that of the tsars—namely, to ensure his continued rule—his methods, aided by modern technology, were more effective and more far-reaching. Whereas tsarism had aimed to perpetuate the ignorance of its subjects, Stalinism strove to plant its ideology in their minds. Tsarist policies in this respect, however, were by no means typically Russian. The most reprehensible censorship law with which

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Nicholas I experimented was copied from the contemporary legislation of Napoleon III. Soviet totalitarianism, on the other hand, is a new phenomenon, an original contribution.

IV

Yet even here there are continuities, not indeed in the thought, but in the motives underlying it, and in the problems it tries to solve. Some of the contributors hint at the prime motive of Russian and Soviet thought: backwardness. Russian social thought revolved around the problem of Russia's differences from the West, her lack of Europe's economic and material development. All Russian social thought was an appraisal of both Europe and Russia, generated by the inevitable sense of inferiority of those outmatched technologically. Conservatives endeavored to gloss over this backwardness or to present it as a blessing. Radicals strove to get Russia out of her backward state—be it by emulating Europe or by cultivating native institutions and traditions —but, in any event and by any means, to bring Russia in line with the most advanced nations of mankind. This aim even Stalin, in his fashion, shared with Belinsky, Herzen, Bakunin, Pisarev, Miliukov, Chernov, Plekhanov, and other Russian radicals. Indeed, his very totalitarianism aimed at accomplishing it. For its imposition was not merely to satisfy his craving for power, but to make sure that Soviet Russia would "catch up with and overtake" the most advanced industrial nations of the West. The essays of some of the economists represented in the symposium show that the Bolsheviks were the only ones among the Russian revolutionaries to have a clear understanding of the economic problems posed by backwardness. If the authors of the symposium had paid more attention to Lenin, they might have found that his ideas contain, however tentatively and unsystematically, a comprehensive theory of underdevelopment, of the political and social problems it poses, and of the means by which a nation might overcome it. They would have found that Leninism contains such a theoretical explanation in its image of twentieth-century imperialism, which it sees as the spread of modern industrial civilization over the entire globe through the "export of capital." In Lenin's eyes, this *spread* of capitalism has an effect on underdeveloped nations similar to the effect which the *growth* of capitalism was thought to have on the proletariat, according to Marxist thought. It makes the underdeveloped nations or their spokesmen conscious of their poverty and sensitive to its causes; it awakens in them the revolutionary resolve to remedy their situation

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by a ruthless, totalitarian effort, if necessary. It is these ideas which enabled Leninism to combine the socialism of Russia's radicals with the nationalism which characterized her social thought, while at the same time laying the theoretical groundwork for the totalitarianism of the Stalin era. Beyond this, Leninism is revealed as a comprehensive theory about the origins and process of the world revolution of our age—indeed, the first serious attempt to think systematically about it. For this reason, the study of Leninism is of first-rate importance to an understanding of the main problems of our century. And since Leninism is indeed a Russian growth, since this world-shaking system of thought is one answer to Russian social problems, it may be fruitful to study the rich thought this society produced as the prototype of the reaction of any underdeveloped nation to the encroachment of the West.

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PEASANTS AND THE STATE

By HENRY ROSOVSKY

Herbert S. Dinerstein, *Communism and the Russian Peasant* (published with Leon Gouré and Herbert S. Dinerstein, *Moscow in Crisis*, as *Two Studies in Soviet Controls*, 254 pp. in all), Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1955, 140 pp. $4.50.

Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1955, 743 pp. $7.50.

TWO books have appeared recently that deal with agricultural problems in eastern and southeastern Europe. They vary as much in scope as they do in physical dimensions. Tomasevich's massive tome is really two complete works in one, an economic history of the component parts of modern Yugoslavia, starting with early medieval times and ending with the First World War (perhaps the first such attempt in English), as well as a highly detailed account of the Yugoslav economy during the interwar period. It is obviously a labor of love and the result of an incredible and admirable research effort. Dinerstein, on the other hand, concerns himself primarily with the Soviet collective farm, and narrows this topic down to the relationship between the state and the collective farmers. His is a study of state control and social attitudes based almost exclusively on Soviet sources and refugee data. There is a very short historical introduction, but the kernel of the book consists of an analysis of developments during the Soviet period, and mainly during the post-collectivization phase at that.

In widely divergent fashions and in relation to regions that differ geographically and culturally, both authors examine economic problems of consequence for large segments of the world; for the economically underdeveloped countries because it may be their own future that is described, and for the economically mature countries because their fate may depend on what happens among the "have-nots" of today. The common denominator of these studies is the peasant, or, more broadly, peasant agriculture in transition.

I

The history of production, when viewed from the standpoint of the relation between industry and agriculture, presents some interesting contrasts. One concerns the unit of production. After the Industrial

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Revolution, the factory became in general the optimum unit of production. To be sure, some putting-out systems died only after a bitter struggle, and some survive to this day. Handicrafts are still in evidence in many parts of the world, both in advanced and in backward countries. Basically, however, the mechanized factory has become the acknowledged organ of efficient industrial production in modern society.

Such clear-cut progress has been nowhere present in agriculture. Here, a variety of units of production have operated, and no doubt will continue to operate, with optimum efficiency. In our day we have forms of collective farming, estates, and small private farms, and all of these at various levels of technological development. More important, perhaps, is the fact that no single judgment can be made about the best over-all method of agricultural production. Too much depends upon geography, specific resource endowment, sociological factors, etc. Put tritely but truthfully, the human element has remained more important in agriculture, and this makes for greater diversity.

In the contrast between industry and agriculture there is another, and what seems to me a more significant, dichotomy. The factory is, in a sense, a collective unit of production. In it, workers and machines are placed in a fairly impersonal conjuncture, frequently far removed from the final product. The craftsman, and even the member of a putting-out system, worked in a much more individualistic setting; in contrast to him, the factory worker can certainly be called a member of a collective.

In agriculture, however, a reverse trend has been in effect. Medieval agriculture was collective, technologically and ideologically. The manor functioned as an integrated production unit in such a fashion that economic individualism was almost impossible and, in most cases, would have been harmful to production. The break-up of the medieval economy produced, in the long run, some fairly radical changes in agriculture. Although these may have started as early as the fourteenth century, in Europe some of them were not yet completed by the twentieth century. One of them was the destruction of the agricultural collective. The strips were on their way out and the fields were enclosed; serfdom had declined and the independent farm became the ambition of the peasant.

Thus, in the nineteenth century, when these two trends were in full swing, the divergence between industry and agriculture became more easily observable. One must keep these considerations in mind to see the real connection between the books by Tomasevich and Dinerstein and to appreciate their true meaning. Tomasevich describes the death

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of a feudal system against a background of political instability and lagging industrialization. Dinerstein deals with the Soviet attempt to solve the agricultural problem in a radical fashion to the accompaniment of a speedy industrialization that placed heavy strains on the whole economic system. Perhaps one may summarize the combined lesson that they teach as follows: the breaking-up of a feudal land-tenure system raises severe social and economic problems. Well-planned and acceptable land reform combined with some industrialization is required to smooth the process. The kolkhoz is not a particularly useful device, especially when administered by a state of the Soviet type. Robert Ruark has recently called attention to an African proverb which sums up the theme of both books neatly: "If a man does away with his traditional way of living and throws away his good customs, he had better first make certain that he has something of value to replace them."

II

In the words of Philip Mosely's preface, *Communism and the Russian Peasant* is "a study of the exercise of Soviet controls in social space—in this instance, of control over the peasantry, which constitutes more than one-half of the Soviet population. . . . [it] is a pioneering effort to outline the basic factors in the long struggle in which the party attempts to mold the peasantry to its own demands for total control, while the peasants, even within the narrow limits set by the collective farm system, strive to satisfy their own aspirations" (pp. viii, x).

It is of course no secret that agriculture is the weak spot in the Russian economy. Dinerstein cites some of Khrushchev's and Malenkov's most damaging admissions to drive this point home: "There were 9 million fewer cows in the Soviet Union in 1953 than in 1928. . . . There were half a million fewer cows in 1953 than in 1952. . . . The average milk yield per cow in the Soviet Union was given as 1000 to 1070 kilograms a year. (The American average is a little over 2400 kilograms annually.). . . In some areas every third calf, every second lamb, and every fourth sucking pig perished. These figures showed how unsuccessful collectivization had been in creating efficient agriculture" (p. 131).

Dinerstein examines this general economic crisis as it expresses itself in the relations between the peasantry and the state. He ranges far and wide over this problem, discussing party techniques, attitudes of officials and peasants, kolkhoz organization, MTS brigades, and other

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related topics. In the process, he reaches a series of revealing conclusions. First, the whole Russian collective farm set-up is saturated with what American soldiers used to call "eyewash." Quotas are set in Moscow without regard to the objective possibilities of production, and consequently they are not and cannot be met. This, in turn, leads to general dishonesty and chicanery. Second, nobody is really fooled by the rosy picture that the government draws of the kolkhoz. The people know that life in the kolkhozes is difficult and often miserable and that the chairmen form a corrupt upper class or are helpless candidates for the next purge. Third, there is obviously not sufficient lateral liaison in the system. The MTS, the party organization, and the kolkhoz may all be working at cross-purposes.

Undoubtedly, the most important general conclusion which Dinerstein draws is that the kolkhoz system has failed to supply the necessary incentives for efficient agriculture. He feels that "the Soviet regime has failed in its major task: the peasant is not convinced of the connection between work and reward, and he is not, therefore, inclined to give his all to work on the collective farm" (p. 128). Dinerstein calls lack of incentive to work the major problem of kolkhoz life (p. 40) and sees here the key failure of the regime. Though this conclusion is probably not startling or novel, it strikes at the very rationale of the whole structure. Does the Soviet experience mean, for example, that under modern circumstances the agricultural collective is inherently unworkable; that even if administered by "men of good will" it contains the seeds of its own stagnation?

To speculate on this subject requires a glance at some other agricultural collectives. A recent study by Melford E. Spiro on the Israeli kibbutz provides many instructive comparisons.[1] In this particular form of farming—which, because of its utopian motivation, sets narrow limits to any valid comparison with the kolkhoz—Spiro finds the same important variables but different weights and causalities. He calls economic motivation the most interesting and most crucial aspect of the kibbutz system, especially because the profit motive (at least in the standard Knightian sense) does not operate in the society (p. 83). Although Spiro discerns many weak spots in the kibbutz, lack of incentive for hard work is not one of them; indeed, judging from his account, it would be hard to find more dedicated labor anywhere. What, then, motivates these "peasants"?

[1] Melford E. Spiro, *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956.

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Spiro discovers a number of personal and group motives and incentives (pp. 83ff.). As is the case in a capitalist society, the harder the inhabitant of a kibbutz works, the greater is the economic return that he receives, although the connection between personal effort and return is much less direct. It must also be remembered that most kibbutz farmers have deliberately chosen this way of life. It is one that permits competitive economic pride, for each individual is identified with a particular branch of the kibbutz—the orchard, the wheatfield, the dairy—and satisfaction seems to be derived from the knowledge that one's own branch contributes to the general prosperity. Spiro finds a related personal motive for efficient and productive economic behavior in the fact that labor *per se* is a value ranking high in the culture of the particular kibbutz that he investigated. Lastly, he mentions the not unimportant factor of the security that the kibbutz offers all its members. On the whole, therefore, motivations for hard work seem more than adequate. It may be an informative sidelight that the people of Spiro's kibbutz are ardent admirers of the Soviet Union.

Forgetting for the moment that the kibbutz is a semi-independent farm community in a small country and the kolkhoz is a link in an integrated complex directed from the capital of a very large one, the failure of the latter to supply the necessary incentives may become more apparent if we follow Dinerstein's analysis. Let us look, for example, at the economic return as it relates to an individual's work. Basically, the Russians operate under a complicated piecework system, whereby "Depending on his skill and training, a worker may receive credit of from one-half to two-and-one-half workdays for each calendar day worked" (p. 40). The theory behind the system is pretty plain, but its specific functioning is a different matter. Dinerstein finds that "despite all . . . care and precision the attempt to convert to piecework a system designed for group effort has never run smoothly" (p. 41). "The picture that emerges . . . is one of kolkhoz officials urging on reluctant peasants" (p. 43). Nor should this reluctance be surprising after we read some of Dinerstein's refugee data concerning the leaders who are supposed to make the system work. One refugee described three kolkhoz chairmen in the following manner: "One of these took to drink, another helped himself to funds and got landed in the dock, and the third was a bully who made the air blue with his curses" (p. 53). "There was a fairly widespread feeling," the author added, "that chairmen often use their positions to make life easier for themselves" (*ibid.*). Another informant said, "Usually chairmen lived very

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well. . . . [they had] chicken, vodka, white bread, and candies. . . . the ordinary kolkhoznik could only get [such] things by stealing them" (*ibid.*). In contrast, this is what Spiro has to say about the kolkhoz chairman's counterpart in the kibbutz: "The general manager—the highest elective officer in the kibbutz—is not the social superior of the cleaner of the latrines" (p. 24).

It is clear that the kolkhoz does not reward the Russian peasant with the satisfaction obtained by the kibbutz farmer. Some of these satisfactions the Soviet system cannot provide, but the provision of others is largely a problem of scale. The strength of the kibbutz seems to lie partly in intense local loyalties and good local management with which the centrally controlled kolkhoz cannot compete. It would seem that the Russians might profit from the experience of our own American corporate giants, like General Motors, and explore the advantages of decentralization. Judging from Dinerstein's account, there is no tendency in this direction.

In Spiro's picture of the kibbutz there are three outstanding weaknesses which make for what he labels a crisis situation (pp. 201ff.). These are the problem of private property, the problem of lack of privacy, and the "problem of the woman." The second and third are peculiar to specific kibbutz conditions. The question of private property, however, is another matter. In the kibbutz that Spiro studied this issue arose over the rights of individuals to own items of comfort for personal use: radios, refrigerators, and even clothing. In the kolkhoz economy, dispute over private property has manifested itself mainly in respect to the peasant's private garden plot and was early recognized as a potential weak spot. As Dinerstein says, "The garden plot is the peasant's personal property. Although . . . he invests a great deal of effort in it, he is expected to devote the greatest part of his time to the kolkhoz" (p. 39). In other words, this is a compromise designed to allow the peasants some benefits from private initiative. But what happens in practice? "The most frequent criticism [in the Soviet press] is neglect of collective work on the kolkhoz in favor of concentration on private garden plots . . . . in some cases, the peasants do not work on the kolkhoz property at all; they concentrate only on their garden plots. . . . since garden plots are too small to support a peasant household, there are many reports of kolkhozniks 'who appropriate state lands, and graze their cattle on state lands . . . and remove boundary stones' " (p. 120). It is obvious that in Russia, too, the issue of private incentives vs. collective goals is far from resolved.

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III

It is not the purpose of this review to deal comprehensively with Jozo Tomasevich's book on Yugoslavia. He covers in detail an enormous variety of specialized topics. But it should be pointed out that, unhappily, this is a book without a conclusion. The last chapter, entitled "Agricultural Credit," begins on page 646 and brings the volume to an abrupt halt fifty-six pages later. Various sections of the book contain summarizing passages, but one fails to get a final "wrap-up" or a clear central thesis. This is sad, because of Tomasevich's demonstrated competence for such a task. Yet it would be unfair to call *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* only a "reference work" in the derogatory sense of the term. It is a careful, serious, and interesting piece of research in a relatively unknown and complex area. Gathering facts that can be trusted, and drawing such conclusions as he has, Tomasevich has performed a major service for the non-specialist. It would be well if there were many more books of this kind about other, equally unresearched, countries.

Most of the book is devoted to the interwar period. In one sense, what happened to Yugoslavia during these decades can be demonstrated by quoting from two separate sources. Of the formation of the state, Robert L. Wolff has written: "The new state was more territorially than the most patriotic Serb could have imagined. Great areas of Macedonia, all of Bosnia and Hertsegovina, all the Habsburg South Slav lands except for what had fallen to Italy now came under the jurisdiction of Belgrade. The new Yugoslavia should have been a satisfied state. But the preparation for such growth was inadequate. To the Serbs it appeared that all they now had to do was govern the rest of their compatriots. To the others, it seemed that they had exchanged one form of bondage for another. The future of the new state was to be stormy indeed."[2] Concerning the period of the Axis invasion, Tomasevich has this to say: "When the test came—the invasion of 1941—the whole fabric of the state simply disintegrated. Whole nations and the great bulk of the population, especially the peasantry, apparently felt that the state in the form in which it existed was nothing that belonged to them and thus was not worth fighting for. . . . Yugoslavia was a wreck wallowing in the turbulent seas of a Europe at war, seething with internal revolutionary and counterrevolutionary fires" (p. 261).

[2] *The Balkans in Our Time,* Cambridge, Mass., 1956, p. 99.

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It is the agricultural economic side of this unpleasant story that Tomasevich tries to explain, and some of the reasons for the debacle are very evident. The result of a compromise between many different kinds of fanatic nationalisms, formed out of splinters of two vast decaying empires, completely devoid of the tradition, and hence the possibility, of responsible government, Yugoslavia probably never had a chance until some powerful ideology could create a unified state not only in name but also in fact. So far it would appear that Titoism fills the bill.

According to Tomasevich, the situation at the end of World War I was roughly as follows. Nationalism had formed the state, but "Except for insuring peace and order, and providing for some education and communications, the new state did very little for the peasant, while in terms of his obligations in taxes, in military service, and to a certain extent in forced labor, it represented a heavy burden" (p. 211). He also notes that an important economic structural change was fully accomplished by the beginning of the interwar period: this was the shift to a money economy, or the shift from a subsistence to a more market-oriented economy. Tomasevich fully appreciates the significance of this. He writes: "Capitalism destroyed the social and economic systems that the peasantry had developed through a centuries-old process of adaption, without replacing it with another which would have enabled the peasantry to improve its economic lot. The great mass of the peasant population in these lands remained hanging between the old system, which was destroyed or made impotent, and the new system, which was unable to meet its needs, especially in furnishing it with adequate employment opportunities" (p. 213).

And finally we reach the most important problem of Yugoslavia during the period: "At the bottom of peasant dissatisfaction in all South Slav areas was the worsening land population ratio and thus the growing agricultural overpopulation and the need of the peasantry to seek employment outside of agriculture, partly at home, partly abroad" (p. 215). If Tomasevich has a main point to make, it is that agricultural overpopulation was the major problem faced by modern Yugoslavia, and that the government's inability to cope with this aspect of the economy was in large measure responsible for its more general failures. Since this is a topic of general interest for all economists, and since Tomasevich does his most interesting and original work in dealing with it, I would like to discuss the matter in some detail.

Yugoslavia's population growth in the 1920's and 1930's was the

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highest in Europe, and at the same time its agricultural population was 76.5 per cent of the total, perhaps also a record. This situation resulted in a population density of 140 people per hundred hectares of cultivated land (1931), and may be compared with a density of 116 for Bulgaria, 63 for Germany, and 42 for Denmark. Only Rumania seems to have been in worse shape (p. 309). Of course, Tomasevich realizes that high densities and overpopulation are not the same thing, and that measuring overpopulation is still another matter. If simple marginal productivity calculations were possible, one could solve the problem of measurement with little difficulty. One could certainly assign to the category of "surplus" all those whose marginal productivities were negative, zero, or very small. But this is not possible and Tomasevich instead examines some of the more realistic means of determining agricultural overpopulation.

He enumerates three principal methods for arriving at determinable results. The simplest procedure is "to take a certain number of agricultural population per unit of land as the norm and to consider all excess population as 'surplus' and a country or area in which the agricultural population has surpassed the norm as characterized by a state of overpopulation" (p. 311). The difficulty in this method lies in determining a meaningful norm that is not mechanistic. A second method is "to establish the labor requirements of the existing system of agriculture, thus taking into account both the structure of agricultural production and the prevailing technology, and add the dependent population. Population above this level is then considered 'surplus'" (p. 312). Thirdly, Tomasevich mentions the complicated and sophisticated attempt of Professor Wilbert E. Moore,[3] in which the total value of agricultural production in all European countries is expressed in crop units, and the resulting per capita levels are then compared with the value of the average European production (p. 313). In this manner, a "standard" population may be calculated, as well as the "surplus" proportion, if any. Tomasevich—rightly, I think—discards the last two methods for reasons of statistical prudence. The raw data are simply not reliable enough to warrant such fine manipulation. The results that he achieves with the first method are sufficiently impressive, especially if it is kept in mind that they are probably biased in a downward direction owing to his high norms.

The "surplus" population of the existing agricultural population of all Yugoslavia in 1938 stood at 44 per cent. In some provinces it reached

[3] *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, Geneva, 1945.

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68.1 per cent and in five out of nine it was over 50 per cent (p. 324). Nor is this situation astonishing. Dwarf farms were the rule, the economy was incapable of supplying needed savings for development (it was probably below the "break-even" point in the agricultural sector), and unrest was widespread among the peasantry in spite of the post-1918 agrarian reform, which Tomasevich discusses in detail. There is no reason to believe that the situation described in Yugoslavia is untypical for large parts of the economically backward world. In parts of the Near and Far East, the percentages cited above may even have to be raised. What remedies were available to the Yugoslavs?

Emigration was out of the question, largely because of the restrictive policies of the United States after 1922. Internal colonization was of only minor importance. Employment opportunities outside of agriculture became crucial, but they afforded only a partial solution because "the agricultural population grew much faster than the absorptive power of the urban economy" (p. 311).[4] Another hope might have been birth control, but this too was ineffective among the peasants. There was what Tomasevich calls an impressive growth in the area of cultivated land, but this remedy was defeated by the high rate of population growth and dwarfage continued to spread.

A partial solution might have been the intensification of agricultural production, i.e., a shift to more labor intensive crops or systematic efforts to increase yields. The former is always difficult to effect in a traditional agricultural milieu, and of the latter Tomasevich could find little evidence. One method of adjustment which was employed—and it must be called radical surgery—was to reduce the number of livestock, and thereby to increase somewhat the area of cultivated land. But this method has very little to recommend it and, on the whole, must have had adverse effects. Still another means was urged: an increase in cottage industries, but this would seem a dubious road to salvation in the twentieth century, and it certainly performed no miracles in Yugoslavia.

In going through the above catalog, it becomes clear that there was only one way out: industrialization. Tomasevich's work is concerned primarily with agriculture, but fortunately he deals with the entire economic picture. There was very little industrialization and Yugo-

[4] Tomasevich mentions another factor which limited the role of urban centers and which is typical of underdeveloped areas: most towns were not of economic origin and did not develop on the basis of an agglomeration of industry, as was the case in Western Europe and the United States. Rather, they grew out of ancient and medieval townships and fortresses (pp. 174-75).

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slavia never even reached the "take-off" point of industrial development. It is hard to say where the failure lay; the government did not make impressive efforts, taxes were unjust, import duties were badly managed, and investment capital was mostly foreign and in very short supply. All this, however, is not the main point. Tomasevich's book demonstrates that an intelligent policy of industrialization—a policy that would have absorbed the landless peasants and farmers of dwarf holdings—was the only feasible solution to most of Yugoslavia's problems. It is regrettable that the country did not possess the leadership and unity to carry through such a program, but it is good that we have Tomasevich's book, in which the issues are so well defined.

In summing up my somewhat disjointed thoughts about these two worthwhile studies, it may be of value to return once more to the common denominator, for both Dinerstein and Tomasevich are primarily concerned with the peasant and with agriculture. And one gains greater benefit from reading them in combination than from reading them independently. The fundamental dilemmas with which they deal are different sides of the same coin (although the specific circumstances vary): how to achieve adequate and sustained economic growth in societies with large peasant populations. Tomasevich describes one such society in a transition period without an adequate policy. Dinerstein analyzes the Soviet solution to the problem, which can be labeled an at least partial economic failure and perhaps an even greater moral failure. But this does not obviate the important point that is made by both books: a specific policy is required. The question is what kind is the most fruitful.

On the basis of reading Dinerstein and other books in the same field, one cannot condemn collectivization as such, but one can see where the greatest mistakes have been made and how they might be corrected. In the case of Russia, this would, of course, require changes in the whole Soviet system, which still seems an idle hope. It is not easy, even with hindsight, to put one's finger on Yugoslavia's main troublespot. The outside world did much that made her problems more difficult. One thing can be said, however: if the Yugoslavs had had available the services of, say, a dozen Booker T. Washingtons to advocate education for economic development, their country's economic history might have made more inspiring reading. We are now trying to supply such men through Point Four and, in the long run, this may well be the wisest policy of all.

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ON THE NATURE OF COMMUNIST RULE IN CHINA

By GEORGE E. TAYLOR

Michael Lindsay, *China and the Cold War: A Study in International Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1955, 286 pp. $3.75.

W. W. Rostow, in collaboration with Richard W. Hatch, Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and Alexander Eckstein, *The Prospects for Communist China*, Cambridge, Mass., and New York, The Technology Press of M.I.T. and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1954, 379 pp. $5.00.

Richard L. Walker, *China Under Communism: The First Five Years*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1955, 403 pp. $4.50.

THE Communist regime on the mainland of China has already survived for six years. During this time it has behaved in such a way as to create the impression abroad that it is in full control of the mainland, has the support of the Chinese people, is engaged on long-range projects for economic and social betterment, and is a military power to be reckoned with in Asia. Diplomatic successes at conferences in Geneva and Bandung and the official visits of Chou En-lai to Asian capitals have tended to create the impression of Communist China's acceptability and even leadership among Asian nations. The hundreds of visitors from many countries who have been taken on guided tours of the mainland and the books which have been written by Indian, British, and other journalists, even when critical, have tended to build up the impression that whatever its faults and its problems, here is a regime which has come to stay. Coexistence with the Communist world can be had for the asking, it is suggested, if we are prepared to accept differences in ideology. To withhold recognition and a "just" and "rightful" place in the United Nations from such a government and to keep an embargo on trade with it is to fly in the face of good sense and to strangle an enormous potential commerce. Much of the world would have us believe that to give support to Chiang Kai-shek is quixotic, unprofitable, and a danger to the peace.

A regime which has been recognized by the Soviet bloc of nations, the United Kingdom, the Asiatic members of the British Commonwealth, and several other powers is in a strong position. We can expect the pressure for admission of Communist China to the United Nations to increase during the coming year and the offer of a bargain over

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the status of the National Government on Formosa—a trusteeship, two Chinas, a plebiscite after ten or fifteen years—to become more and more tempting to those powers whose prestige, unlike that of the United States, is not involved in the matter of supporting Nationalist China. More and more, the United States, assuming that it continues its present policies, will be made to appear as the only serious obstacle to peace in the Pacific.

In view of such considerations, the course of wisdom is to examine with more than usual care the validity of our assumptions about the nature of Communist states and, in particular, about Communist China. For such a task there is no lack of material. Much of it is provided by the Communists themselves in their newspapers and magazines and in their public statements. A considerable amount of this material is carefully reproduced and analyzed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. There are plenty of refugees from the Communist mainland and a continual stream of short-term Chinese visitors who cross and recross the Kowloon border with the consent of both the British and the Communist authorities. There is a small library of books written by journalists, hardly any of whom have seen China before, who have spent varying periods of time in the cities and factories that lie on the guided tour. There are the brainwashed captives, mostly American, who have recently been released as a result of negotiations, on the ambassadorial level, between the United States and Red China in Geneva.

On the basis of facts now available, it is clear that the Chinese people have already paid a terrible price for whatever changes have been brought about by the Communists. In the words of Richard L. Walker, who in *China Under Communism* has written the most comprehensive scholarly account of contemporary China that we have to date, the Peking regime is "based on war, not peace. According to the statements of the top Chinese Communist leaders, warfare—class, civil, and international—has been a key factor in all of the major achievements to date. This is one characteristic of Communist China which is unlikely to change, for war and violence pervade what is rapidly becoming the everyday language, the new education, and the whole philosophy of the nation" (pp. 322-23). For a state of this sort, peaceful coexistence is merely a tactical device in preparation for the inevitable struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist world. The civil war still continues, the war between the people and the government. Over a million and a half peasants died in the year of violence, 1951, when the land reform measures were pushed with calculated

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brutality throughout most of the mainland. Many more millions, estimated at twenty million in figures quoted by W. W. Rostow, died in the purge of so-called counter-revolutionary enemies of the people. To this very day we have the word of Peking and of local officials that thousands are being liquidated in what seems to be an unending purge of common people and party officials.

It would be difficult to disagree with Mr. Walker that Communist rule has been based on deceit and dishonesty or that no standards of truth are observed apart from the needs of the class struggle. Mr. Walker proves his case by pointing to obvious illustrations of broken promises. There are the peasants who were promised their land and were made to join the Communist cadres in wholesale bloodshed to get it, only to find that it was soon to be taken away from them. The movement for collectivizing the farms began almost as soon as the land was parceled out. There are the workers who were promised the leadership of the revolution only to find themselves working longer hours for low wages without the right to strike or to organize themselves under their own freely elected leaders. There are the intellectuals who were promised an important place in the new China and have since been publicly humiliated and brainwashed. There are the leaders of small political parties who were at first given high, if powerless, positions in the "coalition" government only to be discarded as soon as their usefulness had been exhausted and the Communists were strong enough to do without their support. The evidence is endless. Nor does it indicate a temporary digression, a forgivable maneuvering in the process of social progress. Deceit and betrayal are part of the system and characterize the relations between individuals as well as between the Communist Party as a whole and the society it dominates.

In *China and the Cold War*, Michael Lindsay looks at the same problem from a slightly different angle but comes up with roughly the same conclusions. His approach is more personal. These are the reflections of a man who once took a more favorable view of the Chinese Communists, with whom he lived and worked during the war and whom he visited afterwards with the Attlee mission. The change that has taken place, argues Lindsay, is not in his own approach or method of evaluation but in the Communists themselves. The fact that he does not prove this point is not very important, because he does succeed, in this remarkable book, in bringing out the differences between the Marxist-Leninist system and the philosophical implications of the scientific approach.

The problem, says Lindsay, is to determine which of two hypotheses

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fits the facts. One hypothesis is that the Communists are acting rationally but are not sincere in saying that they want peace and the well-being of the Chinese people. The other hypothesis is that they are sincere in saying that they are working for peace and for the interests of the Chinese people but operate in a psychopathic state of emotional and intellectual confusion which makes them incapable of acting rationally to attain these objectives. Lindsay inclines to the second hypothesis, giving as an example the behavior of the Peking regime toward a Britain which has afforded recognition and adequately demonstrated a desire to come to terms. He argues that the Chinese Communist leaders were probably subjectively sincere in wanting peace and in wanting Sino-British friendship but that they acted in such a way as to obstruct these objectives because of the irrationality that comes from faith in the dogmatic Communist system. The Chinese Communists, says Lindsay, reject empiricism. Thus they can be subjectively sincere in denouncing imperialism while giving uncritical support to the Soviet Union, which is obviously guilty, on the basis of empirical evidence, of imperialism. Lindsay feels that the Chinese Communists cannot be said both to want peace and to be acting in ways that are likely to promote it. But if we accept the Communist definition of peace as world conquest, what is so irrational about their method of achieving this objective?

The view that the Communists are acting rationally and are motivated by a desire to secure world power is apparently accepted by W. W. Rostow. This hypothesis explains all the twists and turns of Communist policy, the "doublethink" and the peace movements, as functionally rational steps toward the expansion of Communist power. Mr. Rostow's examination of American policy in relation to the Moscow-Peking axis in *The Prospects for Communist China* is based on a vast amount of political and sociological literature. The problem of policy is judged in the light of all the considerations which confront the policymaker in Washington, but also from the point of view of the scholar. The book is meant to be an example of what the social sciences can contribute to the formulation of national policy, if they are properly exploited.

The analysis proceeds on the assumption that practically everything is relevant to the consideration of policy, which is true enough, and one could wish that Mr. Rostow's conceptual scheme for the policymaker might be more commonly operative than is the case. For all intents and purposes, it is quite safe to proceed on the assumption, as Mr. Rostow does, that the Communists act rationally in pursuit of an

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over-all objective, the indefinite extension of Communist power. But while it is safe for the time being to base policy-making on this assumption, it would be even safer to look on the assumption as an hypothesis to be continually re-examined. The view that is taken of Communist motivation affects every aspect of political analysis. One of Mr. Rostow's most important conclusions, for example, is that in Communist China ideological indoctrination will diminish not so much in scale as in function, that the regime will come to rely increasingly on competent technicians and tough administrators, disciplined in executing orders, and without excessive concern for the relations of their actions to Communist theory or ideology. While the slogans of Marx-Lenin-Stalin-Mao will undoubtedly be retained, they are likely to become increasingly a *pro forma* background to actions and motives quite divorced from them. Such a picture of the Chinese Communists and of the relation between action and ideology is very generally accepted. The Communists are pictured as ruthless, power-hungry men who will eventually make their adjustment to the rest of the world in terms of their capacity to retain the power base on the Chinese mainland which they have so hardly won. Even their allegiance to Moscow will be weighed in the balance, if Moscow is on the losing side, against the prospects of survival offered by coming to terms with Moscow's enemies. Peking's leaders, says Rostow, have a strong sense of history; they will "press their interests coolly and ruthlessly by political schisms and weaknesses" (p. 313); they are confident, united, ambitious, and committed to the use of totalitarian techniques. Such men seem to be essentially rational, even if they have preposterous ambitions and employ objectionable techniques of social control (which appear, however, to work). When faced with overwhelming odds they will retreat, when presented with opportunities they will seize them. They see the future in long-range terms and plan for mankind. Such may be the correct picture, but how do we know?

Lindsay points out that the theory that communism is a conspiracy for world power does not explain the motivation of individual Communists—who certainly do not admit that they are motivated by a desire for power for its own sake. The claim that many join the party for altruistic reasons is certainly supported by the thousands who have left it. But what of the suggestion that it is only in the higher ranks of the party that the conspiracy for world power flourishes? Mr. Lindsay says that such a theory implies an almost superhuman skill in deception among the higher ranks of the party organization. This is a real objection. There is plenty of evidence to show that the highest

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Communists are neither very skillful nor always intelligent; Stalin certainly committed blunders on a colossal scale. The Communist system is one which brings to the top the ruthless party-machine type, the man of crude animal cunning, not the sophisticated intellectual capable of understanding the attitudes of free men. Walker's analysis brings out the importance of psychological controls in Communist China—a new dimension of power, as he aptly calls it—but the crudity of the Communist approach can hardly be exaggerated. In a rough sort of way the controls work, but only because they are crude and based on the use of violence. The superman theory is implausible, but it is the working theory of many American commentators, who always signal a Soviet retreat as a tactical maneuver, never an unwilling and reluctant admission of defeat, and always imply that no American diplomat, however good his case, could possibly win anything in negotiations with Communists. It is also hard to apply the superman theory because of the difficulty of drawing the line between dupes and conspirators. If the Chinese people and many party members are the dupes of Mao and his immediate colleagues, are they themselves then dupes of Bulganin or Malenkov or whoever happens to be at the top?

Lindsay suggests that perhaps the simple and obvious explanation—that Communists really believe in the system they profess to believe in—is the correct one. And if religion is defined as an "emotionally charged faith in a system of beliefs which claims to give a satisfying account of the nature of the world and man's place and duties in it, then Communism is a religion" (p. 73). Like any other system of faith, it has its hypocrisy and its cynics, but it has a life of its own even when its leaders have abandoned it.

From our point of view, Lindsay admits, there is little difference in the immediate threat from communism motivated by faith in the Marx-Lenin system and communism motivated by a desire for world power. But which view of it we take makes a considerable difference to our estimate of Communist strength and our long-range plans on how to deal with Communists and Communist states. Those who hold that the drive for power as such, and for its own sake, is paramount in communism will overemphasize the military aspects of the threat and the reaction. Those who see communism as motivated by faith in the Marx-Lenin system will not underestimate the need for military preparations in the Free World but will understand that the philosophical question of what men believe may well be the end of the matter. They will see more danger in the current Chou En-lai line, to the effect that ideological differences are not important, than will the military or the

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businessman. It makes good sense from the Communist point of view to de-emphasize ideology abroad (not at home) at a time when the nations of the Free World have learned quite a lot about the real nature of communism and have made some progress toward the development of a common body of ideals.

The degree to which Communists have faith in their system of ideas varies a great deal. They certainly go to immense lengths to rewrite history in order to establish the infallibility of the party, the most dangerous article of their belief and incidentally the main threat to world peace. The orthodox Communist has to reconcile so many contradictions that he must, on most occasions, refuse to accept empirical evidence. Such a system of thought is one of the least stable in the world today; it is as brittle as the societies it produces. Walker and Lindsay both leave with the reader the strong impression that the Chinese Communists are not popular with the Chinese people and that the system is such that it will increase rather than decrease the tensions in the society. The fact that 70 per cent of the Chinese prisoners of war in Korea refused to return home is only one factual illustration of this point. There is plenty of evidence that the Chinese people would prefer almost anyone else to Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues, but they are in no position to do anything about it unless the military and police power of the regime is broken. We would be in sad straits indeed if this were not true, if communism were a lovable and stable institution.

The weakness of the Chinese Communist system, its instability and inner tensions, are the source of its greatest danger. This is the danger of rash action by men who are no cleverer than others but who have faith in an irrational system and are therefore likely to act on the basis of inadequate information and warped judgment. If the Chinese Communists were nothing more nor less than power-hungry men who used the Marx-Lenin system with cynical skill purely for propaganda purposes, the problem would be very much simpler because they would be easy to buy or bribe. But if we accept them as true believers (allowing for hypocrites and for a general lessening of fervor as bureaucracy increases), then anything can happen, because they are not open to agreement on commonly accepted goals.

The most damaging impact we can have on the Chinese Communists is on their system of belief. The evidence presented in these three very different books demonstrates that we are dealing with an unstable and dangerous group of men who believe in a system that will never be compatible with peaceful coexistence. We should do nothing to assist

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them in achieving their objectives either internally or externally. Any alternative to them would be an improvement. To recognize Communist China and bring her into the United Nations would be to increase the megalomaniacal tendencies of the rulers. Why assist men whose announced ambition it is to destroy the Free World? The armies of the National Government may not compare with those of Peking, but it is very damaging to Peking for us to protect areas in which Chinese can live and think in comparative freedom. The Chinese Communists should always be treated as if they were the temporary, unstable rulers of a conquered people whom they do not fully control, whose allegiance they cannot count upon, and whose independence they have seriously compromised. For that, apparently, is the situation.

The article by Otto Kirchheimer entitled "West German Trade Unions," in the July 1956 issue of *World Politics* (Vol. VIII, No. 4), was based on a study prepared by the author for The RAND Corporation as part of that organization's broader study of German attitudes toward foreign policy.

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